Summary
The terrorist action against the USS Cole occurred against the backdrop of strident political maneuvering by a few foreign powers for domination over the Indian Ocean and Middle East. Growing U.S. Navy activities in the region have met resistance from Russia, China, India and Iran. All of them want the United States out of the Indian Ocean, although China and India would like to leverage the bombing of the Cole to convince the United States to do more to combat terrorism in the region.
Analysis
Long before the bombing of the USS Cole in a Yemeni port, a number of foreign powers were waging a geostrategic battle for position and control over the Indian Ocean region. Sea trade and energy supply routes from the Persian Gulf through the Arabian Sea to the Indian Ocean and Red Sea are not only appealing to the United States, but to Russia, China, India and Iran - all of which would like to see the Pentagon's ships go home.
All of these powers have a substantial political investment in the region. With the possible exception of Iran, however, none is likely to have had anything to do with, or knowledge of, the deadly attack on the Cole.
Unlike Russia, which is battling for strategic control in the region after losing its superpower status, China's approach in the region is a proactive one. Beijing has gradually staked a claim to strategic sea routes through the Indian Ocean to the Red and Mediterranean Seas. It has been trying to expand its coastal navy to serve in a blue-water capacity by positioning itself at key chokepoints.
For example, Chinese activities in the Spratlys, Myanmar, and the Panama and Suez Canals are examples of this strategy.
China's two overall concerns in the Indian Ocean basin are the United States and Indian navies. China views American strategic forces in the Indian Ocean and Middle East as a strategic second echelon for the U.S. Seventh Fleet and other forces containing Chinese forces in the Pacific. According to the Chinese Military Attaché to Moscow, the U.S. Fifth Fleet is a reserve for the Seventh, while strategic bombers on Diego Garcia can deliver nuclear strikes all over Chinese territory. Also, since the U.S. Central Command includes Central Asia in its zone of responsibility, Chinese strategists view it as a projection of American power to the adjusted Xinjiang Region of China.
While improving relations with India pleases the Clinton administration, India would also like to see a quick end to U.S. security presence in the Indian Ocean.
India's security specialists see the Pentagon's growing position there as part of its long-time goal to dominate the region. India's strategists believe the United States wants to pressure New Delhi - because of India's importance in the region - to support U.S. actions there.
But being the largest Indian Ocean littoral state, India is intent on pursuing a long-term geostrategic goal of gradually squeezing the forces of outside powers out of the zone of its national security interest: broad oceanic areas to the west and east of the country, including the Arabian Sea and its waters around Yemen.
India's growing naval power and increased naval activities in the western part of the ocean this year serve as strong indicators this country intends to assert itself as a major player in Asian and Indian Ocean geopolitics. India is successfully working on a blue-water navy capability, meaning naval power projection far from Indian shores and ability to undertake long-range naval operations.
As India Defense Minister George Fernanges put it on April 14, 2000, "The Indian navy has a responsibility that goes beyond protecting our borders…Indian navy's interests lie from north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea."
Like China, India had nothing to do with what happened to the ill-fated Cole. But India will be willing to give some substance to the discussion with the United States on counterterrorism at India-U.S. summits this year.
Iran, the most powerful of regional countries close to Yemen, probably feels more threatened by U.S. interest in the region than any other country.
Iran believes the United States is quietly building a second-strike force in the Indian Ocean region to complement its operations in the Persian Gulf, according to a source in the Iranian Foreign Ministry.
But, lacking any naval forces outside the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, Iran can do little to counter the world's only remaining superpower. Tehran chooses instead to work quietly behind the scenes, attempting to persuade local governments to ignore Washington's enticements.
Of course, Iran also has contacts with regional entities that aren't directly tied to governments. Iranian intelligence operatives frequently contact representatives of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Yemen and those from Yemen's Shii'a minority.
Iran has no influence over the main radical Islamic groups based in the south of the Arabian Peninsula, including those in Yemen that were probably responsible for the terrorist action against the Cole.
But that does not mean Iran did not know the attack was coming. Iranian intelligence in the region probably was aware that some anti-American actions were brewing. Undoubtedly, Iran will try to use the bombing to further its anti-American agenda.
A geopolitical contest over dominating the Indian Ocean and the Middle East strongly colors the reaction of the major foreign powers on the blast in Aden. Relations with the United States also influenced reactions. All of them want the United States out of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Peninsula.
The terrorist action against the USS Cole occurred against the backdrop of strident political maneuvering by a few foreign powers for domination over the Indian Ocean and Middle East. Growing U.S. Navy activities in the region have met resistance from Russia, China, India and Iran. All of them want the United States out of the Indian Ocean, although China and India would like to leverage the bombing of the Cole to convince the United States to do more to combat terrorism in the region.
Analysis
Long before the bombing of the USS Cole in a Yemeni port, a number of foreign powers were waging a geostrategic battle for position and control over the Indian Ocean region. Sea trade and energy supply routes from the Persian Gulf through the Arabian Sea to the Indian Ocean and Red Sea are not only appealing to the United States, but to Russia, China, India and Iran - all of which would like to see the Pentagon's ships go home.
All of these powers have a substantial political investment in the region. With the possible exception of Iran, however, none is likely to have had anything to do with, or knowledge of, the deadly attack on the Cole.
Unlike Russia, which is battling for strategic control in the region after losing its superpower status, China's approach in the region is a proactive one. Beijing has gradually staked a claim to strategic sea routes through the Indian Ocean to the Red and Mediterranean Seas. It has been trying to expand its coastal navy to serve in a blue-water capacity by positioning itself at key chokepoints.
For example, Chinese activities in the Spratlys, Myanmar, and the Panama and Suez Canals are examples of this strategy.
China's two overall concerns in the Indian Ocean basin are the United States and Indian navies. China views American strategic forces in the Indian Ocean and Middle East as a strategic second echelon for the U.S. Seventh Fleet and other forces containing Chinese forces in the Pacific. According to the Chinese Military Attaché to Moscow, the U.S. Fifth Fleet is a reserve for the Seventh, while strategic bombers on Diego Garcia can deliver nuclear strikes all over Chinese territory. Also, since the U.S. Central Command includes Central Asia in its zone of responsibility, Chinese strategists view it as a projection of American power to the adjusted Xinjiang Region of China.
While improving relations with India pleases the Clinton administration, India would also like to see a quick end to U.S. security presence in the Indian Ocean.
India's security specialists see the Pentagon's growing position there as part of its long-time goal to dominate the region. India's strategists believe the United States wants to pressure New Delhi - because of India's importance in the region - to support U.S. actions there.
But being the largest Indian Ocean littoral state, India is intent on pursuing a long-term geostrategic goal of gradually squeezing the forces of outside powers out of the zone of its national security interest: broad oceanic areas to the west and east of the country, including the Arabian Sea and its waters around Yemen.
India's growing naval power and increased naval activities in the western part of the ocean this year serve as strong indicators this country intends to assert itself as a major player in Asian and Indian Ocean geopolitics. India is successfully working on a blue-water navy capability, meaning naval power projection far from Indian shores and ability to undertake long-range naval operations.
As India Defense Minister George Fernanges put it on April 14, 2000, "The Indian navy has a responsibility that goes beyond protecting our borders…Indian navy's interests lie from north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea."
Like China, India had nothing to do with what happened to the ill-fated Cole. But India will be willing to give some substance to the discussion with the United States on counterterrorism at India-U.S. summits this year.
Iran, the most powerful of regional countries close to Yemen, probably feels more threatened by U.S. interest in the region than any other country.
Iran believes the United States is quietly building a second-strike force in the Indian Ocean region to complement its operations in the Persian Gulf, according to a source in the Iranian Foreign Ministry.
But, lacking any naval forces outside the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, Iran can do little to counter the world's only remaining superpower. Tehran chooses instead to work quietly behind the scenes, attempting to persuade local governments to ignore Washington's enticements.
Of course, Iran also has contacts with regional entities that aren't directly tied to governments. Iranian intelligence operatives frequently contact representatives of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Yemen and those from Yemen's Shii'a minority.
Iran has no influence over the main radical Islamic groups based in the south of the Arabian Peninsula, including those in Yemen that were probably responsible for the terrorist action against the Cole.
But that does not mean Iran did not know the attack was coming. Iranian intelligence in the region probably was aware that some anti-American actions were brewing. Undoubtedly, Iran will try to use the bombing to further its anti-American agenda.
A geopolitical contest over dominating the Indian Ocean and the Middle East strongly colors the reaction of the major foreign powers on the blast in Aden. Relations with the United States also influenced reactions. All of them want the United States out of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Peninsula.
