Hanoi is manipulating the two great powers knocking on its doors — the United States and China — as part of an intricate plan to gain strategic freedom of choice. Both powers desire a lot from the country, but Hanoi is in danger of overplaying its hand. Hanoi is taking a flurry of strategic steps and scheduling numerous diplomatic exchanges this month. First, on May 14, it announced renovations to an air base in the disputed Spratly Islands, raising China's ire. On the same day, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan received U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly. The diplomatic talks fell one week before Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai was scheduled to visit China on May 20-24. Hanoi is playing a careful game to counterbalance China with the United States. Hanoi's move into waters that China claims is a calculated step to test Beijing's resolve. China could use its superior naval force to counter Vietnam in the strategic and oil-rich waters. In that case, Hanoi would turn to Washington — which is courting the Southeast Asian country for a security alliance — and continue to press for control of the disputed area. If Beijing acquiesces to Vietnamese moves in the Spratlys, Hanoi will resist U.S. overtures and keep the superpower at arm's length. Vietnamese officials said May 14 that the country is renovating an airport with a 2,000-foot runway on Truong Sa Lon (Big Spratly) Island, roughly 280 miles off the coast of south-central Vietnam. The reconstruction follows Hanoi's decision to open some of the disputed islands to tourists. The first group of about 60 people left Vietnam on May 19 for an eight-day trip. Hanoi says the renovations are necessary to attract more visitors. The airport opened May 19, which would have been Ho Chi Minh's 114th birthday. China, Vietnam and Taiwan claim sovereignty over all the Spratlys; the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim some of them. Vietnam's tourism venture and airfield raised protests from some of the claimants. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao called the renovation of the airstrip an illegal "violation of China's incontestable territorial sovereignty." The string of islands is located in the middle of one of the world's busiest waterways. Any country controlling the islands and surrounding waters could threaten the flow of trade to and from Northeast Asia. This could cripple Japan and China, which import a large portion of their energy supplies from the Middle East. As much as 70 billion barrels of unexploited oil and natural gas reserves are estimated to lie beneath the Spratlys. Beijing has reached back centuries searching for historical evidence to validate its claims of dominion over nearly all of the South China Sea. Hanoi and other East Asian governments cannot afford to let China or any other regional power control the Spratlys and use the small islands as unsinkable aircraft carriers to dominate the sea lanes and threaten attack. Regional competition has led to a number of conflicts between Vietnam and its northern neighbor, and China has won every time. China seized the Parcel Islands from South Vietnam in 1974 during the war, but never handed them over to its communist allies. In 1979, after Hanoi gravitated toward Moscow and away from Beijing, China invaded the country in retaliation for invading Cambodia and Laos in 1988, and began construction projects on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands — a reef claimed by Vietnam. Vietnamese forces tried and failed to disrupt the projects, losing three ships and about 70 sailors. Relations between Hanoi and Beijing have improved considerably in the past decade. The two countries normalized ties in 1991, and China has become one of Vietnam's top trade partners after a 42 percent rise in bilateral trade to $4.6 billion in 2003. Considering Hanoi's losing track record and China's growing military power, Vietnam's provocative moves in the South China Sea are somewhat unexpected. Hanoi appears to be intentionally trying to provoke a response from Beijing. A ranking Vietnamese military official told STRATFOR that the airstrip is vital for Vietnam's security, and Hanoi does not fear anything more than a diplomatic response from Beijing. Hanoi has reason to be optimistic, believing economic interests and the imposing U.S. military presence in the region will stay Beijing's hand. First, Beijing wants good relations with its southern neighbor. China does not want to enter into another fray with Vietnam while it is working toward a free trade agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Vietnam is a member — not to mention that any conflict involving China would hurt its investment climate. Second, STRATFOR's source says Hanoi believes China is interested in Vietnam's 600 million barrels of proven oil reserves. China became the world's second-largest consumer of petroleum products in 2003, using an average of 5.46 million barrels per day and importing almost 40 percent of that amount. Vietnam's limited supply and production of about 339,000 bpd will never make it a primary source of crude. Similar to China's pending pipeline deal with Kazakhstan, Vietnam's location makes it an important energy partner: Vietnamese oil shipments do not traverse the choke points in the straits of Hormuz and Malacca, and therefore are unsusceptible to interdiction by pirates or an enemy force. The last, and possibly most important, reason dissuading China from aggressive action in the South China Sea is that it would drive Hanoi into a security alliance with Washington. The United States wants to return to the Cam Ranh Bay naval facility it built during the Vietnam War. The base was later taken over by the Soviets, until Russia abandoned it in 2002 because Moscow could no longer afford to lease it from Hanoi. Under Russian management, the deepwater naval base housed as many as 10,000 troops, 15 ships and 30 aircraft, and served as a listening post for eavesdropping on Chinese, Japanese and U.S. forces during the Cold War. Cam Ranh is now largely empty, housing some Vietnamese forces and serving as a commercial airport. The United States approached Hanoi to return to the facility with a far less robust presence and use it as a prepositioning site and base for port calls by the U.S. Navy. So far Hanoi, not eager to again play host to foreign troops, has rebuffed Washington. Vietnam has to consider its increasingly powerful northern neighbor's intentions. STRATFOR's source says Hanoi is prepared to eventually allow a limited number of U.S. forces back to Cam Ranh, but only if a few conditions are met. In addition to economic assistance, Hanoi wants Washington to stop supporting opposition Christian and ethnic minority Montagnards. Thousands of Montagnards took to the streets in three central provinces April 10 and 11, demanding religious freedoms and an independent state. Several people reportedly were injured in clashes with security forces. Vietnamese officials probably laid out conditions for a deal during U.S. envoy Kelly's visit, and will remind officials in Beijing what China stands to lose if it tries to push Vietnam out of the South China Sea. Hanoi has played its hand; now it is waiting to see the response. Beijing is not about to jump the gun and forcefully evict Vietnam from Big Spratly immediately. But China is not prepared to simply roll over either. A continuous population of Vietnamese citizens on the island and repeated tourist trips strengthen Hanoi's case for sovereignty and set a dangerous precedent in Beijing's eyes. China will do its best to use its economic and political power to trump Vietnam's play. If that fails, it could again call upon the South Sea Fleet.