Iranian national security chief Ali Larijani has resigned, a spokesman for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Oct. 20. Saeed Jalili, a deputy foreign minister for European and American affairs, is set to replace Larijani as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and continue negotiations with the West over the country's controversial nuclear program. The resignation comes just days after a scathing criticism of the government's nuclear policy from Larijani's predecessor, Hassan Rowhani, who currently serves as one of two representatives of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the SNSC and is a member of the country's most powerful political institution, the Assembly of Experts (AoE). Conflict between Ahmadinejad and Larijani has been brewing for months. The media tend to portray their differences as a battle of personalities — simply the friction between two rival government officials struggling for supremacy to advance their preferred policy options. But the rivalry goes much deeper; it symbolizes a fault line that runs right through the Iranian establishment over how to pursue the country's goals with respect to Iraq and the nuclear program. Russian President Vladimir Putin's Oct. 18 visit to Tehran, during which he offered the Iranians security guarantees in exchange for concessions on the nuclear issue, seems to have further aggravated these tensions. The pragmatic conservatives — led by Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, chairman of both the AoE and the Expediency Council — are likely leaning toward accepting the Kremlin's offer, while Ahmadinejad and his ultraconservative camp oppose any settlement that places a cap on nuclear development. This infighting has emerged onto the public scene in the form of Larijani's resignation, which clearly indicates a sharp divide within the regime. Khamenei's sympathies are with the pragmatists but, as in the past, he is trying to gain consensus. Larijani's successor, Jalili, is likely a placeholder (like Gholam Hossein Nozari, who is serving as acting oil minister) chosen to maintain the status quo until consensus can be reached between the rival conservative factions. There is growing opposition to Ahmadinejad in the ruling circles, but Khamenei does not wish to remove him through an extra-procedural measure, especially with elections — when Ahmadinejad could be purged constitutionally — only six months away. As for Larijani, this is not the end of him; he will likely stage a comeback at some point. In the meantime, Moscow's offer has sparked an internal crisis that comes at an especially bad time for the Iranians. They are in the crucial stages not only of nuclear negotiations with the West, but also (and more importantly) of talks with the United States on the future of Iraq. This crisis weakens Tehran in the context of both sets of negotiations, and it provides Washington an opportunity to gain an edge in the struggle over Iraq.