South Korean President Kim Dae Jung returned to Seoul June 15, following the first ever inter-Korean summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang. The summit produced a Joint Declaration — dealing with family reunions, economic cooperation and a framework upon which to build the eventual reunification of Korea. It also resulted in the emergence into the public spotlight of the formerly reclusive Kim Jong Il and a promise for a reciprocal visit to Seoul.
As the excitement of the summit wears off, the focus will shift to three key issues. First, both leaders must find a way to maintain the momentum of the summit to overcome domestic obstacles to their agreements. Second, based on the Joint Declaration, a new definition of Korean reunification is emerging. Finally, while Seoul and Pyongyang begin the process of actualizing the summit agreements, the international community — particularly the four powers surrounding the peninsula — will redefine their assessments and policies in regard to the rapid changes on the peninsula. Image and Momentum: Selling the Summit at Home
The summit meeting between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il marks a shift in inter-Korean relations just days before the 50th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. The summit created a forum in which North Korean leader Kim Jong Il could create a new image of himself and North Korea, both domestically and internationally. Kim Jong Il, known as an avid fan of movies and media, played his part extremely well.
A last minute 24-hour delay to the summit reinforced North Korea's image as unpredictable and withdrawn. Amid heightened anxieties caused by the delay, Kim Dae Jung arrived in Pyongyang to the unexpected and unprecedented welcome of Kim Jong Il himself. The carefully choreographed welcome, complete with a military display, martial music and an estimated 600,000 well-wishers chanting “Kim Jong Il” gave the impression of a North Korean victory celebration. For his South Korean audience, Kim Jong Il smiled, joked and displayed the appropriate Confucian respect for the elder Kim Dae Jung. His appearance was in marked contrast to expectations in the South, where he has long been portrayed as a reclusive, mysterious, none-too-intelligent dictator with little charisma.
Kim Jong Il's performance gives him added political capital in the North, as he can now be seen as bringing the South to him. He must maintain this image of victor in order to balance the perception of his ultimate authority with the potential social side effects of opening the economy to South Korean technology and investments. In South Korea, there is but a brief window of opportunity for Pyongyang to maintain the new image of its leader before his new sheen fades and is perceived as little more than an act. In that time, Pyongyang must take concrete steps toward fulfilling aspects of the agreement.
Kim Dae Jung also has a stake in preserving the new public persona of Kim Jong Il. Kim Dae Jung returns from the summit victorious in gaining North Korean agreement to all points of his March 2000 Berlin declaration, including a timetable for the reunions of families separated by the Korean War. Linked to this highly emotional and popular point of the Joint Declaration, however, is the extremely controversial issue of releasing “unswerving Communists serving prison sentences in the South.” Kim Dae Jung has yet to bring together enough parliament members to form a majority coalition. The opposition Grand National Party (GNP), which alone falls just a few seats shy of a majority, strongly opposes the release of these imprisoned North Korean spies. The GNP has warned that the release of these prisoners would be insulting to the families of South Koreans injured or killed by the actions of North Korean infiltrators and terrorists, and it has cited North Korea's use of an earlier released detainee for propaganda purposes as proof that their release will accomplish little toward reconciliation. With the first inter-Korean summit under his belt and a Nobel Peace Prize virtually guaranteed, Kim Dae Jung is betting that the August 15 start of family reunions will buy him enough political capital to overcome the stigma of releasing former spies. Kim must also convince the nation that economic support for the North, with no apparent reciprocity, nonetheless benefits the South in the long term. However, if North Korea does not take sufficient action, Kim Dae Jung may find this a difficult task to accomplish.
“Two Countries, Two Systems” - Defining Reunification
In addition to family reunions, the release of long-term prisoners and economic assistance, the Joint Declaration yielded a statement not yet seen in previous key inter-Korean documents. Point two of the Declaration states: “For the achievement of reunification, we have agreed that there is a common element in the South's concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose form of federation. The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.” While the wording is ambiguous — the North Korean translation calling its proposal a “federation of lower stage” - the agreement introduces the possibility of a phased integration process. In essence, neither a German absorption reunification model, nor a Chinese-Hong Kong “one country two systems” model is the initial step. Rather, it is a “two countries two systems” economic integration, along the lines of the European Union. This new framework lays the groundwork for a more viable process of reintegration that avoids — for a time — the nearly irresolvable ideological divide between the Koreas. Neither regime is willing to step down from power, concede defeat and subject itself to the other. Instead of tackling the more difficult political or social integration, the economic integration can begin immediately — and indeed already has. According to South Korean government figures, the total number of South Korean firms involved in inter-Korean trade rose from 30 in 1989 to 581 in 1999. Bringing North Korea's economy into line with the South presents both opportunities and challenges. South Korea's GDP per capita stands at nearly 13 times that of the North, a far cry from the difference between the two Germanys at reunification. While North Korea currently offers cheap labor, the physical, legal and financial infrastructure is underdeveloped. The actualization of an economic integration - and likely simultaneous cultural and athletic cooperation — will require substantial attention in both the North and South. Pyongyang must balance economic investment and cooperation with the South while insulating North Koreans from fully realizing the economic gap between the nations and thus undermining social order. Seoul, meanwhile, will focus on redefining the parameters of economic reform and growth given the increased, and indeed government-supported, access to North Korea's labor and markets. International Responses — Keeping Up With the KoreasWhile Pyongyang and Seoul focus inward on developing and expanding economic and cultural cooperation, the international community will reassess the situation on the peninsula and redefine national policies. In particular, the four main peripheral powers to the peninsula — China, Japan, Russia and the United States — will find themselves reacting to the processes taking place in Korea, rather than leading them. Of all the peripheral powers, China is perhaps the most prepared for the coming changes on the peninsula, having played an important role in bringing the Koreas together. However, it must carefully monitor and manage the relationship between the two Koreas, so as to prevent the North from sliding into a more pro-U.S. camp.
Moscow has also begun re-engaging North Korea, promising a visit by President Vladimir Putin and lobbying against the U.S. plan for a missile defense system, saying North Korea is not a rogue nation nor a threat to U.S. interests.
Japan has also begun to act. Tokyo diplomats in Moscow are already seeking Russian support in pressing for an early realization of the so-called six-way talks on Northeast Asian security, according to ITAR-Tass. This would add Tokyo and Moscow to the existing four-way talks framework consisting of the two Koreas, China and the United States.
The United States, long the dominant player on the peninsula, is no longer in the driver's seat of inter-Korean relations. The Korean Summit marked a fundamental shift in the North Korean outlook - from treating South Korea as a puppet or tool of the United States to recognizing Seoul as the legitimate counterpart for negotiations. South Korea too has pushed a more independent policy for dealing with the North. Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy became the basis for U.S.-North Korea Policy Coordinator William Perry's recommendations for Washington's relations with Pyongyang. So much so that at the time of its release South Korean political cartoons showed Perry photocopying Kim's Sunshine Policy to deliver to the U.S. Congress. With North Korea dealing directly with South Korea, Seoul will continue to forge its own course, leaving Washington to follow. Faced with an election year and a lame duck president, the United States will remain behind the curve in inter-Korean relations for several more months.
After the Summit - Redefining Korean Relations
The Korean Summit has started a new era on the peninsula. Kim Jong Il has emerged from isolation and into the international arena, undercutting the international image of the North Korean leader as a reclusive despot while adding to the unpredictability of his behavior and goals. Relations between the two Koreas are now on a new footing as well, with the North welcoming the president of the South, rather than dismissing him as a puppet of the “imperialist” United States. Over the next months — and even years — the dominant issues on the peninsula have the potential to shift from whether war will break out to how integration can take place. In the near term, both leaders must spin the summit to their domestic audiences — playing it up as a victory without risk of being undermined by the other's system. Small, comparatively simple yet concrete steps like the reciprocal visit of Kim Jong Il, family reunions and joint sports teams will add substance to relations, while more difficult, longer-term issues - like the actualization of economic integration — develop. All this will be watched carefully by China, Japan, Russia and the United States, each with a major stake in the security of East Asia. Efforts will be made by these nations to reinsert themselves into the process of inter-Korean reconciliation — while at the same time maintain pace with inter-Korean developments.
As the excitement of the summit wears off, the focus will shift to three key issues. First, both leaders must find a way to maintain the momentum of the summit to overcome domestic obstacles to their agreements. Second, based on the Joint Declaration, a new definition of Korean reunification is emerging. Finally, while Seoul and Pyongyang begin the process of actualizing the summit agreements, the international community — particularly the four powers surrounding the peninsula — will redefine their assessments and policies in regard to the rapid changes on the peninsula. Image and Momentum: Selling the Summit at Home
The summit meeting between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il marks a shift in inter-Korean relations just days before the 50th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. The summit created a forum in which North Korean leader Kim Jong Il could create a new image of himself and North Korea, both domestically and internationally. Kim Jong Il, known as an avid fan of movies and media, played his part extremely well.
A last minute 24-hour delay to the summit reinforced North Korea's image as unpredictable and withdrawn. Amid heightened anxieties caused by the delay, Kim Dae Jung arrived in Pyongyang to the unexpected and unprecedented welcome of Kim Jong Il himself. The carefully choreographed welcome, complete with a military display, martial music and an estimated 600,000 well-wishers chanting “Kim Jong Il” gave the impression of a North Korean victory celebration. For his South Korean audience, Kim Jong Il smiled, joked and displayed the appropriate Confucian respect for the elder Kim Dae Jung. His appearance was in marked contrast to expectations in the South, where he has long been portrayed as a reclusive, mysterious, none-too-intelligent dictator with little charisma.
Kim Jong Il's performance gives him added political capital in the North, as he can now be seen as bringing the South to him. He must maintain this image of victor in order to balance the perception of his ultimate authority with the potential social side effects of opening the economy to South Korean technology and investments. In South Korea, there is but a brief window of opportunity for Pyongyang to maintain the new image of its leader before his new sheen fades and is perceived as little more than an act. In that time, Pyongyang must take concrete steps toward fulfilling aspects of the agreement.
Kim Dae Jung also has a stake in preserving the new public persona of Kim Jong Il. Kim Dae Jung returns from the summit victorious in gaining North Korean agreement to all points of his March 2000 Berlin declaration, including a timetable for the reunions of families separated by the Korean War. Linked to this highly emotional and popular point of the Joint Declaration, however, is the extremely controversial issue of releasing “unswerving Communists serving prison sentences in the South.” Kim Dae Jung has yet to bring together enough parliament members to form a majority coalition. The opposition Grand National Party (GNP), which alone falls just a few seats shy of a majority, strongly opposes the release of these imprisoned North Korean spies. The GNP has warned that the release of these prisoners would be insulting to the families of South Koreans injured or killed by the actions of North Korean infiltrators and terrorists, and it has cited North Korea's use of an earlier released detainee for propaganda purposes as proof that their release will accomplish little toward reconciliation. With the first inter-Korean summit under his belt and a Nobel Peace Prize virtually guaranteed, Kim Dae Jung is betting that the August 15 start of family reunions will buy him enough political capital to overcome the stigma of releasing former spies. Kim must also convince the nation that economic support for the North, with no apparent reciprocity, nonetheless benefits the South in the long term. However, if North Korea does not take sufficient action, Kim Dae Jung may find this a difficult task to accomplish.
“Two Countries, Two Systems” - Defining Reunification
In addition to family reunions, the release of long-term prisoners and economic assistance, the Joint Declaration yielded a statement not yet seen in previous key inter-Korean documents. Point two of the Declaration states: “For the achievement of reunification, we have agreed that there is a common element in the South's concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose form of federation. The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.” While the wording is ambiguous — the North Korean translation calling its proposal a “federation of lower stage” - the agreement introduces the possibility of a phased integration process. In essence, neither a German absorption reunification model, nor a Chinese-Hong Kong “one country two systems” model is the initial step. Rather, it is a “two countries two systems” economic integration, along the lines of the European Union. This new framework lays the groundwork for a more viable process of reintegration that avoids — for a time — the nearly irresolvable ideological divide between the Koreas. Neither regime is willing to step down from power, concede defeat and subject itself to the other. Instead of tackling the more difficult political or social integration, the economic integration can begin immediately — and indeed already has. According to South Korean government figures, the total number of South Korean firms involved in inter-Korean trade rose from 30 in 1989 to 581 in 1999. Bringing North Korea's economy into line with the South presents both opportunities and challenges. South Korea's GDP per capita stands at nearly 13 times that of the North, a far cry from the difference between the two Germanys at reunification. While North Korea currently offers cheap labor, the physical, legal and financial infrastructure is underdeveloped. The actualization of an economic integration - and likely simultaneous cultural and athletic cooperation — will require substantial attention in both the North and South. Pyongyang must balance economic investment and cooperation with the South while insulating North Koreans from fully realizing the economic gap between the nations and thus undermining social order. Seoul, meanwhile, will focus on redefining the parameters of economic reform and growth given the increased, and indeed government-supported, access to North Korea's labor and markets. International Responses — Keeping Up With the KoreasWhile Pyongyang and Seoul focus inward on developing and expanding economic and cultural cooperation, the international community will reassess the situation on the peninsula and redefine national policies. In particular, the four main peripheral powers to the peninsula — China, Japan, Russia and the United States — will find themselves reacting to the processes taking place in Korea, rather than leading them. Of all the peripheral powers, China is perhaps the most prepared for the coming changes on the peninsula, having played an important role in bringing the Koreas together. However, it must carefully monitor and manage the relationship between the two Koreas, so as to prevent the North from sliding into a more pro-U.S. camp.
Moscow has also begun re-engaging North Korea, promising a visit by President Vladimir Putin and lobbying against the U.S. plan for a missile defense system, saying North Korea is not a rogue nation nor a threat to U.S. interests.
Japan has also begun to act. Tokyo diplomats in Moscow are already seeking Russian support in pressing for an early realization of the so-called six-way talks on Northeast Asian security, according to ITAR-Tass. This would add Tokyo and Moscow to the existing four-way talks framework consisting of the two Koreas, China and the United States.
The United States, long the dominant player on the peninsula, is no longer in the driver's seat of inter-Korean relations. The Korean Summit marked a fundamental shift in the North Korean outlook - from treating South Korea as a puppet or tool of the United States to recognizing Seoul as the legitimate counterpart for negotiations. South Korea too has pushed a more independent policy for dealing with the North. Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy became the basis for U.S.-North Korea Policy Coordinator William Perry's recommendations for Washington's relations with Pyongyang. So much so that at the time of its release South Korean political cartoons showed Perry photocopying Kim's Sunshine Policy to deliver to the U.S. Congress. With North Korea dealing directly with South Korea, Seoul will continue to forge its own course, leaving Washington to follow. Faced with an election year and a lame duck president, the United States will remain behind the curve in inter-Korean relations for several more months.
After the Summit - Redefining Korean Relations
The Korean Summit has started a new era on the peninsula. Kim Jong Il has emerged from isolation and into the international arena, undercutting the international image of the North Korean leader as a reclusive despot while adding to the unpredictability of his behavior and goals. Relations between the two Koreas are now on a new footing as well, with the North welcoming the president of the South, rather than dismissing him as a puppet of the “imperialist” United States. Over the next months — and even years — the dominant issues on the peninsula have the potential to shift from whether war will break out to how integration can take place. In the near term, both leaders must spin the summit to their domestic audiences — playing it up as a victory without risk of being undermined by the other's system. Small, comparatively simple yet concrete steps like the reciprocal visit of Kim Jong Il, family reunions and joint sports teams will add substance to relations, while more difficult, longer-term issues - like the actualization of economic integration — develop. All this will be watched carefully by China, Japan, Russia and the United States, each with a major stake in the security of East Asia. Efforts will be made by these nations to reinsert themselves into the process of inter-Korean reconciliation — while at the same time maintain pace with inter-Korean developments.
