The United States is considering blacklisting Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. The Bush administration has said it is not yet certain whether the designation will apply to the entire IRGC or just to part of it. If such a label is imposed, it will be the first time the U.S. State Department has designated part of a nation's military as a terrorist group. On one level, this is the kind of thing only diplomats take seriously. First, Iran as a whole already has been designated as part of the "Axis of Evil." Is being a terrorist beyond evil? Second, the purpose of this designation is to impose sanctions against an organization. In this case, the organization is part of a country that already has sanctions against it. The problem is that major powers are paying little attention to these sanctions. The Russians and Chinese certainly show no signs of being prepared to increase pressure on Iran, and there are plenty of European countries — not to mention individual companies — prepared to do business there regardless of sanctions. The problem with this designation is that it is an exercise in impotence and undermines the entire process of designating groups as terrorists. First off, the Iranians won't care. Second, it is hard to imagine anyone changing their position because of this designation. It's not like a country will say, "Well, we were prepared to trade with Iran, but now that you've designated the IRGC as a terrorist group, we won't." And even more to the point, there will be many in Europe, as well as in Russia, who will believe the United States is preparing the case for a strike against Iran and will increase pressure on Washington — not on Tehran. It is not productive, and could in fact prove counterproductive. Given that we see the weaknesses of such a move, you can assume Washington does too. So why threaten it? Remember the one thing that is rarely discussed in Washington, the ongoing talks with Iran in Baghdad? Obviously, in any negotiation, each side is looking for levers with which to frighten and motivate the other. Washington's struggle in these negotiations is to get the Iranians worried about the United States. The country is bogged down in Iraq and has no military force capable of invading Iran, but it does have air and naval power with which to strike. There has been discussion of Iranian training camps for terrorists under IRGC control. The designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization could set the stage for U.S. airstrikes. It can be safely assumed that the Iranians would not like to be bombed. On that premise, the designation of a terrorist organization on their territory would open the door to the United States bombing their military. And that would, we assume, help motivate the Iranians to be more forthcoming during the next round of talks over whatever it is the sides are arguing about at this point. There are a few issues. First, it is not clear U.S. President George W. Bush has the domestic political support to launch such attacks. Second, it is not clear what these attacks would achieve. Air campaigns are notoriously unreliable in bringing about regime change. Washington could undoubtedly blow up some barracks, but it is difficult to imagine the Iranians would give away fundamental interests in Iraq to avoid airstrikes. Larger-scale strikes are possible, but it is hard to say what they would be intended to achieve. On a spectrum from bombing a base to carrying out regime change — where the first is insufficient and the second impossible — what lies in between? Iran could be hurt by a few airstrikes, but this is a country that fought a war against Iraq and suffered a million casualties. The math doesn't add up. Still, you never know what the other side is thinking. Designating an organization as a terrorist group costs nothing, risks little and might well give the United States some psychological leverage. Assuming this isn't simply Washington gas on a slow August day, and that someone actually thinks this designation matters, we likely are seeing a U.S. attempt to gain leverage in a complex negotiation process. But never discount Washington gas as an explanation.