Arab satellite news network Al Jazeera and an Islamist Web site aired previously unseen footage Sept. 7 of Osama bin Laden and other high-ranking al Qaeda leaders apparently planning the 9/11 attacks. The video, like most other recent ones of al Qaeda leaders, was produced by the jihadist network's As-Sahab media branch, the fairly new organization behind the network's latest media blitz. In fact, banner ads appearing on extremist Web sites claim the video is a trailer for an upcoming As-Sahab documentary on the 9/11 attacks. In the absence of major attacks, As-Sahab has become al Qaeda prime's only means of making a strategic impact on the world outside of the Afghan-Pakistani border region. As-Sahab, which means "cloud" in Arabic, is a fitting name for a company whose operations are both fluid and nebulous. Videos of al Qaeda No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri and other leaders must be shot wherever the al Qaeda personalities happen to be, whether a remote location in rural Pakistan, Iraq or Egypt. Because of security concerns and the lack of high-speed Internet access in these places, the raw footage probably is not uploaded to the Internet from where it is shot, but rather is physically transported to a second location where these facilities are available. From there, the video is physically carried or is sent digitally to As-Sahab's post-production facility, where it is edited and the graphics, subtitles and backgrounds are added. The completed videos are then uploaded onto various Web sites and the address is published in Internet forums, where sympathizers copy and further distribute the video files. This direct distribution allows the group to get its entire message out, rather than just the portions aired by Al Jazeera and other news outlets. Moreover, by going through As-Sahab, al Qaeda can consolidate its media releases under one banner, which allows for better coordination and uniformity of content. The quality of As-Sahab's videos indicates they are produced with modern equipment — possibly low-end professional hardware — by competent technicians. The productions now display many of the features common in professional media productions, such as standardized logos, digitally inserted backgrounds and subtitles, often in English. The use of the Internet to post statements from the al Qaeda leadership represents a change from the network's old way of getting its messages to market. In the past, al Qaeda used the dead-drop method, having couriers leave videotapes or audiotapes to be picked up by Al Jazeera. The network's switch to the Internet in 2005, around the time As-Sahab began to release al Qaeda's videos, has enhanced its operational security by eliminating a trail for intelligence and law enforcement to follow back to the group's inner circle. This trail probably led U.S. intelligence to the January al Qaeda meeting in Damadola, Pakistan. That intelligence resulted in the U.S. missile attack on the site. The intelligence collection and planning for that attack likely began before al Qaeda began using the Internet to release its statements. Because of As-Sahab's direct access to the group's core leadership, its camera operators and technicians probably are among the network's most trusted members. (Al Qaeda itself used operatives posing as journalists to assassinate Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud on the eve of the 9/11 attacks, and would not want to see that tactic used against its leaders.) One of the militants killed in the Damadola strike was Abdul al-Maghribi, believed to be al-Zawahiri's son-in-law and al Qaeda's communications director, possibly the head of As-Sahab. Because it is al Qaeda's only reliable and regularly effective method of interacting with the outside world, As-Sahab is critically important to the core leadership. Now that the operational security weaknesses that led to the Damadola strike have been addressed, al Qaeda can be expected to continue its media blitz with more frequent and professionally produced videos.
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