The Japanese government has drafted a five-year defense budget program that includes, for the first time, funding for aerial refueling tankers. The move signals a major policy shift for Japan and gives its restrained air force something it hasn't had before - the ability to project power well beyond its borders and territorial waters.
Japan will buy four tankers by fiscal 2005, with funding for advanced research on the aircraft in the fiscal 2001 defense budget. Defense officials said - largely for public consumption - that the tankers will help prevent accidents, reduce aircraft noise pollution, enable defense forces to respond quickly on joint international missions and bolster Japan's military transport fleet.
But make no mistake about how Japan's defensive capabilities will improve. Not only could it project and sustain air operations in the Pacific Basin but also function independent of the United States in military operations in the region.
Four T-4 trainers perform aerobatics over the Japan Air-Self Defense Forces' Hyakuri Base northeast of Tokyo. (Chiaki Tsukumo/AP Photo)
The difficult path to budget approval for the tankers began seven years ago. First proposed in a report by a special non-governmental advisory panel in July 1993, tanker acquisition quickly became a political issue.
Though backed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the controversial proposal met opposition on the grounds that it violated the intent of Article 9 in the Japanese constitution, which renounces war as a sovereign right of the Japanese nation.
A lack of air refueling assets has historically hobbled Japan's air force. At present, its aircraft are restricted to short sorties, based on fuel and weight requirements. The tankers will allow the air force to project power.
The breakthrough for proponents coincided with a decline in influence of those politically disposed to limiting Japan's military reach. But as a new generation of post WWII leaders has taken the helm, interpreting Article 9 has slowly changed for a number of political leaders.
Japanese defense and political leaders acknowledge that Article 9 has hamstrung them in exercising their responsibilities as a regional and global leader.
Despite Japan's expanded role in U.S. strategy with the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security in 1996 and the revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1997, funding approval for these tankers marks the first departure from Japanese policies against projecting power beyond Japan's borders.
Remnants of opposition remain throughout the tripartite ruling coalition of the LDP, New Komeito, and the Liberal Party. In particular, New Komeito is blamed for successfully killing the tanker proposal in the 2000 fiscal budget. But this year the proposal sold as a means to expand humanitarian missions.
Tankers have been crucial to every U.S. Air Force operation since the Vietnam War. In a joint wartime scenario, Japan's air force and the U.S. Air Force would have to expend costly training and flight time to bring Japanese pilots up to speed.
Some Japanese fighter pilots have received limited aerial refueling training during joint exercises and exchange programs with the United States. But without tankers, these pilots cannot maintain proficiency. And pilots of Japan's larger airborne command/control platforms - crucial to sustaining air operations for long periods of time - have no air refueling experience.
To be a full partner in joint U.S. contingencies, Japan must have its own tanker force. By extending the range and loiter capabilities of the Japanese air force, the tankers will allow the Japanese to project sustained air operations throughout the Pacific Basin. This is Japan's first solid step in gaining independence from the United States for security in the region.
Japan will buy four tankers by fiscal 2005, with funding for advanced research on the aircraft in the fiscal 2001 defense budget. Defense officials said - largely for public consumption - that the tankers will help prevent accidents, reduce aircraft noise pollution, enable defense forces to respond quickly on joint international missions and bolster Japan's military transport fleet.
But make no mistake about how Japan's defensive capabilities will improve. Not only could it project and sustain air operations in the Pacific Basin but also function independent of the United States in military operations in the region.
Four T-4 trainers perform aerobatics over the Japan Air-Self Defense Forces' Hyakuri Base northeast of Tokyo. (Chiaki Tsukumo/AP Photo)
The difficult path to budget approval for the tankers began seven years ago. First proposed in a report by a special non-governmental advisory panel in July 1993, tanker acquisition quickly became a political issue.
Though backed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the controversial proposal met opposition on the grounds that it violated the intent of Article 9 in the Japanese constitution, which renounces war as a sovereign right of the Japanese nation.
A lack of air refueling assets has historically hobbled Japan's air force. At present, its aircraft are restricted to short sorties, based on fuel and weight requirements. The tankers will allow the air force to project power.
The breakthrough for proponents coincided with a decline in influence of those politically disposed to limiting Japan's military reach. But as a new generation of post WWII leaders has taken the helm, interpreting Article 9 has slowly changed for a number of political leaders.
Japanese defense and political leaders acknowledge that Article 9 has hamstrung them in exercising their responsibilities as a regional and global leader.
Despite Japan's expanded role in U.S. strategy with the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security in 1996 and the revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1997, funding approval for these tankers marks the first departure from Japanese policies against projecting power beyond Japan's borders.
Remnants of opposition remain throughout the tripartite ruling coalition of the LDP, New Komeito, and the Liberal Party. In particular, New Komeito is blamed for successfully killing the tanker proposal in the 2000 fiscal budget. But this year the proposal sold as a means to expand humanitarian missions.
Tankers have been crucial to every U.S. Air Force operation since the Vietnam War. In a joint wartime scenario, Japan's air force and the U.S. Air Force would have to expend costly training and flight time to bring Japanese pilots up to speed.
Some Japanese fighter pilots have received limited aerial refueling training during joint exercises and exchange programs with the United States. But without tankers, these pilots cannot maintain proficiency. And pilots of Japan's larger airborne command/control platforms - crucial to sustaining air operations for long periods of time - have no air refueling experience.
To be a full partner in joint U.S. contingencies, Japan must have its own tanker force. By extending the range and loiter capabilities of the Japanese air force, the tankers will allow the Japanese to project sustained air operations throughout the Pacific Basin. This is Japan's first solid step in gaining independence from the United States for security in the region.
