In the presence of opposition leaders, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze signed a letter of resignation on Nov. 23, sparking a celebration by thousands of opposition supporters in downtown Tbilisi. The resignation letter came just after Shevardnadze met with opposition leaders in the presidential palace, for talks mediated by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. Ivanov left before the president resigned, saying his intermediary function had been fulfilled and that Georgia's political forces now should decide the fate of the nation. The pro-U.S. radical opposition, led by the Saakashvili National Movement (SNM), is now in control of Tblisi. STRATFOR sources in the Russian Security Council say that President Vladimir Putin — always reluctant to support Shevardnadze because of his consistent anti-Russian policies — decided to support him three weeks ago, when the crisis over the apparently rigged elections erupted. However, Putin abandoned Shevardnadze when he saw Washington's firm determination to replace him with an even more pro-U.S. president. Sources add that — to mend the rift with Washington over Georgia — Putin sent his foreign minister on Nov. 22 to transfer power from Shevardnadze. However, we do not believe that Moscow is giving up on Georgia: Its interests there are too powerful, including the necessity to secure some control over Georgia to finally win Russia's war in neighboring Chechnya. We think that Putin sent his minister to try to gain some leverage in the new Georgian government, rather than because the United States is playing the role of arbiter in the region. Georgia's internal conflict is likely far from over. Conflict will advance to a new stage: confrontations between a pro-U.S. government in Tbilisi and pro-Russian regions. Several armed conflicts likely will erupt simultaneously — mostly low-intensity and guerrilla-like — but some major offensives also are likely. For example, Ajara, a pro-Russian region on the Turkish border, never will subordinate itself to the new leadership (at least, not without a coup in Ajara — but its current leader is too powerful for that). The region has just declared it will be closing all borders and contacts with the SNM-led government. It also has declared emergency rule on its territory, saying that it has intelligence that the SNM is planning to deploy military forces to take control of the region, local TV Imedi reports. Ajaran leader Aslan Abashidze says that Ajara can defend itself, adding, "We do not want the force to come to power that would be equal to Nazism or Bolshevism; these people [the SNM leaders] have already shamelessly threatened everybody." This suggests that tensions in Georgia are already escalating, particularly now that a conflict between Tblisi's pro-American SNM and pro-Russian Ajara becomes possible. Also, a new war is likely to occur soon between the secessionist Abkhazia region and the central government, since the SNM seeks the forcible return of Abkhazia. Abkhaz army and police were put on the highest level of alert on Nov. 23 after hearing the news of the SNM-led coalition's rise to power. War between a pro-American Tbilisi and pro-Russian Abkhazia would not be trivial. Another possible conflict is between the new government and South Ossetia, one more pro-Russian region that does not want Tbilisi to re-exert control over it. On Nov. 23, the leader of South Ossetia declared emergency rule and ordered the reinforcement of its borders to protect against Tbilisi's troops. Elsewhere, in some provinces where the SNM lacks support, Georgia is torn apart by multisided and deep rivalries. Former Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia's supporters — outlawed since 1992 — remain armed. They are rising from the underground and might decide that now is the time to grab their piece of Georgia's pie. On Nov. 23, Gamsakhurdia's former finance minister, Guram Absandze, and his armed supporters occupied the regional government premises in Samegrelo-Upper Svanetia, declaring himself the new governor. He encountered no resistance. Expect to see more self-declared rulers in weeks to come. With those and other conflicts on the horizon, Georgia probably is marching toward violent disintegration. There may be a pro-U.S. president in Tbilisi, but he will not control much beyond the capital. Furthermore, the new presidential elections, possibly to be held within 45 days, are likely to add fuel to Georgia's internal conflict. No potential candidate — including the now victorious SNM leader Saakashvili — appears to have more than 20 percent of voter support. New tensions can be expected when the election results are announced. Georgia's current events have geopolitical significance beyond possible internal violence. The rise of a strongly pro-U.S. portion of the opposition is a significant geopolitical victory for Washington. On the other hand, it is yet one more defeat in the Caucasus for a weakened Moscow. Shevardnadze was deeply unpopular, but he kept a majority of the country together. The emerging leaders are willing to do much more for Washington than Shevardnadze was, but they do not now enjoy the level of support he once had because they represent only one wing of the opposition. The probable acceleration of Georgia's disintegration will endanger Russia's southern flank — and U.S. plans to pump Caspian oil westward.