Iyad Allawi took office as prime minister of Iraq's new interim government June 1, and reportedly will govern until general elections are held Jan. 31, 2005. That date could change depending on whether the Iraqi security situation is deemed under control. The selection of Allawi as prime minister is solid evidence that — despite the recent fall from grace of Ahmed Chalabi — the United States still plans to influence politics in Iraq through Chalabi's group of pro-U.S. elites. In many ways, Allawi is Chalabi — with a different face. Allawi is portrayed by sources inside Iraq's Shiite community as a well-educated, subtle and not particularly religious Baathist who enjoys regional popularity — mainly among the early Baathist foes of Saddam Hussein (many of whom were executed by Hussein loyalists in 1974), and within some tribal circles in the Middle Euphrates area, including the Babylon and An Najaf regions. Allawi, an intellectual and a former exile, is well connected to the Iraqi upper class. His wife is an Iraqi Shi'i whose father, Mohammad Abdel Khalek Hassouna, was a prominent general under Abdul Karim Qassim, a high-ranking military officer and former Iraqi prime minister in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Allawi also is closely linked to Chalabi, once the key U.S. liaison to the Iraqi opposition and an important supplier of information regarding Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction. Chalabi's sister is the wife of Allawi's cousin, former Defense Minister Ali Allawi. Despite their relationship — and their shared hatred of Saddam Hussein — Chalabi and Allawi do not like each other, having quarreled repeatedly during the days of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). The basis of their animosity seems to stem from a rivalry formed as each tried to maneuver for Washington's favor. STRATFOR sources inside the former IGC also say they have an ongoing personal rivalry over their own status within the country. As a university medical student in the 1960s, Allawi led a Baathist student union and was a member of a leftist group under the leadership of Ali Salih al-Saadi. At the time, he was a devout Baathist. He left for the United Kingdom in the early 1970s to study neurology and also quite possibly to protect himself — as Hussein already had pegged him as an ideological threat because of his ties to al-Saadi, Hussein's persecuted foe. In fact, Allawi escaped Hussein's 1974 purge by virtue of being abroad. When he protested the Iran-Iraq war, suspected Hussein agents attacked him and his wife in their U.K. apartment, seriously injuring both of them — and threatening them with death. Allawi's background and his position in the community lend insight into why Washington tapped him for the job of prime minister. As a counter to the rising influence of Shiite clerics and anti-American Sunni guerrillas, Washington might be trying to cozy up to the upper class of secular Iraqi society, both Shiite and Sunni, through Allawi and his associations. With Chalabi out of the picture — the CIA accused him of passing secrets to Iranian intelligence while the Pentagon defended him — Washington had to choose another leader it could trust. Although the bench of candidates was limited, Allawi was a logical choice. His credentials — at least for now — look unquestionably solid. He does not deny that he has been linked to the CIA and the British MI-6 intelligence agency for a number of years. Washington has chosen to piggyback on another former Iraqi exile whose political goals mostly parallel those U.S. interests. Of course, this appointment demonstrates that the United States is moving away from its former strategy of aligning itself with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Allawi is a Shi'i like al-Sistani, but has much closer ties to the British and American intelligence communities than to al-Sistani. The U.S. has distanced itself from al-Sistani and the Shiite clerical leadership. It also has pressured Allawi to negotiate with al-Sistani over rebel Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, according to sources in the former IGC. After nearly a year of attempts to meet with al-Sistani, Allawi finally was granted an audience. Inside sources say the meeting did not go well; Allawi's efforts were rebuffed. This is likely one of the reasons al-Sistani has been left out of the new interim government. It is not surprising that the meeting did not go well. Al-Sistani knew Allawi was too closely tied to the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Washington — and al-Sistani does not trust the CPA any more than he does the United States. Al-Sistani also likely realized he could not afford the risk of alienating other religious Shia by negotiating with a less-than-devout figure known to have ties to U.S. and British intelligence. Al-Sistani likely was not much interested in reining in al-Sadr. He relied on al-Sadr's Mehdi Army as a way of proving what the Shia are capable of if the new government did not include Shia in a dominant way. By going with Allawi, Washington has proven that there are other, secular Shia — Allawi prominent among them — it can utilize. Allawi's appointment also has made it easier for the United States to make inroads into the formerly impermeable Baathist bureaucracy, which it sees as the basis for the new government. The jury is out on whether the Iraqi people will accept their new leader — but for now this is of minor concern to Washington. The preference given to this secular bureaucracy will not escape al-Sistani's attention. He knows that U.S. influence will be strong and that he will have to work through Washington — and serve its interests — if he hopes to become a viable player again. Sidelining al-Sistani in favor of the Iraqi secular elite suggests that al-Sistani soon will have to make a move. It might not be his final or most important move, but any action likely will be designed to enflame the situation, as well as the way the Iraqi people interpret their new government. In other words, al-Sistani could easily become a catalyst for popular dissension within Iraq. Al-Sistani did release a statement June 3 in which he offered an implicit gesture of support for the interim government, but expressed hope that the new government would provide for timely free elections. Since he knows that Shia allied with him would win such elections, his comments were not so much a sign of approval as a warning shot to Washington and to Allawi's new government.