Representatives from China, Japan, Russia and South Korea will join their counterparts from North Korea and the United States in Beijing in late August to hammer out a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. The intervening days will be filled with bilateral and trilateral discussions as each country tries to ensure that its particular interests are represented at the upcoming talks. However, the diverse nature of the participants makes consensus-building a tedious and near-impossible task, particularly as each tries to ensure that its own issues with North Korea or other participants are addressed. In the end, the six-party talks risk complicating the already confusing negotiations regarding North Korea's nuclear program — and little more than a general agreement with few finalized details likely will come from the late August meeting. Specifics more likely will come from bilateral talks on the sidelines or from future discussions involving fewer participants. The United States has pressed North Korea for multi-party talks throughout the current nuclear standoff, arguing that peace and stability in Northeast Asia involved input not just from Pyongyang and Washington, but from Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo as well. Recently, Moscow has been reintroduced into the equation, with Beijing convincing the North Koreans to invite Russia to balance the talks. But Beijing also wanted to ensure that Moscow didn't throw any last-minute monkey wrenches into the nuclear talks. Beijing's primary concern is to keep stability in Korea to avoid undermining China's own economic growth and to keep the United States from placing too much military interest in the region — at least in the near term. However, Moscow sees the talks as an opportunity to reimpose itself in northeast Asian security and politics, something Russia has paid less attention to as it focused on ties with Europe and the war in Iraq. Beijing and Moscow are not the only participants with different opinions on the way negotiations should be handled. Japan is concerned with North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and with illegal drugs and other substances smuggled from or through North Korea into Japan. But Tokyo also is interested in raising the issue of abducted Japanese — something few, if any, of the other participants want to address. For its part, South Korea has its own particular sets of interests. Seoul appears the most amenable to offering economic cooperation to the North — even more than China — since the current administration sees South Korea's future intimately linked to ending the hostilities on the Korean peninsula and slowly reintegrating the divided nation. Of all the participants in the six-party talks, Seoul is the one most likely to offer or suggest significant economic aid, assistance and investment in the North Korea. Washington enters the talks with the intention of giving up little or nothing and shutting down North Korea's nuclear program — adding a verification process that includes on-the-ground inspections and monitors. And the U.S. administration wants to make clear to North Korea and the world that whatever solution comes, it is not a sign of the United States succumbing to "nuclear blackmail." Far from this is North Korea's desire for a nonaggression pact or, preferably, a formal peace accord to end the 50-year standoff after the end of the Korean War. Such assurances from the United States are vital if Pyongyang proceeds with economic reforms and experiments — experiments that could present an opportunity for the United States to interpose itself, block, take advantage of or try to destabilize the North's regime. Ultimately, the differences in opinions are supposed to be worked out before talks begin, tentatively on Aug. 27. But the array of opinions and motivations for participation leaves little room for compromise except on the most basic of issues — an end to the North Korean nuclear program, some sort of security assurance to Pyongyang and economic and energy assistance to North Korea. Details or deeper issues will emerge in bilateral meetings on the sidelines in Beijing or in future discussions — if the pre-talk discussions don't exacerbate existing rifts among the participants. Pyongyang can easily exploit such rifts, giving North Korean negotiators an edge at the table in Beijing — or at least provide enough incentive for Washington to work out some bilateral deals with Pyongyang.