Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr is prepared to disband his Mehdi Army militia if the An Najaf-based Iraqi clerical leadership instructs him to, senior al-Sadr aide Hassan Zargani told Reuters on April 7. Zargani added that al-Sadr has asked his offices in An Najaf and the Iranian seminary town of Qom to form a delegation to visit the Iraqi Hawza led by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to discuss the disbandment issue. Earlier in the day, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told CNN that al-Sadr's movement will be ineligible to run in provincial elections in the fall if the movement's leadership does not dissolve the militia. On April 5, the Iraqi government's Political Council of National Security — which includes al-Maliki, President Jalal Talabani and the heads of political blocs in parliament — issued a 15-point statement calling on all political forces to disband their militias as a prerequisite to partaking in the provincial elections. However, the Iraqi government — alone or with U.S. support — is in no position to force al-Sadr's movement to change its ways. Washington's demand that Tehran help defang the Mehdi Army has been prominent in U.S.-Iranian negotiations on Iraq. Al-Sadr's March 31 move to cooperate with Baghdad on security matters and the April 7 announcement about the possible disbanding of the Mehdi Army are the result of Iranian involvement (it is no coincidence that al-Sadr has involved his office in Qom in starting the disbandment process). The decline of al-Sadr's control over both the political and military wings of his movement has also played a key role, but the Iraqi government's apparent ability to dictate terms to al-Sadr and his forthwith compliance is largely the result of Iran using its influence. The Iranians did not just decide to help end Shiite militia activity in Iraq for altruistic reasons. They have made a strategic decision that in order to be able to substantively advance the negotiations with the United States and hence consolidate their influence in Iraq, they need an intra-Shia social contract. Iran realizes that the Iraqi Shiite militias' usefulness has not only approached zero, it is now in negative territory, as intra-Shia conflicts are hurting Tehran's bottom line. The Iranians know they are not likely to get many more concessions by waving the militant card at the United States. Tehran's best bet now is to bring order to the Shiite chaos and move toward penultimate-level discussions with the United States on Iraq. Getting al-Sadr to give up business as usual and play by the rules entailed some guarantees to the maverick soon-to-be cleric. The Iranians and their principal Shiite allies have agreed to recognize al-Sadr's role in Iraq's political mainstream. This is why the provincial elections will be critical; al-Sadr wants to be able to turn his social capital into political power in the Shiite south. Despite al-Sadr's talk of preferring the power of the ballot over that of bullets, there are a number of reasons why Iraqi Shiadom is not about to be cleansed of gun-toting militants. First, Iran is ready to make a dash to the finish line in terms of Iraqi stability but it is unlikely to cross it just yet. Iran still needs to work out a deal with the United States on the amount of power Iraq's Sunnis will have. Furthermore, because of other issues — such as the U.S. presence in Iraq and the weapons the United States will give the Iraqi state — Iran wants to retain the threat of creating havoc. Iran is also considering more than Iraq; it is considering the nuclear issue and the situation in Lebanon. This is why the Iranians are moving toward a fourth round of talks with the Americans on Iraq but also announcing upgrades to Iran's uranium enrichment capabilities. Tehran is also closely watching the Israeli military exercises and how they threaten its interests in the Levant. Second and more importantly is the reality of the Mehdi Army and the Iraqi Shiite political landscape. Unlike the Badr Brigade — the former militia of al-Sadr's main rival, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) led by Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim — the Mehdi Army is an incoherent band of highly radical and undisciplined fighters. Like the Kurdish peshmergas' absorption into the security forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi central government, the Badr Brigade was largely — and relatively painlessly — transformed into a political group called the Badr Organization after its members were inducted into the Iraqi security forces mostly during 2004 and 2005. The Badr Brigade, like its parent entity the ISCI, was created in Iran during the days of the Baathist regime and developed into a sophisticated force. The Mehdi Army emerged in Iraq under far less ideal conditions. Therefore, it will not be easy (even for Iran) to fold the Mehdi Army into a political entity or even get its rank and file incorporated into Iraqi security forces. Finally, the Iraqi Shia have historically been a divided lot and it is unlikely that groups like ISCI and the al-Sadrite movement will reach a compromise anytime soon. With the Iraqi state still mostly on paper, these two groups will likely not agree to disagree. This could upset Iranian calculations even after al-Sadr's statement that he is work in progress for quite some time.