China appears to be prolonging its current standoff with the United States by refusing to release the downed EP-3E surveillance aircraft or its crew. While this buys time for Chinese intelligence to examine the plane and its equipment, the real benefit to Beijing is geopolitical.
The underlying process is that China badly wants to redefine its relationship with the United States. In doing so, China wants to change the global perception that the United States is the unchallengeable global power.
Beijing is using this incident to shift the psychology, if not the reality, of the global balance of power, hoping to weaken perceptions of American military omnipotence.
China has long argued for a multipolar world in which the United States behaves less like a lonely superpower and more like a great power surrounded by other great powers, particularly China. We have said for years that the international system's basic reality has been a disequilibrium among global powers, inevitably resulting in other great powers acting to limit American power.
The American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was the critical event for Beijing. It showed the United States regarded China as a tertiary power. The Chinese never accepted the American explanation that the bombing was an accident, most likely because they knew the type of activities conducted in the parts of the building struck. It was simply too much of a coincidence for them.
What struck Beijing most about the bombing was Washington's clearly unconcerned attitude and disregard for the consequences. The United States saw no way for China to respond and anticipated a lack of global response to the action. It was correct on both counts.
To China, this described a world out of control. Since the United States appeared to take whatever unilateral action it wanted without fear of consequence, China felt it necessary to demonstrate there were potentially dangerous ramifications for American actions.
Most important, since the United States seemed to feel it was militarily invulnerable, it needed to suffer a military setback. There were two main reasons for this. First, China needed to create a sense of military parity with the United States, if not globally, then at least regionally. Second, in order to resist the United States globally, China wanted to become the nucleus of a coalition of nations prepared to join in the project. In a world where American military omnipotence was a psychological cornerstone, transforming the perception of American power was critical.
China's attempt to foment a strategic crisis prior to Taiwanese elections was disastrous. Rather than showcasing Chinese power, it was a demonstration of Chinese impotence. The candidate Beijing most opposed won the election and, regardless of threats, China had no military options. The bottom line: China proved unable to pose a geopolitical challenge to the United States.
China has now presented a tactical challenge with broad psychological implications. Whether planned or seized upon with brilliant alacrity, the EP-3E's capture proved a perfect opportunity to demonstrate Chinese power.
This power is shown from several angles. First, the existence of U.S. reconnaissance flights along China's frontier shows the United States regards China as an adversary worth watching. Second, the People's Liberation Army Air Force's interception of an American aircraft drives home China's ability to assert its power along its littoral. And by inspecting the aircraft's innards, China can reveal its technical prowess by demonstrating its ability to exploit what it finds
Above all, the Chinese have the crew, they have the aircraft and Washington is impotent. Beijing remembers the Iranian hostage crisis' psychological effect; the perception of American helplessness created a crisis of confidence both outside and within the United States. By creating a similar situation, even for a short time, China emphasizes psychologically that the United States is not militarily omnipotent, creating a perceptual shift.
By prolonging the crisis, China focuses global attention on an asymmetrical military relationship in which China has the upper hand. This has substantial domestic value. Its greatest advantage, however, is in driving home to potential coalition partners that it is possible to resist U.S. military power.
Only two American military responses are possible: a commando operation to rescue the crew and a military strike against a Chinese asset. The former would be time-consuming to mount and dangerous to execute. The latter would turn a single incident into a near-war situation. The United States will do neither. China is presently immune to American military action, precisely the atmosphere Beijing wants to project domestically and globally.
Since China has little to lose and much to gain in a protracted crisis, how long is enough? Enough is when the world sees China's decision to release the Americans is made solely because China wishes to release them, without any consideration of Washington's threats or feelings. Moreover, we expect the aircraft might never be released - or will be released in small, tagged pieces - as a permanent symbol of Chinese power.
President Bush's decision to remain low key is reasonable, however, the Chinese would love to see some U.S. bluster. Just as China was embarrassed when their threats over Taiwan proved to be hot air, Beijing would love to see Bush announce threats he cannot carry out.
China wants to show the world it is immune to American pressure. Its need to do so is geopolitically founded, with the potential payoff substantial.
The underlying process is that China badly wants to redefine its relationship with the United States. In doing so, China wants to change the global perception that the United States is the unchallengeable global power.
Beijing is using this incident to shift the psychology, if not the reality, of the global balance of power, hoping to weaken perceptions of American military omnipotence.
China has long argued for a multipolar world in which the United States behaves less like a lonely superpower and more like a great power surrounded by other great powers, particularly China. We have said for years that the international system's basic reality has been a disequilibrium among global powers, inevitably resulting in other great powers acting to limit American power.
The American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was the critical event for Beijing. It showed the United States regarded China as a tertiary power. The Chinese never accepted the American explanation that the bombing was an accident, most likely because they knew the type of activities conducted in the parts of the building struck. It was simply too much of a coincidence for them.
What struck Beijing most about the bombing was Washington's clearly unconcerned attitude and disregard for the consequences. The United States saw no way for China to respond and anticipated a lack of global response to the action. It was correct on both counts.
To China, this described a world out of control. Since the United States appeared to take whatever unilateral action it wanted without fear of consequence, China felt it necessary to demonstrate there were potentially dangerous ramifications for American actions.
Most important, since the United States seemed to feel it was militarily invulnerable, it needed to suffer a military setback. There were two main reasons for this. First, China needed to create a sense of military parity with the United States, if not globally, then at least regionally. Second, in order to resist the United States globally, China wanted to become the nucleus of a coalition of nations prepared to join in the project. In a world where American military omnipotence was a psychological cornerstone, transforming the perception of American power was critical.
China's attempt to foment a strategic crisis prior to Taiwanese elections was disastrous. Rather than showcasing Chinese power, it was a demonstration of Chinese impotence. The candidate Beijing most opposed won the election and, regardless of threats, China had no military options. The bottom line: China proved unable to pose a geopolitical challenge to the United States.
China has now presented a tactical challenge with broad psychological implications. Whether planned or seized upon with brilliant alacrity, the EP-3E's capture proved a perfect opportunity to demonstrate Chinese power.
This power is shown from several angles. First, the existence of U.S. reconnaissance flights along China's frontier shows the United States regards China as an adversary worth watching. Second, the People's Liberation Army Air Force's interception of an American aircraft drives home China's ability to assert its power along its littoral. And by inspecting the aircraft's innards, China can reveal its technical prowess by demonstrating its ability to exploit what it finds
Above all, the Chinese have the crew, they have the aircraft and Washington is impotent. Beijing remembers the Iranian hostage crisis' psychological effect; the perception of American helplessness created a crisis of confidence both outside and within the United States. By creating a similar situation, even for a short time, China emphasizes psychologically that the United States is not militarily omnipotent, creating a perceptual shift.
By prolonging the crisis, China focuses global attention on an asymmetrical military relationship in which China has the upper hand. This has substantial domestic value. Its greatest advantage, however, is in driving home to potential coalition partners that it is possible to resist U.S. military power.
Only two American military responses are possible: a commando operation to rescue the crew and a military strike against a Chinese asset. The former would be time-consuming to mount and dangerous to execute. The latter would turn a single incident into a near-war situation. The United States will do neither. China is presently immune to American military action, precisely the atmosphere Beijing wants to project domestically and globally.
Since China has little to lose and much to gain in a protracted crisis, how long is enough? Enough is when the world sees China's decision to release the Americans is made solely because China wishes to release them, without any consideration of Washington's threats or feelings. Moreover, we expect the aircraft might never be released - or will be released in small, tagged pieces - as a permanent symbol of Chinese power.
President Bush's decision to remain low key is reasonable, however, the Chinese would love to see some U.S. bluster. Just as China was embarrassed when their threats over Taiwan proved to be hot air, Beijing would love to see Bush announce threats he cannot carry out.
China wants to show the world it is immune to American pressure. Its need to do so is geopolitically founded, with the potential payoff substantial.
