Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) units held joint exercises with police units in Hokkaido on Nov. 18, Japan's Kyodo News reported. The exercise in defending Japan from armed infiltrators was the first of its kind in the country. Although this primarily was a command post exercise, the next phase will include field exercises. The drill marks another step in the evolution of the GSDF and in Japan's defense forces as a whole. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's military has struggled to redefine its role, which formerly was to guard Japan against a Soviet attack. Several events over the past decade have influenced the domestic debate over the SDF's role and have contributed to changes in the SDF mission and organization. But as Japan's defense force takes concrete steps toward preparing for new contingencies, it is outpacing the political consensus. Of the many defining moments of the past 10 years, the first was the Gulf War. Tokyo was faced with two issues: whether to supply SDF assets to support the coalition effort and what to do about the 500 Japanese citizens detained in Iraq as shields against the attack. Although Tokyo sent minesweepers as part of the international coalition, the government was slow to lend physical support and thus incurred criticism for not pulling its weight. The thinking about the structure of the SDF further evolved with the 1996 takeover of the Japanese Embassy in Lima, Peru. That incident convinced Tokyo that the SDF should find ways to prepare for hostage situations even far from Japan's shores. The 1999 kidnapping of several Japanese geologists in Kyrgyzstan only strengthened this view. Two issues in Southeast Asia molded the debate in a slightly different way. First, there was a rise in piracy in the waters around Indonesia, a strategic shipping lane for most of Japan's oil supplies. Second, instability in Indonesia required Japan to take precautions for the evacuation of its citizens. Both of these incidents led to greater SDF involvement in the region — from joint patrols of the Strait of Malacca to agreements with Singapore for the use of air and naval facilities during emergency operations. Concerns over North Korea — ranging from its missile program to infiltrations into South Korea to frequent intrusions of suspected North Korean spy ships into Japanese waters — further shifted the internal dialogue. Tokyo embraced the idea of cooperating with the United States on missile defense, despite initial hesitation. The SDF also began tightening its relationship with the Japanese coast guard and police, opening better lines of communication and creating protocols for closer cooperation. But it was the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States and the subsequent warnings of a global terrorist network that added the final impetus to changes in Japan's military. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi rapidly seized upon the fear of terrorism to press through a series of changes in the role and scope of the SDF — though as the furor died down in Japan, his subsequent efforts have been rebuffed or at least slowed by internal debate. But while the political protocols and agreements still are being argued, the SDF has taken concrete steps to redefine its own role — and to be prepared when the political determination comes around. The joint GSDF-police exercises are only the first in a series of similar regional exercises, and future joint training likely will be more involved. In addition, in late September and early October, Japanese forces traveled to Hawaii to train with U.S. forces in urban combat, and the GSDF intends to establish more of its own similar training schools. The GSDF also plans to create an anti-terrorism force of 300 soldiers, to be stationed in Chiba Prefecture. The Maritime Self Defense Force and Air Self Defense Force also are altering their training and weapons acquisitions. The MSDF is looking to deploy additional P-3C surveillance aircraft along the west coast and has updated protocols covering coordination with the coast guard and permissions to fire upon infiltrating ships. For its part, the ASDF is seeking an additional aerial refueling aircraft in its next budget and again is trying to gain permission to participate in joint exercises with U.S. forces in Alaska — exercises that involve in-air refueling, something from which Japan formerly shied away because it could be considered an offensive rather than defensive capability. In all, the Japanese armed services already have begun transforming themselves to be better prepared for non-traditional contingencies, including infiltrations, urban combat and piracy. The current GSDF training might lead to the possibility of Japanese forces participating in seek-and-destroy missions against guerrillas and militants — not only in Japan, but also overseas — should the need and political will arise. And political will, rather than physical capability, remains the limiting factor. While Japanese defense forces train and arm for the future, they remain tethered to a complicated political process that must take place before they are dispatched. But that, too, could fade as the internal mood favoring constitutional change grows.