The Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) is close to concluding a deal with radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr to halt the fighting in Baghdad's Sadr City district, CNN reported Oct 6. Sheikh Karim Bekhati, an al-Sadr negotiator, said Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's administration and al-Sadr's representatives "have come close to reaching an agreement," which an unnamed U.S. official termed a "breakthrough." Sources among Shiite tribes tell STRATFOR there is no deal yet, and the claim of a breakthrough is premature, but the dialogue continues; a final round of talks was scheduled for Oct. 6. The sources also say top Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is playing a pivotal role in these talks and is pressing hard for their success by pressuring both the Allawi administration and al-Sadr's followers. Considering that al-Sadr needs to transform his diffuse movement under its current banner of the Mehdi Army — a loosely structured militia — into an organized political party while maintaining its anti-occupation character, it is likely the radical Iraqi Shiite leader will achieve both goals by following the model of the Lebanese Shiite Islamist movement Hezbollah. Given that Hezbollah's dual structure allowed it to simultaneously be a political group and maintain a vibrant militia fighting Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon, the United States — whose future presence in western and southwestern Iraq will be similar to Israel's position in southern Lebanon from the early 1980s until the late 1990s — will try to prevent al-Sadr from adopting the Hezbollah model. Not only is the Hezbollah model most conducive for the type of group al-Sadr requires, the Lebanese Islamist group has had close relations with al-Sadr. There have been consistent reports since the al-Sadrites' emergence in the post-Hussein period that Hezbollah maintains a significant presence in southern Iraq. Moreover, Al-Manar — a television channel run by Hezbollah — has helped al-Sadr to get his message across to his constituency. That said, the question to ask is whether al-Sadr will succeed in forming an Iraqi Hezbollah. A group by that name already exists, and is led by Abdel-Karim Mahoud al-Mohammedawi, who has close ties to controversial Iraqi politician Ahmed Chalabi. Names aside, the two Hezbollahs are quite different. Al-Sadr's envisioned group, however, will likely be similar to the Lebanese group — and will be opposed tooth and nail by both Washington and Baghdad, which is why the negotiations between al-Sadr and the IIG have been a long and slow process. There are several hurdles towards any final deal. First, Allawi insists on house-to-house searches for weapons and that U.S. troops should help Iraqi security forces patrol Sadr City — with al Sadr opposed to both moves. A deal will likely be reached in several days, however, and will be akin to the one which brought the fighting in An Najaf to an end. The deal will probably involve Iraqi police exclusively patrolling Sadr City, with the presence of some Mehdi Army militiamen included in such a police force. Then not all heavy weaponry will be surrendered — sources say no rocket-propelled grenades or bombing devices are expected to be surrendered, but mortars will probably be given up. Additionally, a pledge by Mehdi Army fighters to refrain from attacking Iraqi police inside Sadr City and U.S. troops elsewhere in Baghdad will likely be required. While al-Sadr is unhappy with the terms, there is intense pressure from al-Sistani that he can not afford to disregard. Also, the al-Sadrites do not entirely trust Baghdad and Washington, which is why many Mehdi Army commanders are only willing to settle for a symbolic relinquishing of heavy weapons. The discrepancy between al-Sadr's goals and what he will get is prolonging the negotiations, but al-Sadr — wanting to emerge as a major political player — can not hold out forever. The United States, however, will not want him to have a legitimate political entity which also has a military wing, as it could threaten U.S. military presence in Iraq. Therefore, fighting and tensions between al-Sadr's movement and the Baghdad/Washington partnership will continue even after he joins the mainstream.