The U.S. military and the Iraqi government said June 8 that al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike in the village of Hibhib, five miles north of Baqubah in Iraq's Diyala province, northeast of Baghdad. Al-Zarqawi's death is a very significant event. This alone will not have a dramatic impact on the immediate security situation in Iraq, but it can be seen as an indication of a possible change in the political situation there, which will in turn result in a change in the security situation. Al Qaeda in Iraq's primary goal has been to create an environment of chaos, which is required for it to operate in the country. A major part of this strategy has been to instigate a sectarian civil war by attacking Shiite civilian and religious targets. Al-Zarqawi's removal from the scene will not change the jihadists' strategy. However, most estimates place the number of foreign jihadists operating in Iraq between 800 and 1,000 at any given time — a mere fraction of the overall insurgency, which is estimated to be 15,000 to 20,000 strong. Iraqi nationalists, who make up the bulk of the insurgency, tend to favor targets such as reconstruction projects and energy and petroleum export infrastructure. The death of a jihadist leader like al-Zarqawi is not likely to have a significant effect on the nationalist insurgents' operations. Furthermore, al-Zarqawi was only one among many actors — including other jihadists, Sunni and Shiite nationalist groups and various criminal gangs — participating in the violence in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi, who was born in Jordan, was even demoted in April; Iraqi insurgent leaders moved him down to a military commander position after he made "mistakes," replacing him with an Iraqi, Abdullah bin Rashed al-Baghdadi. Thus, al-Zarqawi's importance — though not his notoriety — was diminished. The United States announced that intelligence from within the foreign jihadist network led to the attack that killed al-Zarqawi. If this is true, the only immediate effect his death will have on the security situation is that al Qaeda attacks might decrease as the group searches for the internal leak and shores up its operational security. However, there have been recent indications that Sunni tolerance of and cooperation with foreign jihadists in Iraq is diminishing. If the Sunni community led U.S. intelligence to al-Zarqawi, it could very well be an indication of political progress that, if it continues, will eventually stabilize Iraq and mitigate the security threat. Also, if Iraqi Sunni leaders betrayed al-Zarqawi, the U.S. announcement that the leak came from within the foreign jihadist network would serve two purposes. First, even if the report is false, the announcement could spread doubt, suspicion and confusion among the jihadist ranks. Second, it could provide cover for the Sunni leaders who gave the U.S. the information leading to al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi's death comes at a potentially pivotal time in Iraq, with the formation of a new government and increased Sunni participation in the political process. These factors, rather than al-Zarqawi's demise, will have a direct effect on security in the country.