Japanese Vice Defense Minister Shingo Nishimura resigned Oct. 20 following an interview in which he said parliament should consider whether Japan "might be better off if it armed itself with nuclear weapons." Nishimura's comment was greeted with shock and astonishment. The suggestion that Japan should become a nuclear power counters the principal of non-belligerency in Japan's constitution. At the same time, it contextualizes other discussions over the definition and interpretation of Japan's self-defense guidelines.
While Nishimura's comment represents an extreme view. It comes in the midst of calls for Japan's Self Defense Force (SDF) to participate in the international force in East Timor and an ongoing debate over the role of the SDF spurred by the revised Japanese-U.S. defense cooperation agreement. In this context, public presentation of the furthest extreme of the self-defense debate is less likely to cause a reconsideration of Japan's nuclear weapons policy than to open up the middle ground to debate.
Nishimura's suggestion that Japan rethink its nuclear policy may be a way to gauge national and external reactions to a possible change in Japan's current stance. Though Tokyo has been quick to deny any move toward introducing nuclear weapons, some newspapers expressed sympathy for Nishimura's "candor" in openly broaching nuclear policy. In addition, opposition parties in the Diet have demanded a committee on national security be called prior to the Diet's extra session to discuss Nishimura's remarks.
Under Chapter II, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, Japan is forbidden to maintain land, sea and air forces. This ensures that they abide by the overriding principle to forever renounce war and the use of force in settling international disputes. Despite Article 9, Japan has been undergoing a natural progression toward redefining its self-defense, pulling away from a reliance on the United States for security issues.
Three anti-nuclear principles have been part of Japanese government policy since 1968. They say that Japan cannot make, possess or import nuclear weapons. Nishimura's comment is unlikely to challenge these principles. However, Japan's pacifist stance maybe be called into question by less dramatic and more pragmatic issues, such as the upcoming naval exercises with the United States and participation in East Timor operations.
There is strong national interest in discussion of defense guideline modifications to enable the deployment of the SDF to East Timor. This, in turn, would set the precedent for future multinational operations in which troops could come under fire and it would define the overall role of the SDF. The next logical progression would be a redefinition or reinterpretation of the half-century-old constitution.
There are signs modification may be on the horizon. One Liberal Democratic lawmaker told former Indonesian President B.J. Habibie on Oct. 11 that Japan was prepared to lift the 1992 law limiting U.N. peacekeeping forces to non-combat duties following conflict resolution. And Liberal Party leader Ichiro Ozawa stated Oct. 21 that Japan should send SDF forces to East Timor.
Another indication is Japan's participation in naval exercises with U.S. assistance Oct. 27-Nov. 9. The exercises, unprecedented in scale, are intended to simulate a response to an emergency situation in "areas surrounding Japan." Neighboring nations are already expressing concern over air space violations and may be beginning to doubt Japan's pacifism.
Japan appears to be following a natural pathway in wanting to defend itself like every other nation. Though discussion of constitutional revisions is still largely taboo, other factors are beginning to prompt talk of constitutional redefinition. As Japan continues to be called upon to participate in international operations and to operate like a "normal" nation, the natural evolution of the defense guidelines, and eventually its pacifist constitution, will continue.
While Nishimura's comment represents an extreme view. It comes in the midst of calls for Japan's Self Defense Force (SDF) to participate in the international force in East Timor and an ongoing debate over the role of the SDF spurred by the revised Japanese-U.S. defense cooperation agreement. In this context, public presentation of the furthest extreme of the self-defense debate is less likely to cause a reconsideration of Japan's nuclear weapons policy than to open up the middle ground to debate.
Nishimura's suggestion that Japan rethink its nuclear policy may be a way to gauge national and external reactions to a possible change in Japan's current stance. Though Tokyo has been quick to deny any move toward introducing nuclear weapons, some newspapers expressed sympathy for Nishimura's "candor" in openly broaching nuclear policy. In addition, opposition parties in the Diet have demanded a committee on national security be called prior to the Diet's extra session to discuss Nishimura's remarks.
Under Chapter II, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, Japan is forbidden to maintain land, sea and air forces. This ensures that they abide by the overriding principle to forever renounce war and the use of force in settling international disputes. Despite Article 9, Japan has been undergoing a natural progression toward redefining its self-defense, pulling away from a reliance on the United States for security issues.
Three anti-nuclear principles have been part of Japanese government policy since 1968. They say that Japan cannot make, possess or import nuclear weapons. Nishimura's comment is unlikely to challenge these principles. However, Japan's pacifist stance maybe be called into question by less dramatic and more pragmatic issues, such as the upcoming naval exercises with the United States and participation in East Timor operations.
There is strong national interest in discussion of defense guideline modifications to enable the deployment of the SDF to East Timor. This, in turn, would set the precedent for future multinational operations in which troops could come under fire and it would define the overall role of the SDF. The next logical progression would be a redefinition or reinterpretation of the half-century-old constitution.
There are signs modification may be on the horizon. One Liberal Democratic lawmaker told former Indonesian President B.J. Habibie on Oct. 11 that Japan was prepared to lift the 1992 law limiting U.N. peacekeeping forces to non-combat duties following conflict resolution. And Liberal Party leader Ichiro Ozawa stated Oct. 21 that Japan should send SDF forces to East Timor.
Another indication is Japan's participation in naval exercises with U.S. assistance Oct. 27-Nov. 9. The exercises, unprecedented in scale, are intended to simulate a response to an emergency situation in "areas surrounding Japan." Neighboring nations are already expressing concern over air space violations and may be beginning to doubt Japan's pacifism.
Japan appears to be following a natural pathway in wanting to defend itself like every other nation. Though discussion of constitutional revisions is still largely taboo, other factors are beginning to prompt talk of constitutional redefinition. As Japan continues to be called upon to participate in international operations and to operate like a "normal" nation, the natural evolution of the defense guidelines, and eventually its pacifist constitution, will continue.
