In the latest installment of the Spratlys saga, Vietnam on June 28 spoke out against recent construction on the disputed islands undertaken by Malaysia. A spokesperson for Vietnam's Foreign Ministry reiterated Vietnam's claim to the Spratlys and described Malaysia's construction of a two-storey building, a radar antenna and a helipad on Investigator Shoal as "a violation of Vietnam's sovereignty." The Philippines officially protested the Malaysian construction on June 24, charging that Investigator Shoal - which Manila calls Pawikan Shoal - falls within the Philippines' 200-mile exclusive economic zone. The Spratlys, which control vital sea lanes and are believed to hold valuable natural resources, are claimed, in whole or in part, by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, China and Taiwan. The four ASEAN member claimants together protested Chinese construction on Mischief Reef in the Spratlys last year. The nations' inability to resolve their own disputes over the islands illustrates an important feature of Southeast Asian politics. The threat posed by China's claim on the Spratlys is clear to all in Southeast Asia. China lacks a sufficient blue water navy to project military power in the region. Establishing a presence in the Spratlys would allow China's coastal navy to perform as a blue water navy, controlling sea lanes inaccessible from bases on the mainland or Hainan Island. But while ASEAN members came together against Chinese construction on Mischief Reef, they have been unable to maintain that unified front, ultimately weakening their position vis-a-vis China. This means one of two things. ASEAN countries could be viewing the competition for the Spratlys in strictly economic terms, underestimating the strategic importance of the islands. Given the predominantly military interest and involvement in the islands seen from ASEAN members, that does not appear to be the case. Alternatively, while the ASEAN members appreciate the potential threat posed by a Chinese presence in the Spratlys, they either do not believe China is capable of deploying to and holding the islands - not likely, given the Mischief Reef construction - or they expect an outside power to ultimately deal with the problem. Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines believe that the United States will not accept Chinese control of the South China Sea, and if even if the United States does, they believe Japan cannot tolerate it. In fact, Manila made a major issue of the Spratlys, in part, to ensure passage of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States. ASEAN is uncomfortable with Chinese expansionism and apparently comfortable with the idea of a countervailing power protecting them from China. It will be interesting to see which countervailing power the member nations' combined or individual foreign policies prefer.