Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao appealed March 30 for the Dalai Lama to intervene in Tibet to end the unrest in the capital, Lhasa. Wen, speaking from Laos ahead of the opening of the third Greater Mekong Subregion summit, also reiterated his position on talks with the Dalai Lama, saying “the door is always open . . . provided he gives up his position on independence and recognizes Tibet and Taiwan are inseparable parts of Chinese territory." MEMBERS-ONLY PODCAST Wen’s statements suggest Beijing is shifting to more nuanced tactics in dealing with the Dalai Lama and the unrest in Tibet. Whereas the government has been portraying the Dalai Lama as a political troublemaker — and the key instigator of the Tibetan riots — it now is putting the onus of solving the problem on the man himself. Banking on his inability to end the continuing riots in China, especially from exile overseas, Beijing is demonstrating his lack of control over Tibetans in China — and hence his lack of legitimacy as their leader. Indeed, by noting that the violence has gained momentum independent of the Dalai Lama and his pacifist symbolism around the world, Beijing can portray him as an ineffective figure who lacks control over the emerging Tibetan factions that preach violence and even “terrorism.” Instead of directly blaming the Dalai Lama, Beijing now is putting the blame directly on those Tibetan groups that are behind the violence. More fundamentally, Beijing is sending the message that support for the Dalai Lama does not have to translate to support for the more violent Tibetan groups — both inside and outside China. Furthermore, by appealing to the Dalai Lama for help, Beijing is not aiming to tap his influence over Tibetan elements in China, but to make it harder for the Tibetan diaspora to further paint the Chinese regime as unwilling to listen to international reason. Meanwhile, Beijing’s control over security in Tibet is getting stronger, not weaker. In reality, the Dalai Lama's ability to influence events in Tibet is diminishing. He has issued appeals before, with no result. Sources now say the recent series of riots that began March 14 was the result of a struggle for supremacy among various Tibetan groups that consider the Dalai Lama unable to deal with the unrest. Domestically, this move could cost Beijing some marginal internal political points in that it could make the leadership look weak, though the military/security fist that Beijing has applied to this problem since the start should give it some room to maneuver. Moreover, by placing a condition on its offer of a dialogue with the Dalai Lama, the Chinese leadership is setting him up for failure. The timing and location of Wen’s latest appeal — at an international development convention in Laos covered by foreign media — indicate it is designed more to manage foreign relations than to address internal security concerns. By making simultaneous support of the Dalai Lama and condemnation of Tibetan violence an option, the Chinese leadership is pre-empting an expected rise in political pressure against Beijing as the Dalai Lama meets world leaders in the coming weeks. Disparate activist groups, such as those focused on the crisis in Darfur, Sudan, already are joining forces to pressure Beijing for political change. As these groups further synchronize rallies, news conferences and other events, we can expect Beijing’s strategy for dealing with the Tibet issue to become increasingly nuanced and active abroad.