The latest session of the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear ambitions wrapped up Feb. 13 with a new agreement laying out next steps for the dismantlement of Pyongyang's nuclear program. The agreement, in short, sets a 60-day timeline for North Korea to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear plant (including the reprocessing facilities) and for the United States, China, Russia and South Korea to supply the equivalent of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (which could include food or other types of aid as well). Japan has bowed out of supporting the initial tranche of aid for domestic reasons. Unlike the Sept. 19, 2005, Joint Statement, the new agreement sets out some concrete steps toward the ultimate goal of the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear capability, including the listing by North Korea of its nuclear sites and the establishment of separate working groups to discuss energy aid and the normalization of relations among North Korea, Japan and the United States. Specifics aside, this new deal changes the tenor of negotiations with North Korea from this point forward. It institutionalizes the process and removes some of the individual "spoilers" from the broader group negotiations, thus taking what has been a crisis management issue and changing it into a diplomatic engagement on security, political and economic issues. The Feb. 13 agreement begins by referring to, but not repeating, the goal of the Sept. 15 Joint Statement, which says, "The six parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the six-party talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner." The new agreement is based on this and a reference to the promise to supply energy to North Korea as stated in the Sept. 15 statement. But this agreement goes several steps beyond the September statement, requiring all parties to take actions within 60 days in order to demonstrate a commitment to the process. Rather than one side making a gesture and the other following, each of these steps is set to begin (or, in some cases, be completed) within 60 days: 1. North Korea shuts down the Yongbyon facility, including the reprocessing unit, and invites International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors back to the site. 2. North Korea begins discussing the list of all of its nuclear programs. 3. North Korea and the United States restart the process of normalizing relations. Washington takes steps to remove sanctions imposed under the Trading with the Enemy Act and begins removing North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. 4. North Korea and Japan resume talks aimed at normalizing relations. 5. The five parties aside from North Korea agree to supply energy and economic aid to North Korea, with an emergency shipment of the equivalent of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to take place within the 60-day window. This 60-day window requires actions of each party while not requiring any party to be seen as making a bilateral concession to another. This might be semantics, but it eliminates the tit-for-tat battle over who has to blink first. To ensure that the process moves forward, the six parties have agreed to meet again in 30 days. Perhaps more important than this initial commitment phase is the establishment of five working groups that will address certain side issues. These are part of the six-party process, but operate separately from the broader talks, keeping some of the bilateral spoilers of the multilateral forum off to the side while allowing smaller focused groups the ability to work out contentious details before bringing them to the higher-level six-party talks. The five working groups are: a bilateral U.S.-North Korean group on the normalization of relations, a bilateral Japanese-North Korean group on the normalization of relations, a Russian-led group on the development of a "Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism," a South Korean-led group on economy and energy cooperation, and a group (likely led by China) on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. By hiving these off, issues like Japan's ongoing spat with North Korea over the kidnapping of Japanese citizens in the past can be dealt with separately and thus not undermine the broader progress or movement on other issues. It also makes each of the five parties (aside from North Korea) responsible for a section of the broader picture. China retains control over the overall process (and ultimately, if there is going to be future progress, China will be critical for verification). Russia gains a role in East Asia as a moderator among China, Japan and the United States, while South Korea gains additional influence over the development of economic and energy infrastructure in North Korea — a critical step in the path toward eventual unification. In some sense, this weakens the North Korean bargaining position, as in the past it could sink all progress by blaming it on a single party. But Pyongyang gains the institutionalization of the six-party process. The new framework takes this out of the "crisis management" basket and places it on the level of routine diplomatic management. North Korea gains the permanent attention and ear of the various players, remains the central issue in the region and thus achieves its goal in its nuclear program — economic and energy support and regime survival. This marks a substantive shift in the overall nuclear negotiations with North Korea. Though the ultimate goal remains the "verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," there is now an acceptance of the North Korean regime as a viable negotiating partner, as something to engage rather than something to punish and contain. That brings North Korea to the table not just as a threat to be dealt with, but as a dialogue partner — a major shift in how the United States views the North Korean situation. In some sense, this repeats the pattern of U.S.-North Korean relations under the government of former U.S. President Bill Clinton, which started out extremely acrimonious and ended with direct diplomatic engagement. The groundwork is being laid for a similar path with North Korea, though this time without any required timelines (like the 2004 Agreed Framework) to constrain the dialogue with an all-or-nothing requirement. Instead, this is an open-ended agreement. If progress is not made, North Korea gets no further assistance (at least assuming all parties follow the agreement). If Pyongyang cooperates, it gets more energy and economic aid and political recognition. In institutionalizing the dialogue, the North Korean nuclear issue now moves into the realm of the routine. That does not mean all problems are resolved. It does not address the earlier demands by the KEDO consortium that North Korea repay the debt for KEDO's construction work on the never-completed light-water nuclear reactors as part of the 2004 Agreed Framework. Nor does it make explicit reference to North Korea's nuclear weapons (though it does mention identifying the location/status of plutonium extracted from fuel rods, so that could include the nuclear devices). And it does not set solid dates or mechanisms for verifiable denuclearization. It leaves these issues for the working groups and the broader six-party talks in the future. Though there are many unanswered questions, there is now action by all parties to move out of crisis mode and into the diplomatic (and some would say bureaucratic) mode. For Washington, this offers some evidence of a foreign policy "victory," or at least a demonstration of foreign policy without the use of force. For North Korea, it once again shows that Pyongyang's nuclear program is and continues to be a bargaining tool, rather than an offensive tool. For Seoul, this is a vindication of the engagement policy, and lays the groundwork for greater economic and energy development in North Korea and between the two Koreas, building up the North in preparation for future unification. For Russia, this marks a return to the broader issues of East Asian security. For Japan, it is a way to continue to hound North Korea on the abduction issue as long as domestic politics require it, all without facing pressure from the United States to back down. And for China, Beijing once again plays the central role in the denuclearization and regional proliferation issues, retaining leverage needed for dealing with the United States. In 30 days, the parties will meet again to check progress. There is always room for one or more parties simply to refuse to comply, and many pitfalls lie ahead — but the sense of crisis is fading, and the routinization setting in.