Peace talks between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are set to restart Feb. 16-17 in Kuala Lumpur. For a number of reasons, it appears likely that a peace deal can be reached on the restive island of Mindanao. The first positive prospect for reaching a peace accord is the apparent readiness of a large portion of the MILF to come out of the jungles and discontinue the 26-year-old guerrilla war. After waging a long and successful jungle campaign, the MILF outgrew the initial period of a guerrilla war and entered what North Vietnamese Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap classified as the second stage, partially characterized by taking and holding terrain. After fighting in the jungle for years, the MILF have developed a fondness for larger bases containing all the amenities of town. However, the rebels do not have the power to hold them. The MILF established the large base, Camp Abubakar, which was overrun during former President Joseph Estrada's all-out war against the rebels in 2000. Instead of falling back on small units and mobile bases for hit-and-run attacks, the MILF relocated their headquarters to a new base, the Buliok Complex. This base was later taken by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in February 2003, and the AFP's withdrawal remains a key MILF demand for the upcoming peace talks. From the outside looking in, the MILF appears to have been corrupted by creature comforts and has lost some of its will to continue the fight. If given half an opportunity, many rebels just might cut a deal and consider forging their assault rifles and rocket launchers into plowshares, just as their compatriot Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) did in 1996. Another factor is the new prominence the Mindanao conflict has taken on in the last two years. The attack by Islamist militants on U.S. soil Sept. 11 prompted unprecedented international attention to the conflict in Mindanao — a double-edged sword for the MILF. Renewed military ties between the United States and the Philippines were already in the offing before Washington became obsessed with finding and destroying al Qaeda and its affiliated groups. However, the U.S. war on militant Islamists accelerated the process. In 2002, the United States sent special forces to the southern Philippine island of Basilan to help the AFP hunt down and eradicate the Abbu Sayyaf — a hard-line MILF splinter group loosely affiliated with al Qaeda that supports itself with kidnapping for ransom. U.S. President George W. Bush's administration has also increased military aid to the Philippines, including granting it major non-NATO ally status in 2003 and requesting $30 million in military financing for 2005 from Congress — a $13 million increase from the previous year. The United States, despite Manila's continued official denials, is preparing to re-establish a military base in the Philippines. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs Lincoln Bloomfield and Brig. Gen. John Allen, principal director for the Department of Defense's Asian and Pacific Affairs Office, met with Philippine Foreign Affairs Undersecretary for Policy Sonia Brady to discuss repositioning U.S. troops in the region. A Feb. 12 Manila Times report quoted an unidentified diplomatic source as saying that the deployment of U.S. forces to the Philippines would be useful as a hedge against Chinese violations of the Code of Conduct in the contested Spratly Islands. Permanently stationed U.S. forces in the country will also be helpful for security concerns much closer to home. Washington has sent envoys to Manila and Mindanao to facilitate a peace deal between the Philippine government and the Moro rebels. The U.S. Institute of Peace — a quasi-governmental agency staffed by former high-level U.S. government officials — will participate in the talks in Kuala Lumpur. From the U.S perspective, it is hoping to pacify Mindanao, which has become a refuge for Islamist groups like the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiah, and deny an important area of operation to militants. If the MILF does not reach a deal with Manila sometime in the near future, it faces another all-out war with the AFP, this time with the backing of the United States. The hammer of a U.S.-supported military confrontation is not the only incentive to end the rebellion: The United States and Europe have sweetened the deal with promises of large aid packages if a peace accord is reached. Washington has offered a $30 million aid package to help develop the war-torn island of Mindanao, and 15 European countries including Britain, France, Italy, Russia and Spain offered a staggering $540 million. Internal Philippine politics have created momentum toward peace as well. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo is facing a tough election race ahead of May 10 polls. A peace treaty to end Philippine's largest insurgency would certainly be a boon for her election campaign, almost ensuring that Manila will offer the best terms it can at the negotiating table. The AFP — preferring to settle the conflict once and for all on the battlefields of Mindanao instead of making concessions to the rebels — could present obstacles to a peace deal. However, the possibility of future U.S. military aid hinging on the actions of the AFP in what Washington considers an important strategic issue should keep the Philippine military in line. Although prospects look favorable for peace, it is not, by any means, a slam dunk. There are enough hard-line members in the MILF who would oppose a peace deal with anything less than an independent Mindanao and could derail negotiations with a massive attack. But — given the circumstances — it appears that some kind of framework for ending the conflict is likely to appear, similar to the 1996 peace deal with the MNLF. This does not mean Mindanao will be pacified overnight — far from it. The Southern Philippine island will be marred by violence for years to come. Groups within the MILF that reject peace, will splinter off and continue the fight or turn to criminal activities like kidnapping for ransom. The MILF itself rose out of opposition to the 1996 accord, and another small, more militant group will likely appear if a deal is reached. But each accord leaves a smaller and smaller group of active resistance, breaking down the Mindanao conflict into something much more manageable for Manila.