The April 24 attack against the Egyptian resort of Dahab on the Gulf of Aqaba was similar to attacks in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt; Bali, Indonesia; and Amman, Jordan, in that several bombs detonated in close proximity within a short time frame. This approach was inspired by al Qaeda, whose signature tactic is staging multiple, near-simultaneous attacks. The Dahab attackers, however, also capitalized on other successful tactics now shared by militants around the globe. These latest bombings appear to follow a trend in militant attacks against tourist targets witnessed since the November 2005 Bali bombing: the use of smaller improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to get closer to the target. This tactic was seen in Amman as well, and is likely meant to counter on-site security at hotels and the use of vehicle barriers, which has made it difficult for attackers to get truck bombs close enough to cause serious casualties. This increased security is the result of the attacks in Indonesia, Jordan and, more specifically, Sharm el-Sheikh and Taba in Egypt. Unlike the other recent attacks in Egypt, however, the Taba bombings in October 2004 took place in different locations spaced over two hours.
Another emerging trend — also a response to increased security at some Western-owned hotel chains — is the shift away from hitting the well-protected hotels and focusing on other, even softer, targets such as restaurants and hotels that lack either the money or the will to take serious security precautions. In the October 2005 Bali bombing, the attackers bypassed the large chain hotels entirely in favor of restaurants off of hotel property. In that attack, bombers wearing suicide vests stood in the middle of crowded dining rooms and detonated their devices, killing at least 26 people and wounding more than 100. The next month, however, similar tactics were used against hotels in Amman, causing significant casualties. The effectiveness of on-site security was seen in the Sharm el-Sheikh bombings, when two of the three bombers were forced to detonate against secondary targets, perhaps causing fewer casualties than they had hoped for at hotels. Only the attack against Sharm el-Sheikh's Ghazala Gardens Hotel, which lacked vehicle barriers, caused significant casualties when a suicide bomber succeeded in crashing a truck into the hotel lobby. In Amman, the quick response by a Days Inn security guard caused the bomber to leave the building — and detonate his suicide vest outside. This undoubtedly saved many lives. In contrast, the bomber at the SAS Radisson succeeded in penetrating the building, exploding in the midst of a wedding reception, causing a high casualty count.
According to Egyptian officials, the IEDs used in the Dahab attack were relatively small — reportedly composed of gunpowder and packed with nails for shrapnel — like the IEDs used in the more recent Bali bombing. This is consistent with a trend of using smaller, less-complex IEDs with less destructive force but still able to cause high casualties against soft targets. All of these trends could indicate that militant groups as far apart as Indonesia and the Middle East are learning from one another, either by exchanging information on tactics, techniques and procedures — possibly using vehicles such as jihadist chat rooms on the Internet. Then, too, they all could simply be watching international news broadcasts to analyze what tactical innovations worked in other attacks.
Given that Dahab was Egypt's third attack in 18 months, whichever group is responsible probably still has functioning cells out there, meaning the Egyptians have failed to disrupt the group's operations despite mass arrests following the first two attacks. Furthermore, over this time period, the Egyptians might have thwarted other attacks, or militants aborted attack plans for other reasons. In other words, the actual level of militant activity in Egypt could be even higher.
