The apparent loss of the Russian Oscar-II nuclear submarine Kursk will have repercussions that long outlive Moscow's dramatic efforts at rescue and recovery. The submarine sank to the bottom of the Barents Sea on Aug. 12. Russian rescue efforts have been unsuccessful. Stranded in more than 300 feet of icy water, the crew could run out of oxygen as early Friday, though a British rescue submarine is due on site on Aug. 19. The accident will significantly and immediately impact upcoming Russian naval operations. More importantly, though, a handful of Oscar II and late model Victor III submarines are at the heart of Russian naval stategy: they are used to defend against attacking carrier battle groups beyond the range of Russian aircraft. With this accident, the Russian Northern Fleet has lost a vital platform; in a sense, it is as if the United States had lost an aircraft carrier. Naval operations will immediately be diminished. Kursk went down as its crew was exercising to deploy to the Mediterranean Sea as part of a carrier group, led by the carrier Kuznetsov. Ironically, the cruise was designed by the Putin government as a show of renewed Russian force in European waters. The Oscar II fleet is so small and divided between Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, that Moscow could be forced to either take one of the other nine Oscar IIs off a previously scheduled patrol, or deploy a vessel at a lower level of readiness. Russia has a large submarine force, of approximately 122 vessels. But these are steadily declining in number. The readiness of these submarines, however, is the real problem for Russia's navy. Three years ago, only 100 of these were believed ready for combat deployment. As a result, the small number of Oscar IIs — only eight are believed to be on duty and another is incomplete — are at the heart of Russian naval doctrine, making each one count even more than the numbers suggest. Designated K-141, Kursk was launched in May, 1994 and entered Northern Fleet service the following year. Oscar IIs and Victor IIIs are key to the defense of the Russian coastline. They are in essence, the tip of the spear in Russian naval doctrine. In March 1996, the largest naval exercise since the fall of the Soviet Union unfolded and the Russians used both classes of submarines — two of each — to intercept the carrier Kuznetsov, which simulated a foreign attack. A pair of subs simulated attack on Kusnetsov at two points in the Norweigan Sea before Backfire bombers were called in. Russian naval doctrine appears to depend on these behemoth subs — a submerged Oscar displaces 24,000 tons of water — to hit carrier battle groups beyond the range of land-based aircraft. The doctrine is basically similar to Soviet-era doctrine and appears intended to make up for the weaknesses of air and surface forces, according to a study by the U.S. Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). ONI concluded after the 1996 exercises that the use of these few submarines "can effectively challenge task forces outside cruise missile and carrier aviation strike range of the Russian homeland." In general, the Oscar IIs appear to have become more active in recent years; a Pacific-based submarine shadowed the U.S.S. Nimitz off Seattle in the late 1990s. The loss of Kursk will also impede operations in the Barents, Kara and Norwegian seas. Patrols in the Barents are believed to focus on defense of the northern coast line. Patrols in the Norwegian Sea are focused on shadowing U.S. carriers and Tomahawk-carrying combatants. Open ocean patrols from Russia can extend across the North Atlantic to monitor the movement of submarines carrying ballistic missiles. If the crew is lost, the accident will have taken the life of up to 10 senior naval officers, who were reportedly aboard as observers. A total of 116 to 118 are aboard. If so, the loss of these officers could create a short-term disruption in the navy leadership. Most significant to Russian strategy, the loss of the nuclear submarine will probably force the Putin government to reconsider its aspirations to be both a conventional and a nuclear power. An Oscar II takes three years to complete — the remaining one in the class is believed to be lying incomplete in a shipyard. The accident will likely set off a chain reaction that places pressure on Russian military spending. Recriminations are likely over training, maintenance and rescue. Unless it chooses to live with this vulnerability at sea, the Putin government may be forced to redirect resources away from conventional forces — such as airborne units — or other land-based nuclear programs to replace Kursk. Before the accident, President Vladimir Putin had hoped to increase spending from $4.4 billion to $5.5 billion next year. The realization that a key component of naval doctrine is at the bottom of the Barent Sea will send a shudder through the country's defense debate.