Argentina's congress began to debate June 30 an export tax that has thrown the country into repeated chaos since it was enacted in March. July 1 press reports indicate that congressional leaders are pushing for a set of subsidies to small farmers in an attempt to offset the damaging impact of the export taxes on agricultural goods — the export taxes have led to crippling national strikes. The farmers have accused the government of using the proposal to split the farmers camp, but the greater danger is that such a policy will further damage an already-stuttering economy. Politically, splitting the farmers by offering handouts to poor, small-scale farmers while taxing large, richer farmers would be an astute move by the Argentine government. If the government can rupture the political cohesion of the farmers' organizations, it may be able to prevent wide-scale strikes and demonstrations. However, any political peace would only mask deeper economic damage. Fundamentally, the problem is this: The large-scale producers are the ones capable of sustaining the agriculture industry in Argentina. By continuing to levy export taxes on the large producers, Argentina will be confronting the issue as if it were a purely political problem. But the fact remains that the export taxes, in combination with price caps at home, have rendered agricultural companies unable to make a profit on their products. The net impact of crippling the agriculture industry has the potential not only to threaten food production in Argentina but also to severely hinder Argentina's overall economic performance. Argentina's agriculture industry is one of the most productive on the world market, and agriculture accounts for approximately 55 percent of Argentina's exports and about 8 percent of Argentine gross domestic product. A combination of the farmers' strikes, shifts in regulatory regimes and export bans and tariffs have stifled Argentina's ability to export its goods since President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner came into power. The impact of these policies can be seen in data released in May indicating that Argentina's trade surplus has dropped by 23 percent year-on-year –- partially because exports have fallen (the export of agricultural processed and raw goods fell 16 percent), but mostly because domestic demand is increasingly being met by imports (imports shot up by 47 percent). For now, high global prices of agriculture goods are mitigating the impact of these developments; however, with any slackening of food price growth, coupled with deteriorating investments in the agriculture industry, the long-term outlook is not good. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the Argentine government can really afford to be pursuing these kinds of major subsidy programs. Argentina has become overcommitted to populist policies, and the toll is becoming evident. The government is going deeper into debt, in a haphazard way reminiscent of the conditions preceding the 2001 debt default. The tax on Argentine agriculture exports was partially designed to rein in the industry by discouraging the production of goods meant for export. The secondary goal is the redistribution of income to poorer demographics that form Fernandez's support base. Although the outcome of the congressional debates is not yet clear — and the congress could continue debating the issue indefinitely — the politically expedient solution in this case will not at all address the fundamental problems plaguing the Argentine economy. If the solution to the farmer dispute is "more of the same" kinds of policies, Argentina may find itself completely overburdened with populist commitments, facing a national crisis in its most basic industry: food.