Chinese state-run media released an illuminating report April 19 discussing "living conditions and logical supplies" for Chinese soldiers stationed on islands in the Spratlys. The report mentioned that the islands were now outfitted with new and improved helicopters pads, weaponry, reconnaissance equipment and concrete shelters - all for use by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). In the past, the Chinese government has insisted that new structures built on the islands were meant for fishing, not for military use. Now it appears that the government has dropped that pretense. The policy shift comes just a week before a meeting between Chinese officials and South East Asian nations to haggle over a code of conduct for the South China Sea, where Beijing and four ASEAN members have a dispute over claims to the Spratly islands. The shift in policy suggests that China won't give an inch at the talks and may also herald a surge in Beijing's regional assertiveness. According to official Chinese maps, Beijing uses its claim to the Spratlys as its basis for claiming essentially the entire South China Sea as its territorial waters. Besides the political claim to the sea - and ensuing international legal rights that accompany it - the significance of the islands lies in their ability to extend the range of China's green water navy. The navy, operating from the Chinese coast and from the Spratlys, can cover the sea like pincers. Without that access, it could not cover the sea from only one side with the ships it has at hand. The South China Sea is perhaps the most important waterway in the world. For this reason, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam also stand firm behind their claim to sovereignty over these islands. Any country controlling these waters could potentially threaten the flow of trade to and from Northeast Asia. For a country like Japan, which imports 80 percent of its energy supplies, such interference could be paralyzing. As well, the Spratlys are believed to hold a wealth of oil, gas and mineral reserves yet to be exploited. Today's report about PLA equipment in the Spratlys highlights one of the main sticking points between ASEAN and Beijing. ASEAN nations perceive China as gradually expanding and fortifying its claim to islands that remain in dispute. It is a creeping invasion that they can do little to stop. Their draft version of the code of conduct, rejected by China in talks last year, centers around a rule restricting new occupation of reefs, shoals and islets in the area. Beijing's vision for the code is quite different. China's draft stipulates a ban on military exercises and patrols near the Spratlys. In addition, China has repeatedly warned ASEAN members against bilateral military exercises with the United States. The Philippines, a traditional U.S. military partner, has balked at this request; just last month the Philippine army held war games with U.S. troops near the Spratlys. Thailand and Singapore will hold annual Cobra Gold exercises with the United States on May 9. Neither China nor ASEAN has compelling reasons to compromise. ASEAN members would change little by threatening to sanction trade with China. Its major trading partner is the United States, followed by Japan. Even within Asia, exports to ASEAN nations represent only about an eighth of China's total exports within Asia. China would like to retain influence in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam, but likely weighs claims in the Spratlys as a simpler means to maintain it. The participating governments may sign a document at the April 25 meeting - but only one that avoids diametrically conflicting agendas, and thus settles nothing. No one, least of all Beijing, is prepared to yield. At the last meeting in March, China and members of ASEAN managed to agree that they needed some code of conduct, even if a non-legally binding one - in other words, no more than a gesture.China's actions in the Spratlys may well represent a broader shift in regional doctrine. In China, hard-line voices in the government now appear to be drowning out others, after a long struggle for power. The new unrestrained assertiveness in the Spratlys may soon extend to other regional relationships, whether it means courting regional allies or trumping adversaries - in particular, Taiwan.