On June 5, members of the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) took control of the capital of the Solomon Islands, holding the prime minister, just 17 days after gunmen seized power in a coup attempt in Fiji.
In response, Australian Prime Minister John Howard said that while Australia condemns the acts in both nations, Australia “can't be held responsible for everything that goes wrong” in the region, according to the Australian Associated Press. The prime minister's statement is a far cry from what the doctrine Howard laid out in September 1999, after Australian forces led a multinational force in East Timor. At the time, he said that Australia has "a particular responsibility to do things above and beyond" in Asia.
The difference between Australia's involvement in East Timor and its hands-off approach to the Solomon Islands and Fiji lies in a simple fact. Timor threatened the security of the region and the coups unfolding on the islands right now do not.Fiji and the Solomon Islands have minimal strategic or economic implications for Australia. Australia has limited military resources available for operations outside its own territory. Economically, Fiji and the Solomon Islands represent less than 1 percent of Australia's total trade. Internal ethnic and economic struggles alone, then, provide little reason for Australia to risk its own citizens and resources in a direct intervention.
On May 19, 2000 a group of armed gunmen seized Fiji's first Prime Minister of Indian descent, Mahendra Chaudhry, exactly one year after Chaundhry was sworn in. The coup led by George Speight has been couched in terms of a struggle between the ethnic majority Fijians, who lost political power last year, and ethnic Indians, who make up 44 percent of the population and dominate the financial and professional sectors.
Speight, a member of the ethnic Fijian party SVT, is son of an SVT parliamentarian and friend of former Finance Minister Jim Ah Koy, also of the SVT. Under the previous SVT government, Speight was chairman of Fiji Hardwood Ltd., a state-run timber firm with the largest reserves of mahogany in the world, according to Fijilive.com.
When the predominately ethnic India Fiji Labor Party (FLP) came to power in 1999, Speight was removed from his posts, losing his economic power and political connections. While capitalizing on ethnic tensions, the coup has been less a broad-based ethnic movement than a personal attempt to rebuild economic power and political connections.
Similar to Fiji, the coup in the Solomon Islands has both ethnic and economic motivations. With the apparently unopposed coup in Fiji, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) planned and launched its own attempt to change the government on June 5, taking control of the security forces and holding Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu. The MEF demanded Ulufa'alu's resignation, claiming he had done little to ease ethnic tensions during his term. The MEF represents the natives of the island of Malaita, who have engaged in militia fighting for 18 months with members of the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFF), made up of natives of the neighboring island of Guadalcanal. For years, ethnic Malaitans have been moving to Guadalcanal - particularly the capital Honiara - dominating political and economic affairs. The IFF formed to oust the Malaitans, and the MEF was created to retaliate. In June 1999, fighting escalated, leading to the government declaring a state of emergency and the Commonwealth group of nations to dispatch a special envoy to bring the two sides together. While a peace accord was inked in late June, the tensions and fighting did not end.
In 1999, East Timor's vote for independence and subsequent separation from Indonesia threatened the stability of Indonesia, wracked by massive political change as well as religious, ethnic and separatist violence. Australia has interests in the natural gas deposits of the Timor Sea. Indonesia's strategic position, astride the passageway between the Indian and Pacific Ocean and as a buffer between Australia and the rest of Asia, also made Australian action an imperative.But the internal nature of the coups in Fiji and the Solomon Islands and the lack of broad strategic interests make Australian, or other international involvement, unlikely. While Australia has laid out a broader security role for itself in Asia and the Pacific, the cost and potential risk must match the strategic and economic interests of the nation and available military resources.
Both coup attempts are still unfolding. International responses, from India to the Commonwealth, have also shied away from direct involvement, instead decrying the subversion of democracy and threatening economic or political sanctions. And while Australia is prepared to deploy troops for the evacuation of its citizens should the situations deteriorate substantially, it is clear that Australia's regional security ambitions have limits.
In response, Australian Prime Minister John Howard said that while Australia condemns the acts in both nations, Australia “can't be held responsible for everything that goes wrong” in the region, according to the Australian Associated Press. The prime minister's statement is a far cry from what the doctrine Howard laid out in September 1999, after Australian forces led a multinational force in East Timor. At the time, he said that Australia has "a particular responsibility to do things above and beyond" in Asia.
The difference between Australia's involvement in East Timor and its hands-off approach to the Solomon Islands and Fiji lies in a simple fact. Timor threatened the security of the region and the coups unfolding on the islands right now do not.Fiji and the Solomon Islands have minimal strategic or economic implications for Australia. Australia has limited military resources available for operations outside its own territory. Economically, Fiji and the Solomon Islands represent less than 1 percent of Australia's total trade. Internal ethnic and economic struggles alone, then, provide little reason for Australia to risk its own citizens and resources in a direct intervention.
On May 19, 2000 a group of armed gunmen seized Fiji's first Prime Minister of Indian descent, Mahendra Chaudhry, exactly one year after Chaundhry was sworn in. The coup led by George Speight has been couched in terms of a struggle between the ethnic majority Fijians, who lost political power last year, and ethnic Indians, who make up 44 percent of the population and dominate the financial and professional sectors.
Speight, a member of the ethnic Fijian party SVT, is son of an SVT parliamentarian and friend of former Finance Minister Jim Ah Koy, also of the SVT. Under the previous SVT government, Speight was chairman of Fiji Hardwood Ltd., a state-run timber firm with the largest reserves of mahogany in the world, according to Fijilive.com.
When the predominately ethnic India Fiji Labor Party (FLP) came to power in 1999, Speight was removed from his posts, losing his economic power and political connections. While capitalizing on ethnic tensions, the coup has been less a broad-based ethnic movement than a personal attempt to rebuild economic power and political connections.
Similar to Fiji, the coup in the Solomon Islands has both ethnic and economic motivations. With the apparently unopposed coup in Fiji, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) planned and launched its own attempt to change the government on June 5, taking control of the security forces and holding Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu. The MEF demanded Ulufa'alu's resignation, claiming he had done little to ease ethnic tensions during his term. The MEF represents the natives of the island of Malaita, who have engaged in militia fighting for 18 months with members of the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFF), made up of natives of the neighboring island of Guadalcanal. For years, ethnic Malaitans have been moving to Guadalcanal - particularly the capital Honiara - dominating political and economic affairs. The IFF formed to oust the Malaitans, and the MEF was created to retaliate. In June 1999, fighting escalated, leading to the government declaring a state of emergency and the Commonwealth group of nations to dispatch a special envoy to bring the two sides together. While a peace accord was inked in late June, the tensions and fighting did not end.
In 1999, East Timor's vote for independence and subsequent separation from Indonesia threatened the stability of Indonesia, wracked by massive political change as well as religious, ethnic and separatist violence. Australia has interests in the natural gas deposits of the Timor Sea. Indonesia's strategic position, astride the passageway between the Indian and Pacific Ocean and as a buffer between Australia and the rest of Asia, also made Australian action an imperative.But the internal nature of the coups in Fiji and the Solomon Islands and the lack of broad strategic interests make Australian, or other international involvement, unlikely. While Australia has laid out a broader security role for itself in Asia and the Pacific, the cost and potential risk must match the strategic and economic interests of the nation and available military resources.
Both coup attempts are still unfolding. International responses, from India to the Commonwealth, have also shied away from direct involvement, instead decrying the subversion of democracy and threatening economic or political sanctions. And while Australia is prepared to deploy troops for the evacuation of its citizens should the situations deteriorate substantially, it is clear that Australia's regional security ambitions have limits.
