Philippine President Joseph Estrada on December 3 called for criminal charges to be filed against twenty Chinese fishermen captured on November 30 near a disputed reef in the Spratly Islands. There had been earlier indications that the fishermen would be freed following a stern lecture on Philippine territorial claims and fishing regulations, the standard treatment of Chinese found fishing in Philippine territorial waters. However, despite calls from the Chinese government for the immediate release of the fishermen, it now seems that Estrada is intent on keeping Chinese-Philippine relations in a state of duress. His latest move seems to be inviting a Chinese reprisal, so we might ask what the Philippines could gain by provoking China? The issue of territorial control over the Spratly Islands is long-standing and complicated. While China, Vietnam, and Taiwan each claim to be the sole owner of the island chain, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei also claim various islands and reefs. In October, China and the Philippines came head to head over Chinese construction on one of the Islands. In response to the presence of Chinese warships and construction of shelters on Mischief Reef, the Philippines raised an immediate call for China to cease building on the reef. The Philippine reply did not end there, however, and orders were given for Philippine Navy patrol ships to fire warning shots at Chinese vessels found within five miles of the disputed reef. At that time, prior to the APEC summit in Malaysia, we discussed several possible reasons for the Philippines' aggressive attitude toward China (AIU Volume 1, No. 29, November 12, 1998). The most obvious reason, and one that is still valid today, was that Estrada needed a potential Chinese threat in order to persuade the Philippine Senate to approve a new military agreement with the United States. Estrada wants to renew military training cooperation with the U.S. in part to gain U.S. assistance in upgrading the Philippine military. Nationalistic sentiments in the Philippine Senate, however, do not favor the return of a U.S. military presence to the Philippines. An overriding dread of aggressive Chinese behavior would give Estrada the extra bargaining chip he needs. Another factor that may have influenced Estrada to keep tensions with China high was the possibility that he was, in fact, acting on behalf of U.S. policy. In the run-up to the APEC meeting, the U.S. embarked on what appeared to be a diplomatic offensive against China over non-economic strategic issues, including Taiwan and Tibet. The Philippines simply added to the pressure on China by provoking a potential military confrontation over the Spratly Islands. With the conclusion of the APEC summit, however, the tensions over Chinese construction activity in the Spratlys seemed to fade away. As these tensions were receding, the Philippine Navy captured twenty Chinese fishermen near another disputed reef, Alicia Annie, on November 30. Accused of illegally fishing in Philippine waters and using cyanide for fishing, the twenty were taken to the Armed Forces Western Command Headquarters in Ulugan Bay. On December 1, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Tang Guoquiang requested their release and said China felt the detentions were illegal. The same day, Philippine Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora announced that the fishermen would soon be released after a lecture on respecting Philippine territory. However, on December 3, Estrada ordered government prosecutors to file charges. Estrada said, "They violated some Philippine laws, so they should be charged. We are not afraid. Anybody who violates the law of the country should be charged. Nobody is exempted from the rule of law." Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas, originally concerned over the potential increase in tensions with China, has said that he has now notified the prosecutor's office of Estrada's decision. China's response to the news was swift. Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao demanded the immediate release of the fishermen, and stated further that "we will take effective measures to prevent the occurrence of similar issues in the future." While Estrada was challenging China over the fishermen, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon was addressing the issue of China at a forum on American-Philippine relations. While saying that China's refusal to deal with disputed territorial issues now will affect China's effectiveness in the region in the future, Siazon specifically cited the Spratly issue. Siazon warned that U.S. relations with China should be handled cautiously and with the good of the rest of Asia in mind. "The issue here is that Washington may be tempted to invest too much in its strategic partnership with Beijing to the detriment of the interests of its regional allies," according to Siazon. At the same meeting, Estrada also focused on the Spratly issue and called on greater cooperation with the U.S., saying, "There are security problems in our region such as the continuing issue of Mischief Reef and of the South China Sea." He again pushed for a new military agreement with the U.S. and said, "We should be able to use our alliance to assist the urgent task of modernizing our armed forces." While his actions before APEC may have been in part instigated by the U.S., Estrada now seems to be moving on his own. Though some geopolitical tensions with China are beneficial to the U.S. position in Asia, the refusal of Estrada to let the current crisis pass may put the U.S. in an awkward position. If the Philippines and China continue on this path, and the tensions escalate to military proportions, the U.S. may be forced to make some tough choices. Estrada is pushing now both internally and externally. Keeping the threat of China alive makes approval of the military cooperation treaty by the Philippine Senate more likely. At the same time, Estrada wants the U.S. to wholly support the Philippines over China in the Spratlys and to limit its China policy initiatives. Estrada is now playing his own game, and the stakes are high. He is not letting up on China, and is betting on the U.S. to back him up. The question is, how far is Estrada willing to go?
RANE
SUBSCRIBERS ONLY

Expert analysis when it matters most.

Get access to RANE's decision-grade geopolitical intelligence.