China National Offshore Oil Corp., Philippine National Oil Corp. and PetroVietnam — all state-run firms — said March 14 they have agreed to conduct joint seismic surveys of the South China Sea. Each country will contribute $5 million to the $15 million initial cost of the three-year project. The agreement could lead to the first systematic seismic survey of the South China Sea by countries that all have territorial claims to the Spratly Islands and their offshore regions. It also reveals Manila as a more proactive presence in regional politics, as it apparently brought China and Vietnam into the project. The deal, however, fails to address the territorial disputes — an omission that will come back to haunt Manila, Beijing and Hanoi should the surveys reveal energy resources in the region. China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan all have claims on some or all of the Spratly Islands. Control over the islands and their surrounding waters would put the owner in charge of key trade routes and allow it to claim any natural resources below the ocean floor. As a result of political — and military — confrontations among these countries, no systematic seismic survey of the South China Sea has been performed to determine the size of oil and/or gas resources in the area, although many experts have estimated the reserves are substantial. In brokering this agreement, Manila appears to be taking a more aggressive role in regional politics, reflecting a Philippine desire to balance strategic competition and to secure energy reserves. The Philippines' proximity to many of the Spratly Islands has resulted in heated political debate between Manila and Beijing over possession of various reefs. As a result of Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's visit to Beijing in September 2004, China National Offshore Oil Corp. and Philippine National Oil Corp. agreed to a joint study in the South China Sea. Manila again took charge of its neighborhood by announcing March 7 another joint agreement with Vietnam for a scientific study of the sea. By March 10, China was voicing its concern over the second agreement. Four days later, Arroyo came out in praise of the trilateral deal. Although the Philippines is not officially named as the agreement's broker, the order of events leading up to it indicates Manila was responsible for bringing in Hanoi and Beijing. A third-party mediator also will be necessary, since China and Vietnam have a history of poor relations when it comes to offshore and mainland border issues, including China's 1976 seizure of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam. Tensions in the sea reached a breaking point in January 1988 after diplomatic efforts failed to settle China and Vietnam's claims to the Spratlys. The resulting naval battles resulted in two sunken Vietnamese ships and more than 70 dead Vietnamese sailors. The new deal suggests a mutual interest by the participants in making decisions regarding the Spratly Islands and South China Sea an exclusively internal affair. By getting directly involved in the Spratly issue, the Philippines will be reducing tensions and pressures between itself and China. In the past, the Philippines relied on its strong relationship with the United States to deal with regional disputes. As Washington is now preoccupied elsewhere, the Philippines no longer has this option. As a result, when Manila saw Beijing encroaching on the disputed territory, the Arroyo government decided to cooperate with its neighbor instead of confronting it. China benefits from participating in the joint survey — and not contracting out foreign firms to survey the area, like it did with the U.S. firm Crestone Energy Corp. in 1992 — because it furthers the country's so-called peaceful rise to power. For the time being, the new agreement can be viewed as a step forward in regional cooperation. It fails, however, to address sovereignty issues regarding the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands. The lack of established ownership inevitably will prove extremely problematic — as the same issue has been a source of conflict in the area for decades. Should the survey be undertaken and prove that oil and/or gas exist in the South China Sea, the partner countries will find themselves in a situation very similar to the territorial problems facing Indonesia and Malaysia. That is to say, Spratly claimants will be even more driven to assert their presence in the area and to use more forceful methods to defend this presence — a move that will only compound, and possibly bring to a head, already-existing tensions surrounding claims in the area.