Summary
If U.S.-China relations enter a lengthy period of deterioration, the armed forces of both powers will probably compete for regional influence despite the unparalleled military might of the United States. A major effort to contain a China bent on using a limited set of strategic capabilities to undercut American dominance would require the Pentagon to retune many of its plans. Ultimately, Beijing cannot keep up with Washington in a long-term competition for military dominance. But in the next five to 10 years, the playing field will likely host a heated contest.
Analysis
U.S.-China relations have been deteriorating for some time over several contentious security questions.
The recent collision of a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese jet fighter over the South China Sea is one of several issues in recent years that have not boded well for the relationship. Other issues include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, American plans for a national missile defense, China's weapons proliferation activities, the temporary cutoff of U.S. satellite technology transfers to China and a series of spying incidents at U.S. national weapons laboratories.
With the election of U.S. President George W. Bush, who described China as a strategic competitor as opposed to a strategic partner during the election campaign, Beijing and Washington have moved further apart on these contentious issues.
These disagreements could significantly degrade relations, leading the two nations' militaries to increasingly confront each other in East Asia as they compete for regional hegemony. China is attempting to expand its sphere of influence with air and sea capabilities and other strategic capabilities, and the United States is trying to check that expansion.
Coming Military Contest
As the competition evolves into more substantial military confrontation, it could take on the markings of a true contest, as the United States must accelerate some of its military restructuring plans to contain China's military ambitions. Over the long term, however, Washington's financial and technical advantages will hold sway and China will have to relinquish some of its military objectives.
While emphasizing new air warfare capabilities, the People's Liberation Army Navy is the focus of China's military modernization program. Still a shadow of the U.S. Navy - the U.S. Pacific Fleet alone could probably defeat it - Beijing is making slow but steady progress in introducing a fleet capable of operating far from Chinese territory and posing a challenge to other regional forces. China sees fast-attack patrol boats, new destroyers, new attack submarines, anti-ship missiles and aircraft-carrier capabilities as the keys to checking U.S. dominance of the seas.
U.S. intelligence estimates contend that within a decade China could put to sea a dozen nuclear-powered attack submarines based on the Russia Victor III design and capable of sinking American aircraft carriers and other surface ships. Russian and Chinese sources say the first boat in the Type-093 class is near completion and components are undergoing sea trials.
Add to that up to four Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers, four recently acquired Russian Kilo-class diesel-attack submarines, new anti-ship missiles and other strategic capabilities, such as information warfare aimed at taking advantage of perceived U.S. weaknesses, and you have a major shift in the balance of power in the region.
This shift could materialize more quickly than originally anticipated if U.S.-China relations continue to worsen over the panoply of political-military differences. In March, Beijing announced a 17.7 percent increase in defense spending this year, the biggest expansion in real terms in two decades.
Washington on the Offensive
Washington is aware of this shift. An ongoing review of U.S. defense strategy places increased emphasis on Asia - namely, China. The U.S. surveillance flight that had to land on Hainan Island in China April 1 was part of a larger U.S. effort to keep tabs on what the Chinese military is up to in the region, including submarine advances, intelligence-gathering operations and space launch activities.
Many, if not all, of the weapons systems and capabilities China is developing are well known to the United States from an earlier military contest: the Cold War. But a military game of chess with China would be significantly different for several reasons.
For one, the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits, where China focuses its expansionist activities, are shallow compared with other large bodies of water and are dotted with surrounding countries, islands and other shoals, posing challenges for the U.S. Navy. Instead of operating on the high seas as designed, the U.S. fleet in the region must prepare to operate in the littorals, or near coastlines, a location that requires enhanced defensive measures.
Secondly, China, unlike the Soviet Union, knows it cannot take on the United States plane for plane, tank for tank or even ship for ship. Instead, Beijing has focused on developing key strategic capabilities that could hurt the Pentagon where it is most vulnerable.
China's Military Modernization
China has done its homework and has fashioned military modernization plans accordingly, including submarines and warships with anti-ship cruise missiles that could endanger U.S. aircraft carriers or prevent access by U.S. forces to key areas such as the Taiwan Straits.
Moreover, viewing U.S. reliance on information as an Achilles' heel, China has embarked on a computer warfare program. In a glimpse of what is to come, China defaced U.S. Web sites during the 11-day standoff over the U.S. spy plane, according to U.S. officials.
U.S. military planners are aware of American vulnerabilities and Chinese plans to target them and have laid out long-range plans to address many of them. But heightened military tensions between the two countries could find the United States lacking in some key areas over the next five to 10 years, forcing Washington to accelerate its plans.
In the area of force structure, the United States has several efforts on the drawing board that better position it for a military competition for control of East Asia. But most of them are far off in the future.
For example, growing agreement that its fleet of large aircraft carriers will be increasingly at risk of missile attack makes it likely the Pentagon will seek to build smaller, more agile flattops. But this could take a decade or more. Until then, it will have to work to minimize the risk to its fleet.
In other areas of shipbuilding, the United States may have to accelerate its modernization efforts. It is developing a new land-attack destroyer, the USS Zumwalt class, which will be stealthier than the current fleet. But the first ship in the new class will not be ready for prime time until near the end of the decade.
Likewise for increasing calls within the Navy to resurrect smaller ships, such as frigates, that are more agile and better suited for littoral operations. The “Streetfighter” concept, as it is known, has yet to be approved and remains only in the proposal stage.
Forward basing is another area where the United States may have to make changes should its focus turn to containing the Chinese navy and other Chinese military forces.
While Japan will remain the primary jumping off point for American forces in the region, Tokyo is increasingly critical of the U.S. presence, particularly on Okinawa, where the ill-fated U.S. surveillance mission began. To help reduce the lengthy transit time from the United States, Washington may look for a new basing plan.
One option may be to build up the military presence on the U.S. territory of Guam. Washington already stockpiles cruise missiles there and has been considering the forward deployment of bomber aircraft and submarines. These plans would probably be reviewed with an eye toward acceleration should relations between Washington and Beijing continue their downward spiral.
The United States may also look to other nations in the region to build up a deterrent force, as plans to rely less on forward bases and more on projecting force from the United States will not be realized for a considerable time. Some possibilities include the Philippines, which is seeking renewed U.S. military assistance, and Thailand, where American and Thai forces are currently participating in Cobra Gold - the largest military exercise in Asia this year.
The United States would also probably have to gin up its intelligence-gathering operations, which now focus on a wide array of threats, from international terrorism and countries of concern such as Iraq and North Korea to the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Even basic capabilities such as Chinese language skills among U.S. intelligence personnel, much less prevalent than Russian, will have to be honed quickly. Spy satellite coverage would also probably have to be redirected from other potential threats.
The Balance of Military Power
Although an overall comparison of U.S. and Chinese military capabilities clearly demonstrates that Washington outstrips Beijing in every area, a prolonged degradation in relations would highlight the significant cost of keeping China in constant check.
Whether in areas of force structure, forward basing or intelligence gathering, the United States may have to make dramatic changes earlier than expected to ensure it can achieve its objectives in the region.
Additionally, by focusing its energies on China, the United States will have to make trade-offs in other regions. Because a confrontation with China will not be on the scale of the Cold War, when money was no object, the United States will have to deal with China and everything else with finite resources.
Over the long term, the United States, by sheer economic and technological capability, will dominate China in the competition for military pre-eminence in East Asia. Nevertheless, American dominance is not guaranteed. A prolonged and heated standoff with Beijing will require Washington to reshape its military strategy. That will take time. In the meantime, the Chinese military will not be a pushover.
If U.S.-China relations enter a lengthy period of deterioration, the armed forces of both powers will probably compete for regional influence despite the unparalleled military might of the United States. A major effort to contain a China bent on using a limited set of strategic capabilities to undercut American dominance would require the Pentagon to retune many of its plans. Ultimately, Beijing cannot keep up with Washington in a long-term competition for military dominance. But in the next five to 10 years, the playing field will likely host a heated contest.
Analysis
U.S.-China relations have been deteriorating for some time over several contentious security questions.
The recent collision of a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese jet fighter over the South China Sea is one of several issues in recent years that have not boded well for the relationship. Other issues include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, American plans for a national missile defense, China's weapons proliferation activities, the temporary cutoff of U.S. satellite technology transfers to China and a series of spying incidents at U.S. national weapons laboratories.
With the election of U.S. President George W. Bush, who described China as a strategic competitor as opposed to a strategic partner during the election campaign, Beijing and Washington have moved further apart on these contentious issues.
These disagreements could significantly degrade relations, leading the two nations' militaries to increasingly confront each other in East Asia as they compete for regional hegemony. China is attempting to expand its sphere of influence with air and sea capabilities and other strategic capabilities, and the United States is trying to check that expansion.
Coming Military Contest
As the competition evolves into more substantial military confrontation, it could take on the markings of a true contest, as the United States must accelerate some of its military restructuring plans to contain China's military ambitions. Over the long term, however, Washington's financial and technical advantages will hold sway and China will have to relinquish some of its military objectives.
While emphasizing new air warfare capabilities, the People's Liberation Army Navy is the focus of China's military modernization program. Still a shadow of the U.S. Navy - the U.S. Pacific Fleet alone could probably defeat it - Beijing is making slow but steady progress in introducing a fleet capable of operating far from Chinese territory and posing a challenge to other regional forces. China sees fast-attack patrol boats, new destroyers, new attack submarines, anti-ship missiles and aircraft-carrier capabilities as the keys to checking U.S. dominance of the seas.
U.S. intelligence estimates contend that within a decade China could put to sea a dozen nuclear-powered attack submarines based on the Russia Victor III design and capable of sinking American aircraft carriers and other surface ships. Russian and Chinese sources say the first boat in the Type-093 class is near completion and components are undergoing sea trials.
Add to that up to four Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers, four recently acquired Russian Kilo-class diesel-attack submarines, new anti-ship missiles and other strategic capabilities, such as information warfare aimed at taking advantage of perceived U.S. weaknesses, and you have a major shift in the balance of power in the region.
This shift could materialize more quickly than originally anticipated if U.S.-China relations continue to worsen over the panoply of political-military differences. In March, Beijing announced a 17.7 percent increase in defense spending this year, the biggest expansion in real terms in two decades.
Washington on the Offensive
Washington is aware of this shift. An ongoing review of U.S. defense strategy places increased emphasis on Asia - namely, China. The U.S. surveillance flight that had to land on Hainan Island in China April 1 was part of a larger U.S. effort to keep tabs on what the Chinese military is up to in the region, including submarine advances, intelligence-gathering operations and space launch activities.
Many, if not all, of the weapons systems and capabilities China is developing are well known to the United States from an earlier military contest: the Cold War. But a military game of chess with China would be significantly different for several reasons.
For one, the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits, where China focuses its expansionist activities, are shallow compared with other large bodies of water and are dotted with surrounding countries, islands and other shoals, posing challenges for the U.S. Navy. Instead of operating on the high seas as designed, the U.S. fleet in the region must prepare to operate in the littorals, or near coastlines, a location that requires enhanced defensive measures.
Secondly, China, unlike the Soviet Union, knows it cannot take on the United States plane for plane, tank for tank or even ship for ship. Instead, Beijing has focused on developing key strategic capabilities that could hurt the Pentagon where it is most vulnerable.
China's Military Modernization
China has done its homework and has fashioned military modernization plans accordingly, including submarines and warships with anti-ship cruise missiles that could endanger U.S. aircraft carriers or prevent access by U.S. forces to key areas such as the Taiwan Straits.
Moreover, viewing U.S. reliance on information as an Achilles' heel, China has embarked on a computer warfare program. In a glimpse of what is to come, China defaced U.S. Web sites during the 11-day standoff over the U.S. spy plane, according to U.S. officials.
U.S. military planners are aware of American vulnerabilities and Chinese plans to target them and have laid out long-range plans to address many of them. But heightened military tensions between the two countries could find the United States lacking in some key areas over the next five to 10 years, forcing Washington to accelerate its plans.
In the area of force structure, the United States has several efforts on the drawing board that better position it for a military competition for control of East Asia. But most of them are far off in the future.
For example, growing agreement that its fleet of large aircraft carriers will be increasingly at risk of missile attack makes it likely the Pentagon will seek to build smaller, more agile flattops. But this could take a decade or more. Until then, it will have to work to minimize the risk to its fleet.
In other areas of shipbuilding, the United States may have to accelerate its modernization efforts. It is developing a new land-attack destroyer, the USS Zumwalt class, which will be stealthier than the current fleet. But the first ship in the new class will not be ready for prime time until near the end of the decade.
Likewise for increasing calls within the Navy to resurrect smaller ships, such as frigates, that are more agile and better suited for littoral operations. The “Streetfighter” concept, as it is known, has yet to be approved and remains only in the proposal stage.
Forward basing is another area where the United States may have to make changes should its focus turn to containing the Chinese navy and other Chinese military forces.
While Japan will remain the primary jumping off point for American forces in the region, Tokyo is increasingly critical of the U.S. presence, particularly on Okinawa, where the ill-fated U.S. surveillance mission began. To help reduce the lengthy transit time from the United States, Washington may look for a new basing plan.
One option may be to build up the military presence on the U.S. territory of Guam. Washington already stockpiles cruise missiles there and has been considering the forward deployment of bomber aircraft and submarines. These plans would probably be reviewed with an eye toward acceleration should relations between Washington and Beijing continue their downward spiral.
The United States may also look to other nations in the region to build up a deterrent force, as plans to rely less on forward bases and more on projecting force from the United States will not be realized for a considerable time. Some possibilities include the Philippines, which is seeking renewed U.S. military assistance, and Thailand, where American and Thai forces are currently participating in Cobra Gold - the largest military exercise in Asia this year.
The United States would also probably have to gin up its intelligence-gathering operations, which now focus on a wide array of threats, from international terrorism and countries of concern such as Iraq and North Korea to the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Even basic capabilities such as Chinese language skills among U.S. intelligence personnel, much less prevalent than Russian, will have to be honed quickly. Spy satellite coverage would also probably have to be redirected from other potential threats.
The Balance of Military Power
Although an overall comparison of U.S. and Chinese military capabilities clearly demonstrates that Washington outstrips Beijing in every area, a prolonged degradation in relations would highlight the significant cost of keeping China in constant check.
Whether in areas of force structure, forward basing or intelligence gathering, the United States may have to make dramatic changes earlier than expected to ensure it can achieve its objectives in the region.
Additionally, by focusing its energies on China, the United States will have to make trade-offs in other regions. Because a confrontation with China will not be on the scale of the Cold War, when money was no object, the United States will have to deal with China and everything else with finite resources.
Over the long term, the United States, by sheer economic and technological capability, will dominate China in the competition for military pre-eminence in East Asia. Nevertheless, American dominance is not guaranteed. A prolonged and heated standoff with Beijing will require Washington to reshape its military strategy. That will take time. In the meantime, the Chinese military will not be a pushover.
