Abu Musab al-Zarqawi purportedly has issued a communique declaring his allegiance to Osama bin Laden's global jihadist network. In the Oct. 17 Internet-posted statement, the top jihadist leader in Iraq — and the world's third most infamous jihadist — indicates his organization, Jamaat al-Tawhid and Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad), or JTJ, has joined al Qaeda. It is extremely difficult to authenticate statements on jihadist Web sites — the Bush administration said Oct. 18 it was trying to do just that — but if al-Zarqawi and bin Laden have teamed up they have done so out of desperation; both groups have been constrained by structural limitations and weakened by U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. The reason for the alliance notwithstanding, this new jihadist coalition has the potential to step up the pace and intensity of attacks in Iraq and its surrounding states. Contrary to mainstream media and the Bush administration's take on al-Zarqawi, STRATFOR has maintained the position that the Jordanian-born Ahmad Fadeel Nazal al-Khalayleh — also known as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi — is an independent jihadist operator confined to Iraq and, to some degree, its immediate neighbors. Two of his previous statements support this view. In both messages — a letter addressed to bin Laden and intercepted in early February by the U.S. military in Iraq and an Internet-posted statement in mid-June — al-Zarqawi tried to prove he is a worthy al Qaeda partner while also making the point that his movement was doomed without outside intervention. The statements also were aimed at allaying any concern within the al Qaeda leadership that al-Zarqawi is a competitor. Ultimately, al-Zarqawi was trying to win al Qaeda over to his game plan for Iraq, which entails fomenting a civil war by targeting the majority Shiite population. On two previous occasions, al Qaeda attempted to distance itself from sectarian attacks against the Shia (notwithstanding its anti-Shiite ideology), making it seem as if the global jihadist network had no interest in doing business with al-Zarqawi. Furthermore, there has been no word from al Qaeda on al-Zarqawi's pledge of allegiance to bin Laden. As Washington and its allies continue to close in on al Qaeda's jugular — capturing or killing many of the network's leaders and key operatives around the world — a union with the Iraqi militants was most likely too enticing to resist. The alliance will face problems while the leaders struggle to determine a new hierarchy — and perhaps a long-rang plan of attack. After all, al-Zarqawi's notoriety as a jihadist entrepreneur is third only to that of bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Additionally, JTJ already is established in the main Muslim battleground — where al Qaeda has been absent. While the leaders debate these issues, the alliance could be more vulnerable to counterterrorism initiatives — their communications opening up potential access points to security and intelligence apparatuses. For now, this merger will allow both sides to share the pool of human and material resources available for jihadist causes in the Muslim world, which translates into increased operational capability and thus a surge in attacks. Moreover, both sides bring unique resources to the new entity: JTJ's recruiting network and al Qaeda's experience in dealing with U.S. intelligence. Unless an al Qaeda statement confirms al-Zarqawi's claims, it is impossible to know whether this statement is simply a JTJ publicity stunt. If it is true, it proves both sides are desperate for survival — and ready to prove their relevance.