Editor’s Note: This is the third in a four-part series on the rebuilding of a key al Qaeda node in Somalia. With the recent increase in al Qaeda activity in Yemen and the flow of fighters out of Iraq partially directed toward Yemen, it is likely that the country will see an influx of jihadists in the near future. Yemen is currently a relatively safe location for al Qaeda fighters' operations. But, for a multitude of reasons, the security dynamic there is likely to change as their attacks continue and pressure upon the government to act increases. Given Somalia's history as a critical al Qaeda bridgehead into East Africa and its proximity to Yemen — a mere 100 nautical miles from the Yemeni coast — Somalia provides a plausible release for any jihadist influx. Its lack of a strong central authority, coupled with its porous borders and the presence of al Qaeda-affiliated groups, makes it a logical destination for these al Qaeda fighters if Yemen increases its internal security and begins to carry out counterterrorism operations. Over the past couple of years al Shabaab and the Somalian insurgents have been trying to advance their cause by portraying Somalia as a central theater in the "war against the infidels." In this manner, they have been trying to attract material support and foreign fighters. Up to now, most al Qaeda-linked militants have traveled to Iraq, a more traditional battleground for al Qaeda, where cells are already in place. But as U.S. operations in Iraq have progressed, it has become more difficult for the jihadists to conduct operations as successful and effective as in the past. Therefore, some of these fighters likely will begin flowing out of Iraq in search of another cause and insurgency to support. This especially holds true if the fighters are not welcomed back by their home governments or are persecuted when they return home and need to relocate. This same dynamic occurred after the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and many Islamist militants who found themselves unwelcome at home took up the struggle in such out-of-the-way places as Chechnya and Bosnia. There was also a large segment of the displaced jihadist population that had no problem returning to their respective homelands but rather chose to continue fighting on their own accord and traveled in search of worthy causes elsewhere. In such cases, a country with a chaotic environment and a chance to wage a jihad, like Somalia, could appear attractive. In fact, recent reports suggest that the flow of foreign fighters into Somalia has been steadily increasing in the past few months. While this is a long-term outlook, in the short term, as the link between al Shabaab and al Qaeda strengthens, there likely will be a shift in al Shabaab's operational doctrine. Even with the limited and unsophisticated tactical doctrine the group employs at this time, al Shabaab has been able to inflict heavy casualties among the Ethiopian forces, similar to al Qaeda’s operations against U.S. forces in Iraq. While the Somalian militants currently rely on small-unit assaults of villages and checkpoints and the occasional bombing of soft military targets, as al Qaeda's influence grows stronger, al Shabaab is very likely to begin adopting a tactical doctrine similar to one associated with an al Qaeda-affiliated group, marking the difference between an insurgency and terrorism. The new doctrine likely will include an increased dependence on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle-borne IEDs as well a more directed campaign aimed at the military and civil infrastructure in and around Somalia. Iraq-style guerrilla attacks, including roadside bombs targeting Ethiopian forces, have already increased in Somalia as al Shabaab has begun to adjust its tactics. Although Somalians have traditionally been averse to the use of suicide tactics — as was previously the case in Algeria and with the Taliban — it is possible that, with an influx of foreign, al Qaeda-linked fighters, this tactic will begin to take hold among al Shabaab members much like it eventually did among the Taliban and jihadist groups in Pakistan.

Somalia's Place in the Jihadist Movement

As previously stated, al Shabaab has been proactive in its attempts to promote its cause and attract material support by trying to portray Somalia as a central theater in the jihadist movement. While it certainly has been one of the more active — and operationally effective — nodes outside of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, al Shabaab has yet to reach the point where Somalia would warrant being considered a central theater. This is for cultural and geographic reasons as much as anything. In many ways, Iraq is considered a critical and historical part of the Muslim world. Somalia, on the other hand, is considered Muslim territory but is seen as a place on the periphery, and not at the heart of the Islamic world. In the broader context of the jihadist movement, al Shabaab is an up-and-coming local node, and Somalia remains a secondary theater of operations. However, with the beginning of the foreign jihadist flight from Iraq and increased support from al Qaeda sympathizers elsewhere, al Shabaab has been provided the opportunity to transform Somalia into a central theater, much like Bosnia and Chechnya became central theaters for jihadist militants when opportunities to fight elsewhere evaporated. One factor that could forward al Shabaab's cause would be an increased U.S. presence, which would in turn give the Somalian militants the opportunity to directly strike U.S. forces. If Somalia provided an opportunity for jihadists to strike directly at U.S. forces, Somalia would likely see an even greater influx of support from abroad, possibly propelling Somalia — a former "backwater" — into the forefront of the jihadist movement, alongside the likes of Afghanistan and Iraq. Next: A look at Somalia in the context of the war against Islamist militants