Amid growing domestic food supply concerns, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez threatened Jan. 20 to nationalize farms and milk processors that refuse to supply the domestic market. He also threatened to nationalize banks that do not give enough low-interest loans to farmers. Although Chavez frequently lashes out at business interests, his Jan. 20 threats carry significant weight, since the food supply problem is fuelling an increasingly organized opposition and hampering his efforts to get his socialist agenda back on track. Chavez has been battling politically damaging shortages of basic foods, such as meat, milk and eggs. These shortages contributed to Chavez's defeat in the Dec. 2, 2007, election (which would have intensified his socialist revolution, had he won) because they affect his main constituency — the poor, who make up about 35 percent of Chavez's "hardcore" supporters, thanks to expanded social programs and generous handouts. Widespread price controls have prompted the shortages as producers sell their products on the black market or look for more lucrative markets abroad. Food imports have only partially offset the shortages, but even more irritating for Chavez, they limit his foreign policy independence — especially with Colombia, which provides 30 percent of Venezuela's food (and which plans to limit Chavez's future participation in hostage release negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The milk problem is particularly acute; the Finance Ministry has said that less than 10 percent of milk demand and less than 40 percent of demand for nine other staples is being met. This has prompted Chavez to raise prices in order to alleviate supply concerns, but the price increase is not likely to solve the shortage problems completely. Chavez will now monitor the situation closely; if shortages continue or intensify, he might move forward with limited farm and milk plant nationalizations. Using the military for such actions, however, would be unpopular and excessively risky for Chavez, given his waning popularity. Chavez might reason that the political cost of nationalizing a few "bourgeois" farms and milk plants is minimal compared with the benefits of re-establishing his popularity among the poor. It is a risky gamble for Chavez, however; Venezuela faces growing economic imbalances, including spiraling inflation, lack of basic service delivery and other product shortages. These developments are likely to strengthen opposition to Chavez within the "third pole" — people who are becoming increasingly disillusioned with Chavez but are reluctant to join a formal opposition group. Farmers, although not demographically a large group, could become another influential group that grows more vocally critical of Chavez and further strengthens the opposition. The banking sector has so far avoided direct confrontation with Chavez, and it is likely to comply with Chavez's demands, given that it has profited from other Chavez policies, such as the reselling of Argentine debt in the domestic market. Challengers to the Venezuelan president, including student groups and politicians, will quietly attempt to shore up their growing influence and will look forward to this year's regional elections as a venue for handing Chavez another defeat.