Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said April 4 that his security forces would stop arresting militiamen (a reference to the Mehdi Army of Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr) if they give up their weapons. A day earlier, al-Sadr encouraged his followers to protest the U.S. occupation by participating in a million-strong march April 9, the five-year anniversary of the fall of Baghdad. The move comes after al-Sadr's March 31 order to his militiamen to stand down across the country and "cooperate with the government to achieve security." Meanwhile, al-Maliki said that security operations similar to the one conducted in Basra could be repeated in other areas, including the al-Sadr strongholds of Baghdad's Shula and Sadr City districts. Al-Sadr's decision to pursue legal political action while al-Maliki's administration is pressing ahead with security operations to establish control over areas that thus far have been under al-Sadrite militia control showcases the massive change under way in the al-Sadrite movement's approach. These changes, however, are not limited to procedural matters; instead, the al-Sadrites are undergoing a substantive shift. Not only is the group willing to engage in the politics of accommodation with the Iraqi government — dominated by its main rival, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) led by Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim — it is also moving toward appropriating the objectives of his opponents. Al-Sadr's behavioral shifts are the culmination of efforts on Iran's part to rein him in. After years of exploiting the al-Sadrite movement as a spoiler card against the United States, Iran started working about a year ago to temper al-Sadr and his movement. It started with al-Sadr going to Iran to resume his seminary studies. Shortly thereafter, he agreed to a truce and moved to transform the Mehdi Army from a purely paramilitary entity into a political organization along the lines of the Badr Organization (the ISCI's armed wing). Tehran’s efforts are now in a critical phase in which the Iranians have been able to press al-Sadr into adopting their plans. After having long and bitterly opposed the federalism project championed by al-Hakim's ISCI, al-Sadr is now signaling that he is willing to accept it. In a March 29 interview with Al Jazeera, al-Sadr said that if federalism does not involve dividing Iraq, "it is fine," and that the occupation hinders federalism because "as long as there is occupation in Iraq, federalism will constitute the partitioning of the country, even if it is centralized ... if there was no occupation, my answer would be different. Then there would be room for discussion." This statement represents a massive shift in the al-Sadrite position on the subject and has significant geopolitical implications, especially in terms of Iranian influence in Iraq. An autonomous Shiite federal zone in the south, along the lines of the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq, would go a long way in allowing Iran to consolidate its influence in Iraq. But given the opposition from the al-Sadrite movement, the Iranians and their principal proxy, the ISCI, have not been able to make much headway so far. Al-Sadr realizes that, ultimately, his is a Shiite movement, and the sectarian polarization that is now a regionwide phenomenon necessitates the creation of a federal zone that will work to the Iraqi Shia's advantage. Furthermore, his competition is with other Shiite groups and not the Sunnis or the Kurds, and his grass-roots movement at the local level in the Shiite south could do well in a federal zone. These considerations have likely brought a balance between his Arab/Iraqi nationalist leanings and his Shiite/Islamist identity. Obviously, given the conditional support for the idea, much work will have to be done to get al-Sadr to fully align himself with the project. Here is where the Iranians will have to work very hard to establish an intra-Shia power-sharing mechanism, mostly by getting the ISCI and the al-Sadrite movement to work with one another. Al-Sadr's moves toward mainstream politics will have to be rewarded with a share of the Iraqi power structure, which will take time. Furthermore, the al-Sadrite movement is fraught with internal contradictions and is thus still unstable. Therefore, it is unclear whether the al-Sadrite movement can successfully make the transformation and whether the Shiite community can forge an internal social contract. But it goes without saying that an Iraqi Shiite landscape moving toward a consensus will give Iran an edge in its dealings with Washington. Furthermore, the Sunnis — who up until now were happy to see that al-Sadr opposes federalism — will find themselves sandwiched between the Shia and Kurds. This issue highlights the structural problem with post-Baathist Iraq, where a reduction in intracommunal tensions leads to an increase in intercommunal struggles.