The European Council approved an initiative known as the "Eastern Partnership" on June 20, which is set to become the main foreign policy conduit for relations between Brussels and Europe's eastern periphery. The details of the plan will crystallize by March 2009. The main thrust of the initiative is to create a forum to forge closer political and economic links between the European Union and Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and, potentially, Belarus. Poland is in charge of the initiative, with Sweden in a close supporting role and Germany providing strong moral support. The proposal is rather vague at the moment, but will involve some level of multilateral cooperation between Brussels and the Eastern European countries, with regular meetings between leaders, cultural exchanges and, possibly, some form of a visa regime relaxation. None of this will shake Europe's foreign policy establishment to the core, nor really do anything of note that is already not under way on a bilateral level. The proposal is not so much aimed at what it can do for Eastern Europe, however, as what it can do for the EU foreign policy generally and the orientation of European development aid in particular. The initiative is most certainly a Polish-German counter to the Mediterranean Union proposed by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, approved — albeit in a far more limited version — in March. Germany initially opposed the French initiative because it was too broad, too ambitious and too French. Paris' original initiative proposed nine different agencies and even a bank for the Mediterranean Union, all closely watched by the French, naturally. It would also have diverted most EU development aid to the Mediterranean basin, where German politicians privately felt Brussels would be underwriting a resurgence of French colonial ambitions. The Eastern Partnership is therefore an attempt by Germany and Poland to restore balance to how the European Union deals with its neighbors and potential future EU members (although most countries covered by both initiatives have next to no chance of EU membership in the next decade or two). Poland crafted the proposal and brought Sweden in because it felt the European Union would not take their initiative seriously without the backing of a more-established member state. Warsaw's decision was sound, because the European Union in fact would not have allowed just Poland to shape EU policy for dealing with its Eastern European neighbors, some of which remain firmly within the Russian sphere. Poland is staunchly anti-Russian due to recent history, but also because of straightforward competing economic interests in their shared neighborhood. Since competition with Moscow is thus the mainstay of Polish foreign policy, Moscow is understandably not pleased with Warsaw's leadership over this initiative. As it happens, Polish interests on this matter mesh well with EU interests: Brussels also wants to isolate Russia and continue to chip away at Moscow's periphery. (In contrast to the Polish proposal, French interests in the Mediterranean do not align so neatly with EU interests.) Many Kremlin heavyweights already have spoken against this meddling in Russia's sphere, and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev may speak out against it when he meets his Belarusian counterpart in the next few days. While Sweden is a neutral country the Russians can deal with, its inclusion is probably not going to do much to assuage Russian fears that the European Union will use Poland to barge into what Russia considers its realm of influence. But Sweden's inclusion will assuage EU fears that Poland will become overly enthusiastic about the Eastern Partnership and draw Brussels into a diplomatic war with Russia that the European Union does not want. As it is, Poland is a handy tool for the European Union, allowing Brussels to play a sort of good cop/bad cop routine with Russia: While Poland aggressively challenges Moscow in Russia's western periphery, Brussels can appear more reasonable, blaming any serious spats with Russia on Poland’s zeal. But to make sure things do not get too out of hand, Sweden will act as a chaperone and watch that the Poles play within bounds the European Union is comfortable with. The European Union definitely wants to challenge Russia in the region, and a Polish-Swedish partnership offers just the right balance of enthusiasm for going toe-to-toe with Moscow (the Polish contribution) and diplomatic acumen (the Swedish contribution) to work. The proposal provides a strong indication of how Brussels intends to conduct its foreign policy for the time being. The proposed Lisbon Treaty was supposed to change the EU policy of handing off specific foreign-policy portfolios to member states, such as the French initiative with the Mediterranean or the Lithuanian initiative with Kaliningrad. The original Neighborhood Policy, now sliced into different geographical proposals, was supposed to be Brussels’ domain. The proposed new high representative for foreign affairs — essentially a permanent foreign minister — was intended to give current head EU diplomat Javier Solana the institutional support and, more important, the authority to take on such specific initiatives. With the Lisbon Treaty on ice for the time being, we should expect to see the European Union continue to outsource these initiatives to member states. While that may solve institutional problems and streamline policymaking, it also will hinder the European Union from presenting a strong front. This could become especially important when facing down Russia in the countries listed in the Eastern Partnership.