The Indian navy has refused to take delivery of the refitted INS Sindhuvijay, a Russian-built Kilo-class (Project 877) submarine that has been in service with the Indian navy since 1990. Citing six consecutive failures of the Club cruise missile (known to NATO as the SS-N-27 “Sizzler”) in test firings in late 2007, New Delhi has recalled the 50-man crew scheduled to return the ship to India from a dockyard near St. Petersburg. This marks another addition to tensions between Russia and India. Though this refusal is not, in and of itself, enough to meaningfully alter either Indian military readiness or New Delhi's relations with the Kremlin, relations between the countries are already tense over the long-troubled conversion of the former Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov. Taken as a whole, India's medium-term naval strategy and the future of Indian naval aviation rely heavily on the fate of the Gorshkov. The delay of the Kilo refit is less unsettling to the foundation of New Delhi's future naval plans — except for its contribution to India's comfort level with continued reliance on Moscow. The catch is that much of the defense hardware India purchases from Russia simply cannot be had anywhere else. A British carrier or two might be coming up for sale late in the next decade, but India is looking to expand beyond Harrier jump jets to larger, more capable fixed wing aircraft. Meanwhile, a collaborative effort on a fifth-generation fighter is already under way. The lead boat of the Scorpene class under construction in Cherbourg, France. In one sense, submarines are a different story. New Delhi already has signed a deal to buy six (currently ordered, but with options for up to 15) new French Scorpene-class submarines, which could eventually include an option for air-independent propulsion (AIP) on later boats. But Russia's new Amur-950 design could be a compelling argument for sticking with Russia; its 10 vertical launch tubes could prove a good match with India's BrahMos cruise and anti-ship missile (which, unlike the Club, is too wide to be fired from standard torpedo tubes). Though India has been firm in the case of the Sindhuvijay by recalling the crew, the underlying alignment between Moscow and New Delhi is far from snapping. India has too much to gain, even if Russia does prove unable to deliver on time or of passable quality. Nevertheless, these delays and disputes continue coming at a bad time, as India is looking to expand its foreign collaboration on defense and acquire some 126 multi-role combat aircraft and is in the midst of high-level defense talks with the United States. Washington is not about to sell India an aircraft carrier or its newest stealth aircraft. But Moscow is no doubt falling in New Delhi's esteem. And in the globalized economy, the price of such esteem is future business. Russia will sooner or later find that these failures will cost it valuable defense contracts in India and beyond.