Editor’s Note: This is the final part in a four-part series on the rebuilding of a key al Qaeda node in Somalia. Thus far, the United States has limited its involvement in Somalia to tactical airstrikes with cruise missiles and AC-130 gunships — both standoff weapons systems — and naval interdiction operations along the Somalian coastline. There have been U.S. Special Forces and CIA paramilitary operations on the ground in Somalia, but these have been more intelligence-gathering operations than direct-strike operations (the operatives quietly locate targets for other resources to strike). However, the United States certainly has recognized the need to be involved directly in Somalia. U.S. forces have established a central base of operations at Camp Lemonier — a former French Foreign Legion base in Djibouti — where most U.S. air operations originate. Furthermore, the United States has established numerous forward operating bases within Ethiopia to support U.S. air operations in the region. FREE PODCAST It is likely that the United States' involvement will increase in Somalia, due to the growing presence of al Qaeda-linked militants — namely al Shabaab — and partly due to the increase in maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. For now, the United States seems content with providing support to Ethiopian operations, and any growth would be in the form of air, naval or Special Forces assets. However, regardless of any increase, Somalia is likely to remain on the periphery of the war against Islamist militants, with Iraq and Afghanistan remaining at the forefront for the time being. This is not to say that the situation in Somalia is not a concern for U.S. military planners; rather, at this point, there is little more that can be done without a sizable shift in U.S. forces' presence in the region.

The Outlook for al Shabaab

If this situation plays out as STRATFOR sees it, the link between al Shabaab and al Qaeda might strengthen over time, and the flow of weapons, explosives and jihadists through Yemen, Eritrea and elsewhere might continue, but al Shabaab is not likely to drastically increase in size or strength in the long run. Up to this point, the combination of Ethiopian and pro-government forces and limited U.S. action has not defeated the insurgency, though it has managed to keep them slightly off balance; at the same time, the insurgents have not defeated the Ethiopians or the Somalian government the Ethiopians are backing. If history is any indication, al Shabaab and the local al Qaeda nodes will fade away over time. Al Qaeda nodes in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, the Sinai and the Philippines have risen up in the past, only to be dismantled and reduced to a much lesser level by government crackdowns aided by international assistance from countries such as the United States. However, it is important to note that Somalia has a different dynamic. Jihadist movements have the potential to thrive where there is chaos — as in Afghanistan and the Pakistani border areas — but do not do as well in countries with a strong central government. Because of the vacuum of state power in Somalia, al Shabaab has an opportunity to thrive. Eventually, increased U.S. and Ethiopian operations — especially with increased intelligence gathering and sharing — will take their toll on al Shabaab and destabilize the group's core command and control structure, weakening its operational capabilities. However, al Shabaab does pose a very real threat. Without continued counterterrorism efforts — in combination with efforts to stabilize Somalia and establish a strong central authority — al Shabaab could help re-establish al Qaeda's foothold in East Africa and create serious security issues both in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa.