The event consuming Russia's attention and energy until the middle of next year is the succession of President Boris Yeltsin, the only president post-Soviet Russia has known. Instead of being sent off with thanks, Yeltsin and his governments will be ushered into history held responsible for the ruinous process of economic reform. An era draws to an ignominious end. But the shape of Russian politics that will follow can already be discerned in the political campaigns now under way, both for the Duma elections on Dec. 19 and the presidential contest next June. The balance of power between the presidency and the legislature is already determined; the Russian Constitution favors the presidency. The Duma is frequently little more than a debating society. The elections are significant for what they foretell. The Duma election foreshadows the presidential one: Several potential presidential candidates are heading parties or blocs vying for the Duma, and success in December will indicate strength in June. The Duma elections will, in fact, indicate just how radical the shift away from Yeltsin will be. Contrary to alarmism in the West, Russians do not appear ready to hand power to reactionaries such as the Stalinists.
Yet Russia is poised for a dramatic reversal of course. The parties likely to gain the greatest number of seats in the Duma in December hearken not to the recent experiment of pro-Western reform but instead to the centralized and tightly managed early days of perestroika. The signs are unmistakable; crushed, humiliated and nearly penniless, Russia is headed back into its past.
Duma Race: The Also-Rans
The major political factions competing for the Russian Duma - and eventually the presidency - can be roughly divided into three groups: the sentimentalists, the dreamers and the centrists.
The sentimentalists, who hearken back to what was, include the now essentially mainstream Communist Party, as well as radical fringe groups such as the Stalinists. Second are the dreamers, pro-Western reformers still seeking what might have been. Included are the Union of Right Wing Forces, which groups the long-discredited liberal reformers of former Yeltsin governments, and the more moderate Yabloko party, which has managed to avoid being tarred by most of the failures of reform. Finally, and predominantly, are the centrists: various iterations of the post-reform party in power, notably the Fatherland-All Russia and Unity blocs, and Our Home is Russia.
Once again, the communists of the KPRF are doing well and seem poised for a repeat of their success in the 1995 elections. The party is polling nationally within a few points of the favorite, Fatherland-All Russia. With its familiar platform and promises, and a scandal-free reputation, the KPRF is becoming the country's political comfort food. In 1995, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), led by Gennady Zyuganov, won the largest bloc of seats in the Duma, with 22.3 percent of the vote.
Over the last two years, the KPRF has attempted to balance its traditional message and image with a move toward the center. The strategy, however, has served less to attract new voters than to drive away the few firebrands that gave the party vibrancy. Even the bulk of its longtime ally, the Agrarian Party, has left for Fatherland-All Russia. Nevertheless, as things stand, the KPRF's large, if aging, electorate should deliver the party a strong second place in the Duma elections.
The KPRF could improve its current position in either of two ways. First, if the centrists and moderate reformers continue to tear each other apart, or Yeltsin attempts an extra-constitutional gambit to retain power, the KPRF would stand to capitalize on the opening. For this, the Communists need only remain alert and media savvy. Second, and more proactively, they could capitalize on two main issues in Russian politics - the Chechen war and the money laundering scandals. The Chechen war is difficult for the KPRF to oppose, since it appeals to nationalist sentiment, but Zyuganov will be ready to pounce if Russian forces become bogged down, or are routed. The scandals are a cudgel with which to beat the Kremlin-backed parties, although KPRF has so far not wielded the issue as well as has the Fatherland-All Russia camp.
Antipathy toward the Kremlin corruption may find an outlet in support for the Stalinists and other extremists. Fortunately for the West, Russia's radical fringe are such a divided bunch of strong personalities, there is little chance they will be able to put together a sustainable bloc of any size. The "Stalinist Bloc: Workers' Russia, Officers - for the USSR" bloc, led by Viktor Anpilov and others, could squeak in on a protest vote. A previous version of this Stalinist bloc fell less than half a percent shy of winning proportional representation in the Duma in 1995.
The Stalinists could also benefit from the decline of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), recently re-invented as the "Zhirinovsky Bloc." Tainted as it is by past support for the Yeltsin administration and by rumors that it is now under the influence of hated oligarch Boris Berezovsky and his allies, Zhirinovsky's party is unlikely to win proportional representation this time around. December could easily see some of the party's protest vote going to the Stalinists.
On the opposite end of the spectrum are Russia's dreamers: the pro-Western reformers. Of these, only Yabloko stands a chance at the polls.
Leader Grigory Yavlinsky's successful role in past economic reforms and, more important, his lack of involvement in the Kremlin's failures, makes Yabloko a prime target for Russians who still hold out hope for reform, yet aren't happy with what they have seen. The Aug. 24 addition of former Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin - a late convert to reformist sentiments - to the Yabloko ticket will likely make little difference at the polls, as the conservative votes he draws will be offset by the liberal votes he drives to the Union of Right Wing Forces.
The party will likely rank third in the Duma race - it is currently polling at about 10 percent nationwide, and at least twice that in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Yabloko will undoubtedly retain its own electoral base and could gain some support from reform-oriented voters who see the Union of Right Wing Forces as a lost cause, and from centrist voters dissatisfied with both Fatherland-All Russia and Our Home is Russia.
The Union of Right Wing Forces (SPS), on the other hand, is hopeless. Cobbled together from the tattered remnants of the pro-Western reform movement, SPS groups together several of the main theoretical economists and political reformers Russians hold personally responsible for the collapse of the Russian economy. Included are former prime ministers Yegor Gaidar and Sergei Kirienko, and veteran Kremlin power broker and former Yeltsin Finance Minister Anatoly Chubais. While SPS did not exist in 1995, member parties that did run failed to make the 5 percent threshold for proportional representation with all their votes taken together. Now, with Russia still recovering from last year's economic collapse, it would take nothing short of a miracle for the SPS to win 5 percent of the vote.
One early indication of how poorly the bloc is doing can be seen in St. Petersburg, a liberal center where coalition member Russia's Democratic Choice did well in 1995. A recent Gallup poll showed SPS running fourth in the city, with 8 percent. The bloc fell behind Fatherland-All Russia and Yabloko, each with 27 percent, and the Communists, with 9 percent. Elsewhere, the SPS barely scrapes 2 percent. While individual SPS leaders may win in carefully selected single-member districts, the few votes that might have gone to their federal ticket will likely take refuge in Yabloko.
Primakov Gains Strength
The most popular and dynamic group of parties, the loosely defined "centrists," is poised to take power. Led by former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, the center-left Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) coalition is positioned not only to control a commanding position in the Duma, but to launch Primakov into the presidency as well.
Though political polling is far from failure-proof in vast and heterogeneous Russia, there is no reason to doubt predictions OVR will take up to 25 or even 30 percent of the vote. Depending on how many other parties make it past the 5 percent barrier and by what amount - and depending on how the single-member districts shake out - OVR could feasibly come within one coalition partner of controlling the Duma.
While OVR dominates in the polls, it has two deep internal contradictions. Primakov's partner and would-be presidential competitor recently resolved one of these by publicly announcing his intention not to run for the presidency. Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's poor showing in the polls supports his decision to step aside. But his decision is only as durable as other Russian politicians' declarations; in other words, this is not likely to be his final word on the subject.
The other contradiction, the inherent conflict between the party's strong federalist and its regional leaders, may be mitigated by the new Unity bloc. Russia's governors are now dividing among themselves, aligning with competing factions such as OVR and Unity. Representing a bid by Yeltsin's political "Family" to retain some control over its destiny, Unity trails far behind OVR in the polls. Led by the respected and previously apolitical "Hero of Russia," Emergency Situations Minister Col. Gen. Sergei Shoigu, Unity faces serious potential pitfalls.
Chief among these is the dangerous deal the Kremlin struck with the regional governors who form the backbone of the bloc. In the absence of a charismatic leader or its own grass-roots network, Unity needs the support of the governors' political machines to generate votes. As most of these governors represent Russia's more economically backward regions, this support was likely won through the promise of economic incentives, which could only be granted at the expense of IMF austerity measures or Russia's wealthier, OVR-aligned regions.
Primakov's party is seizing on Unity's deepest weakness: its connections to the Kremlin. Such accusations have been hard to shake. The late date at which the party coalesced and its sudden, well-organized appearance on the scene argue against grass roots origins. Yeltsin's deputy chief of staff helped organize the bloc, and Yeltsin presented Shoigu with Russia's highest medal, Hero of Russia, just before he stepped forward to take the helm of Unity. While Shoigu claims that Yeltsin was surprised and concerned by the formation of the new bloc, neither the president nor Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have tried to hide their support for Unity.
In addition, OVR has launched a full-scale effort to portray Unity as the product of Boris Berezovsky. If there is one person less popular in Russia than either the radical economic reformers or the president, it is Berezovsky. Several recent events have played into this allegation. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, his personal mouthpiece, was all but cheerleading plans for the merger of Unity and Our Home is Russia (NDR), which would have boosted Unity at the polls. Even former prime minister and potential political ally Viktor Chernomyrdin called Unity a Berezovsky project.
If OVR can use these factors to make the link between Berezovsky and Unity stick, the bloc may be dead in the water.
The Men Who Would Be President
Three winners are shaping up in the Duma contest for proportional representation: Primakov's OVR, the KPRF and Yabloko, probably in that order. The Zhirinovsky Bloc and the Stalinists, competing for the protest vote, each stand a slight chance of sneaking across the 5 percent line. Unity may end up with a few dozen deputies, though they will likely be directly elected.
The Duma elections are most important in what they predict for the real seat of Russian power: the presidency. Russians tend to identify parties with individuals, rather than the other way around. Votes for top parties and blocs competing for the Duma are as much votes for the presidential candidates heading them as they are for the parties themselves.
As a result, the strongest candidates to emerge for next year's presidential contest will be Primakov and Luzhkov from OVR; Zyuganov of the KPRF; and Yavlinsky and Stepashin of Yabloko. In addition, Putin is likely to receive support from Unity. While his party is in decline, Zhirinovsky will undoubtedly run in the election, as will independent candidate Gen. Alexander Lebed.
The Duma election will not just determine who gets seats in the legislature but also launch the presidential campaign. The parties and candidates will likely wait for the outcome of the Duma elections before doing anything too rash. Once the balance of power becomes evident, there will be six months in which to win, buy or steal the presidential election.
And presidential politics are already mirroring those of the Duma. The presidential polls reflect the Duma polls, with Primakov well in the lead, followed by Zyuganov and either Yavlinsky or Putin. Primakov also comes out ahead in the various hypothetical two-way races. As we have mentioned previously, Russian poll data is highly questionable, and a concerted campaign by Boris Yeltsin in 1996 overcame predictions of his defeat. But accuracy in predicting the presidential winner is not necessary to predict presidential policies.
Indeed, the shape of issues in the presidency is already being outlined. While three different themes are resonating in the campaigns, among the leading presidential contenders there are just two agendas. Next June's election will pit a majority of candidates rooted in the limited, state-controlled "reforms" of the late Soviet era - Primakov, Putin, and Zyuganov - against one actual reformist: Yavlinsky.
Russians are seeking order more than reform, and Yavlinsky cannot promise this. Even if miraculously handed the presidency, Yavlinsky would find himself in the same quandary as did reformist Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar. Yavlinsky lacks the strength, the will and the support necessary to crush the Communists, the remaining oligarchs and the entrenched apparatchiks.
All of the remaining leading presidential contenders - Primakov, Putin, Luzhkov, Lebed, Zyuganov and Stepashin - are products of the last days of the Soviet regime. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, they have consistently reflected this legacy in their behavior.
As a member of the Soviet Politburo and the Communist Party, leading presidential contender Primakov took part in shaping and managing perestroika. When the economic experiment spun out of control, Primakov was reportedly involved in the massive flight of Communist Party capital and Soviet state property to safe havens abroad. Later, as head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Primakov blocked an investigation by the Russian parliament into the alleged illegal holdings.
His tendency toward centralization was also evident in his term as prime minister. While in office, he unleashed the Russian Prosecutor General against the oligarchs and attempted to reassert central control over key sectors such as the media and arms sales. He surrounded himself with the Soviet cronies, packing the government with former KGB agents and placing the former head of the Soviet central planning agency, Gosplan, in charge of the economy. He placed a priority on preventing Russia's disintegration, advocating a strong central government, appointed governors and enacted top-down management of the regions. In foreign policy, Primakov's style was confrontational, emphasizing the military and security services.
Primakov has continued to press a Soviet era-inspired agenda in the Duma campaign, calling for centrally-controlled economic restructuring and maintaining a strong and internationally influential regime. His partner Luzhkov, a potential presidential candidate as well, was once considered a reformer but is more accurately described as a regional party boss, more amenable to central control than to free-market reforms. Both OVR leaders are supported by a cadre of former KGB officers, scattered throughout the Moscow city government and through the MOST Group business empire of their financial backer, Vladimir Gusinsky.
Putin likewise has his roots in the Communist Party, the KGB and perestroika. A career KGB officer, Putin was not a perestroika planner, but a trusted and highly competent foot soldier in the project. Evidence suggests he was involved in Communist Party capital flight during his tenure as a KGB officer in Germany. Upon returning to Leningrad, Putin infiltrated the reformist movement and became deeply involved in establishing and managing the shape of perestroika there.
As prime minister, Putin has dramatically reasserted central control over the regions - driving guerrillas out of Dagestan and ordering the invasion of Chechnya. He has firmly asserted the priority of Russia's national interests over the concerns of the IMF. Specifically, he has committed to rebuilding Russia's defense and security forces and to re-establishing the central government's authority in the regions. As well, Putin allowed the revival of the corruption investigations initiated by Primakov against the oligarchs. And he has presided over continuing administration efforts to gain control of key sectors of the economy such as arms and energy.
In the end, the choice between Primakov and Putin is nothing more than a choice between master and student. Putin picked up as prime minister where Primakov left off. They share the same origins and agenda. Luzhkov, though a far less popular candidate, is aligned with Primakov and if elected would likely follow the same agenda.
Nor does Communist Party chief Zyuganov offer much variety. Apparently not deeply involved in the perestroika effort, he was more of a traditional Soviet bureaucrat. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Zyuganov has shifted the KPRF more toward the center, coming to accept the inevitability of economic openness. Even so, his image of an open economy, like that of his political rivals, involves substantial government intervention, broad social safety nets and a strong regime.
Lebed, a long shot for the presidency but a potential kingmaker, has demonstrated his affinity for the perestroika model as governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai. As governor, he favors a strong military and central government, and does not shirk from intervention in the economy.
Finally, despite his newfound affiliation with Yavlinsky and Yabloko, Sergei Stepashin's reformist credentials are dubious at best. The main part of Stepashin's career was in the security services, first in the Soviet Interior Ministry, where he was tasked to extinguish hot-spots throughout the Soviet Union, then in Yeltsin's administration. Like Putin, Stepashin monitored Leningrad's reformists in the early 1990s. He later served in Yeltsin's security and intelligence apparatuses before succeeding Primakov as prime minister.
Stepashin has little chance of winning the presidency, but if he does, his career suggests that he would be willing to employ the security apparatus in the interests of the central government.
All of the candidates who stand a chance at the presidency share a highly centralized approach to government. Most have common backgrounds, and political training, within the Communist Party and/or the KGB. And many were deeply involved with the development and implementation of perestroika. With the candidates so firmly stacked toward federal control, Russia's new government is not likely to follow the model the West has in mind.
The West is not likely to intervene on behalf of reform. Western nations and their financial institutions tried this before, only to be taken for a ride. Admitting this and coming out against the Kremlin is also not an enticing option, as it risks tarnishing the Kremlin's long-time proponents in the West, as well as undermining what few elements of the reform process remain in Russia. Facing a choice between several perestroikist "centrists" and a reactionary collapse of Russia, Western leaders will opt to avoid the latter and to deal with the presidential victor later.
The cautious line being taken by the West is already apparent in the money laundering scandals. Worries about stability have kept the investigation from becoming too public or going too high within the Kremlin. Unwilling to risk fueling an already-enflamed Russian nationalist sentiment by forcing the country into more dire economic straits, Western governments will likely prod the International Monetary Fund (IMF) into releasing tranches of its last loan before each of the upcoming elections.
In the end, there is little the West, or Russian reformists, can do. Even if Western-style reformists were to take control, the current situation in Russia is such that they would not be able to implement reform before gaining control of the country's chaotic economic situation.
Russia's current political and economic situations demand the iron-fisted re-imposition of central control. The Russian government is paralyzed, unable to rein in the oligarchs and criminals who dominate the economy. Lacking adequate revenues, the government is unable to maintain the Russian military or to assert control over the regions. This requires extreme measures. If the next government refuses to take measures to re-impose central authority and, in some cases, central control, it will surrender the country to decay, disintegration and extremism.
None of the leading candidates are yet prepared to surrender Russia to this fate. A decade after the end of the Cold War, the future of Russia is as clear as its recent history. It is propelling itself backwards in a desperate attempt to gain control. Russia in the year 2000 will dramatically resemble the Russia of the final years of the Soviet Union.
