The crisis between Ukraine and Russia built over New Year's Day, then took a twist on Monday. Having failed to come to an agreement on a price hike for natural gas, the Russians, as they had promised, decided to cut supplies to Ukraine. In a demonstration that geography really does matter, cutting supplies to Ukraine is impossible without also reducing supplies to Russia's Western European customers — including Germany, which gets 30 percent of its natural gas from Russia through the Ukrainian pipelines. On Jan. 1, the Russians started making good on their threat and began to reduce the pressure in their pipeline. This immediately started affecting Europe, which reported reduced flows of gas — and that in the middle of winter. The Russians claimed that they were providing Europe with all the natural gas they needed, but that the Ukrainians were illegally siphoning off natural gas for their own use. The Ukrainians rejected this charge, claiming that they were using their own reserves plus supplies coming in from Turkmenistan — supplies which, incidentally, must travel through Russia in order to reach Ukraine, and the Russians say Turkmen gas is not reaching that country. As the howling from Europe mounted, the Russians said they would pump almost 100 million additional cubic meters of natural gas a day to make up for the deliveries that didn't arrive on Jan. 1. This was intended to eliminate a European energy crisis. As stated in an announcement by Russia's Gazprom, "With the aim of preventing a possible energy crisis caused by Ukraine illegally taking gas, Gazprom has taken the decision to deliver additional gas. We stress that the additional delivery of gas is not designed for Ukrainian consumers." The Russians aren't idiots, so they obviously have gamed this out. If we bear in mind that revenues from Ukraine are not the Russians' primary interest here, we can make out what is happening. The Russians want to bring massive pressure to bear on Kiev to reverse its foreign policy course. Part of that strategy is to drive home how vulnerable Ukraine is to Russian energy cut-offs. The Ukrainians, knowing that cutting supplies of natural gas to Ukraine would mean a Russian embargo on deliveries to Europe as well, assumed that the Russians were bluffing. They did not think the Russians could stay the course — and, on the surface, they haven't. But consider what the Russians have done. They have claimed that the reason there was a shortfall was because of Ukraine's siphoning; the Ukrainians denied this. The Russians have now increased the amount of natural gas flowing through the pipelines. They also have said that none of this is intended for Ukraine. If natural gas does not reach Europe in the quantities promised, the Russians will point to Ukraine with much greater credibility. They will even give European observers access to see how much gas they are pumping. The Ukrainians might be able to work from reserves for a while, but eventually — and not too far in the future — they will need gas. If they start siphoning, the Europeans will blame them, rather than the Russians. In this way, Moscow is trying not only to cut off Ukraine's gas supplies, but also trying to recruit the Europeans in general, and the Germans in particular, against Ukraine. A natural gas shortage is no joke for the Europeans. It can hurt badly and quickly. Ukraine's right to national self-determination is an important issue for the Europeans, but it ranks substantially below their own energy interests. If the Russians pump and the Ukrainians siphon, Moscow is betting that the Europeans — and particularly the Germans — will rapidly turn on the Ukrainians. It must be borne in mind that Ukraine's Orange Revolution was an American project, supported by countries like Poland; neither government is deeply liked by Berlin. Germany had no objection to the Orange Revolution until it started to cost it something. Russian leaders figure that they can peel the Germans — and, needless to say, the French — away from support for Kiev through this natural gas maneuver. The Germans will say that this is another fine mess the Americans got them into and start brokering between Ukraine and Russia. Moscow is betting that between their own energy problems and a growing sense of pressure from two directions, the Ukrainians will look at the world differently by March — particularly when the Americans do nothing for them. The Ukrainians will face a choice: Don't siphon and suffer shortages, or siphon and face the wrath of Berlin. In either case, the Russians will be able to say that if the Germans are having trouble with their supply, they should go talk to the Ukrainians. This gamble might not work, but given the overwhelming geopolitical stakes for the Russians, it is a move with lots of upside and very little downside. The worst that could happen, the reasoning goes, would be no movement on Ukraine's part and a stern diplomatic note from the Germans. The best would be a German split from the Americans over Ukraine, and Germany taking on the role of arbitrator and enforcer of Ukraine's compliance in gas consumption.