At a Feb. 9-10 conference attended by defense ministers of NATO member states and a few non-NATO guests, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that Russia would withdraw from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty if NATO expands its military presence into former Warsaw Pact nations. Ivanov's warning is in line with recent Russian saber-rattling aimed at deterring the United States from encroaching on Moscow's traditional turf. Ivanov said, "With NATO enlargement, they start operating in the zone of vitally important interests of our country." Ivanov's words underscore Russia's wariness about NATO's deploying a large presence in Moscow's front yard and along a strategic invasion route. NATO's eastward expansion is inevitable, and Russia has few substantive countermeasures available. Overt military conflict is out of the question, and an opposing military buildup would cost Moscow more than it is willing to risk financially. Instead, Russia's strategy will include the legal wrangling to which Ivanov alluded in Munich. But despite Kremlin efforts to force NATO to acquiesce, Moscow ultimately will fail to slow the expansion into the former Soviet states. NATO and the Soviet Union signed the initial CFE treaty in 1990. The provisions of the treaty called for caps on the amount of combat equipment allowed in certain prescribed "zones" in Europe. In the intervening years, the language in the CFE has become outdated. It does not explicitly cover certain states — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia — because they did not exist at the time. Moscow's stance on the CFE is at once simple and convoluted: It maintains that all limitations imposed by the original treaty should remain in effect until a new treaty is ratified. NATO argues that since the countries in question did not exist at the time the CFE was signed, its implementation does not apply to military capabilities in those states. This legal quagmire will force both players to couch their actions within the framework of a now-obsolete Cold War-era treaty. Revisions to the CFE that would have restructured its limits to impact particular nations, rather than "zones," that were drawn up in 1999 but never completely ratified. Some NATO members passed the revisions, but others abstained due to accusations within the alliance that Russia was violating the treaty. Russia admitted to some violations but said they resulted from a temporary situation related to ongoing struggles in Chechnya. These "temporary" violations have continued into 2004, however, because Russia still has 70,000 troops stationed in the breakaway republic. Thus, the stalemate over the CFE remains in place. Aside from raking NATO over the legal coals, Russia has a few other options to limit the military expansion. The most obvious one would be to redeploy a large, permanent presence into the westernmost regions of Russia — such as the Russian province of Kaliningrad — but such a deployment would carry a great deal of risk. First, a Russian military buildup in these areas would cool warming relations between Russia and the European Union — Germany in particular — an alliance Moscow sees as much more strategically important than the threat of NATO troops in the Baltics. Second, the cost of such a move also would place a significant burden on Russia's limited defense budget. Finally, an increase in Russia's conventional military footprint in this region would do little to deter U.S.-NATO military expansion: Washington and NATO are moving toward implementing an advanced doctrine focused on a fluid-force structure rather than a large, static military presence. The United States envisions these Central and Eastern European facilities as small "jumping-off" points that would not house a permanent military cadre but could play host to rotating reactionary forces. Another option would be to redeploy Russia's vast nuclear arsenal westward, which would represent an overt threat to NATO facilities. Russian defense officials recently went out of their way to downplay the possibility that strategic missiles would be aimed at NATO member — and potential military host — Poland. This denial from the Russian military highlights the capability Russia retains to target NATO facilities in the region, should it choose to do so. The only other option would be an unexpected military operation similar to the Russian seizure of the Pristina airport during NATO's Serbian campaign — which was carried out without the knowledge or consent of Kremlin officials. It would be difficult to pull off such a stunt a second time; as the old saying goes: "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me." The possibility of the Kremlin approving such an operation is also highly unlikely, in part because President Vladimir Putin views the burgeoning alliance with the European Union as a strategic imperative and will not allow the military to endanger it. A military stunt involving several hundred soldiers certainly would get NATO's attention, but it would not have the same impact as a prominent relocation of thousands of Russian troops. As discussed, this is not currently a possibility. Despite the Kremlin's protestations, U.S. officials are probing former Soviet states such as Bulgaria, Poland and Romania and scouting the region for sites for military installations. This will continue beyond 2004, ultimately resulting in the deployment of a U.S.-NATO presence into these regions. In the end, Moscow's options outside the political arena are severely limited. The Kremlin knows this and will do the majority of its negotiating in behind-the-scenes meetings, accompanied by public threats aimed at convincing NATO of Russia's firm stance — even if that stance is only ignored.