A lone gunman fired a Kalashnikov assault rifle at the U.S. Embassy in the Yemeni capital of Sanaa early Dec. 5 before being shot by Yemeni security guards and taken into custody. Although some 85 rounds were exchanged, damage to the embassy was light and no one other than the gunman was injured. Yemen is known as a base of jihadist activity, but the incident most likely was not part of an orchestrated assault against the embassy by al Qaeda or other jihadist group. To say that firearms are plentiful in Yemen would be an understatement. Rifles, pistols and even machine guns and rocket launchers are readily available at arms markets just outside of Sanaa, suggesting this could have been the work of anyone with a complaint against the embassy or the United States in general. Moreover, because the gunman appeared to have acted alone and the attack was minor is scope, it is unlikely that it was carried out by an al Qaeda cell or other jihadist group. Al Qaeda favors large, coordinated attacks that are designed to cause maximum damage or casualties, such as the nearly simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, or the failed attack against an oil facility in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia, in 2006. Al Qaeda has favored soft targets recently, but it does have a demonstrable operational history of attacks against diplomatic targets. However, in hitting an embassy — especially an Inman facility — al Qaeda would not just send in a single gunman with an assault rifle. The U.S. Embassy in Sanaa is an Inman building, meaning its architecture includes security features recommended by a commission chaired by former Deputy CIA Director Adm. Bobby Inman following the 1983 attacks in Beirut, Lebanon. The embassy's outer security, which is the responsibility of Yemeni security forces, is not very formidable, however. People and vehicles are able to go up to the embassy walls without being challenged by the Yemeni guards, though the sensitive parts of the installation are well back from the walls, and security inside the compound, which includes metal detectors and U.S. Marine guards, is tighter. 
Although the attack is not significant by itself, jihadist activity in Yemen has increased recently. In September, two simultaneous but unsuccessful attempts to attack oil facilities occurred in the northeast province of Marib and the Dubba Port in Hadhramaut province. Sources in Yemen report that four factors are leading to the increase in jihadist activity. First, because of its strategic position, Yemen is a hub for jihadists transiting to and from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. Second, Yemen's intelligence service is heavily influenced by Salafist and jihadist elements. Third, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh relies on certain radical Islamist political figures for his own political health. Finally, Yemen's system of tribal alliances often allows local militants to avoid prosecution because they are considered the responsibility of their tribe. This attack could have been perpetrated by anyone with a gripe against the United States — and could inspire copycats. Although Yemen remains an active theater for jihadist operations, the incident most likely was not the work of a jihadist group.
