Foreign and defense ministers from every member of NATO are meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, on Feb. 7-8 to discuss the alliance's policy and future. The meeting will set the groundwork for the April 2-4 heads of government summit in Bucharest, Romania Compared with previous gatherings, there is little disagreement as to the alliance's strategic direction or the core issues facing the West's premier political-military institution. But that does not mean its path is obvious. After the Cold War, a dominant question that regularly confronted the alliance was simply "whither NATO?" The alliance had been forged in the early days of the Cold War to deter — and if necessary, to fend off — a Soviet attack. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the legitimate question emerged of whether the alliance was needed anymore. In retrospect, NATO easily survived the test. Even with governments in Berlin and Paris less than thrilled with the United States, even with the Soviet threat gone, even with the Clinton administration's domestic preoccupations, and even with the agony of Bosnia making NATO members question the alliance's utility, the alliance still managed to summon up sufficient dynamism and purpose to adjust its mission and find new reasons to be. In the strategic environment of 2008, there is no serious discussion about the "end of NATO." Far from it. There is a broad agreement within the alliance not only about its continued existence, but also about the broad strategic questions that it must wrestle with. What is missing is agreement on what is to be done about those questions.
- The topic of the day is Kosovo. NATO wants to see Kosovar independence as the next step in tamping down Balkan chaos, bringing the added benefit of embarrassing the Russians. But even the alliance members pushing hardest for an independent Kosovo are not willing to bleed for the territory, especially if conflict would trigger a broader confrontation with Moscow. The question is how to stall on Kosovo while retaining the flexibility to sneak independence through at a time of Russian weakness without exposing cracks in the alliance.
- Afghanistan is an issue that bridges the short and long terms. NATO has now had forces there for six years, yielding many lessons that need to be applied to broader alliance policy. But parallel to the learn-apply-improve process endemic to any successful organization, the Afghan mission is nowhere near complete. Though there is strategic agreement that Afghanistan is a necessary mission, there is no consensus as to how the alliance can better manage its operations in that conflict.
- The debate over how to function more effectively comes down to command and control. NATO members recognize that the combination of "coalition of the willing operations" allows for action and dynamism even when the alliance is not of one mind. The trick is unifying command structures to reduce diplomatic drag and make military deployments more versatile. That requires whittling away at the ability of individual members to restrict the rules of engagement — and even the geographic deployment — of their forces. While sound in theory, in practice there are few issues more politically thorny.
- Counterterrorism is more than just the trendy topic of the year, and will remain a core concern of NATO even if something like 9/11 never happens again. But rationalizing a force structure designed to fight a world war on the plains of Europe with a desire to combat terrorism is a task that will take years of transformation. And before that can happen, the nitty-gritty of separating terrorism from rebellion, defining areas of interest, and debating what actions are allowed to NATO forces must be debated and decided.
- There is the issue of expansion. NATO, unlike the European Union, is always on the lookout for new members. But the alliance does not want to bite off more than it can chew. Croatia might be the only country likely to get an invitation to join in April, but the alliance is ever more deeply engaging all of the remaining Balkan states not already in the fold. There also is the possibility of including Ukraine and Georgia, two states on which NATO cannot make a decision until the alliance decides how to deal with Russia itself.
- Speaking of Russia itself, the Kremlin's increasing bellicosity and financial wherewithal have provided the strategic glue necessary to reunify minds across the alliance. The Western Europe-Central Europe split that manifested as recently as 2003 is now largely gone so far as NATO is concerned, and even non-NATO European states such as Austria and Finland have coordinated more closely with alliance activities, largely out of concern of a Russian resurgence. The alliance agrees that it must resist Russian advances, but the details as to how firmly and whether to push back (and if so, where) remain elusive.
