The Israeli air force (IAF) has not been nearly as successful in its strikes against Hezbollah rocket launchers as Israel had hoped. This has been made evident in the past week not only by the heavy rocket barrages against northern Israel but also by Hezbollah tactics that have emerged in its fight against Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Israel's response time to rocket launches is reportedly around two minutes. Hezbollah has figured this out and has been using several tactics to avoid follow-on attacks by Israeli aircraft and artillery. Some launchers have been rigged with remotes or are physically triggered by a Hezbollah fighter with a scooter, who will approach a previously prepared launcher and move away at high speed. These tactics are probably used with more rudimentary launchers for smaller Katyusha rockets. Larger Fajr rockets require larger, heavier launchers that are often vehicle-mounted. Hezbollah has reportedly been using dummy launchers in some cases that emit a false heat signature. They set up the dummy launcher next to the real launcher and immediately withdraw the real launcher after firing. In many cases, the IAF has apparently been engaging the decoys left behind. The unabated barrages of Hezbollah rockets day after day attest to the failure of the IAF to eliminate launchers effectively. As the ground fight intensifies, an even bigger issue for IDF will be anti-tank missiles. In an interview Aug. 10, a retired Israeli general insisted that Hezbollah's anti-tank weapons were new Russian technology modified and improved in Iran, calling them the "best in the world." While that may be something of an exaggeration, there is no doubt that these weapons have been effective. Half of Israeli combat casualties have been tank crewmen. In a statement Aug. 9, Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah insisted that Hezbollah had destroyed 60 Israeli Merkava tanks. The IDF acknowledged only 30 tanks destroyed or seriously disabled. Nevertheless, this is not a minor accomplishment for Hezbollah. Exact figures are not available, but often only one or two crew members are reported killed when an Israeli tank is hit (the Merkava has a crew of four). This suggests that, while Hezbollah is effectively engaging the Merkavas in a military sense — taking them out of the fight and requiring IDF to dedicate substantial tactical resources to retrieving the tank and crew — the tank is not undergoing a catastrophic penetration. If this turns out to be the case, then one important purpose of the Merkava design — to save the crew — may have been achieved. Nevertheless, as IDF moves into the next phase of the offensive, the challenges it will confront from Hezbollah will be substantial. Both sides have demonstrated their ability to adapt and persevere. In engagements along the border, in some instances, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish these two sides by their tactics. Israeli troops have begun to adopt Hezbollah guerilla tactics — emplacing snipers, engaging and quickly withdrawing, etc. Israel and Hezbollah will both continue to refine their procedures in the next phase of operations.