The repeatedly delayed final round of peace negotiations between the Myanmar government and 16 major ethnic insurgent groups has been postponed again until March. The so-called Hpa-An talks, to take place in Karen state's capital, are expected to precede a grand ceremony for signing a landmark national cease-fire agreement. Ethnic insurgent leaders and civilian government officials reportedly reached an agreement on a broad cease-fire framework following a series of high-level negotiations that began in mid-2013. Yet the government's attempt to expedite the agreement and show domestic and international audiences its commitment to peace was postponed because of remaining differences with ethnic forces and splits within the government itself.
The process of national reconciliation is part of the latest chapter of Myanmar's political transformation and normalization of relations with the outside world. After coming to power in March 2011, the quasi-civilian government under President Thein Sein had pledged to make ethnic issues a national priority, underscored by three principles — internal peace, stability and development — that would guide the country's political change. This was reflected by the government's effort to mend ties with ethnic groups, including the discarding of a mandate for these groups to disarm and transform their autonomous militias into border guard forces under the command of Myanmar's armed forces, known as Tatmadaw.
Meanwhile, Naypyidaw adopted a three-step strategy for peace talks: a state-level cease-fire focusing on truces with individual groups, a national cease-fire agreement and, eventually, an inclusive political dialogue that will address differences on key issues such as political autonomy and power sharing in the ethnic region and ethnic groups' demand for a federalist system. Thirteen cease-fire agreements were signed, covering more than half of the country's main ethnic armed groups and forces.
Nonetheless, the cease-fire process did not preclude Tatmadaw's ongoing military offensive in northern Kachin state and part of Shan state, where powerful ethnic insurgent armies remain, including the Shan State Army and Palaung State Liberation Front/Taang National Liberation Army. Most notably, war against the Kachin Independence Army broke out in June 2011, ending a 17-year cease-fire pact and fueling speculation among many ethnic forces that the government was not serious in its offers of a cease-fire and peace. Small-scale skirmishes in these regions have continued until the present day. Meanwhile, the three major ethnic armed forces in Shan state — the Restoration Council of Shan state, the United Wa State Army and the National Democratic Alliance Army, the latter two of which are closely allied to China — have not yet agreed to participate in the cease-fire agreement.
No War, No Peace
With seven main national ethnic minority groups — Kachin, Chin, Karen, Shan, Karenni, Rakhine, Mon — and countless smaller groups occupying vast and sensitive borderland, Myanmar has been defined in its modern history by enduring ethnic conflicts and armed struggles. The root of these hostilities lies in the ongoing struggle for the ethnic majority Bamar to exert power in the country's highland periphery, home to most ethnic minorities. Soon after independence, many highland ethnicities, including the Kachin, Shan, Karen and Chin, fought against the Bamar-dominated central regime for autonomy and control over natural resources. Complicating this was the communist upheaval, as well as numerous internal divisions and shifting alliances among the ethnic minorities in the highlands.
The absence of nation-building and high degree of state insecurity had forced successive Myanmar governments to always prioritize a state-centric security policy. Shortly after independence, the country faced successive threats of uprisings from Karen rebels against the lower Irrawaddy River Valley, growing communist insurgencies and exploitation by bordering countries. The need to preserve Bamar-centered national security warranted the military's hard-line approach toward insurgencies and its eventual rise to power. The tendency to prioritize national security also provided a justification for the junta's 50-year-long dictatorship, economic mismanagement and decadeslong isolationism. When the military sealed Myanmar off from the rest of the world, the country was relatively secure yet very underdeveloped.
Previous Attempts at Reconciliation
Numerous ethnic minorities and a borderland with a tendency to fragment left Myanmar's central government with two options: a military, security-centered regime isolated from the international community or an open, civilian government facing the country's ongoing division. Isolation meant economic stagnation, and openness meant the proliferation of internal volatility. Western pressure, strengthened by sanctions, for political transformation and economic pressure to open to the international community forced Myanmar to reintegrate with the world.
However, the country's perennial internal conflicts also pushed civilian political elites in Naypyidaw to prioritize national reconciliation. Meanwhile, Myanmar's ethnic regions host some of the country's most lucrative hydropower, coal and mineral resources and thus are crucial for Myanmar's investment and trade prospects. These regions are also important to Myanmar's ability to connect with fast-growing neighboring economies.
This scene has played out before. The former military government, pushed by the West into political transformation after its bloody crackdown in 1988 on pro-democracy protests and a subsequent coup, made similar attempts at reconciliation. Along with a national election and a host of economic reform proposals, the military government reached 20 cease-fire agreements with ethnic armies, including the United Wa State Army, the Kokangs, the Mons and the Kachins.
However, these earlier cease-fire pacts were limited. Basically truces, they failed to transform into the promised political settlement to address ethnic minorities' fundamental calls for power sharing and economic development. At the same time, an unexpected overwhelming victory by the opposition National League for Democracy during elections and a lack of international acknowledgement further convinced the military junta to tighten its grip on power out of greater concerns for regime security. The outcome was an eventual collapse of the cease-fire agreements and a deepening gulf between the minority ethnicities and the central government, simultaneous with the abrupt end of the political transition in the early 1990s.
Obstacles to National Reconciliation
Myanmar's unsettled geopolitical challenges — divisions along geographic and ethnic lines — continue to threaten its current political transition. The country's rising strategic significance as an energy corridor to China and a key part of the Southeast Asian system gave way to greater acceptance from the international community after the regime's political opening. Fast-track political reforms and a cease-fire agreement carried out by the civilian government also raised optimism among the public and ethnic groups about the possibility of a peaceful transition.
Nonetheless, as all sides move beyond a symbolic national cease-fire and toward a sensitive political settlement and constitutional amendments, the unresolved ethnic divisions and differences over power sharing and state formation could pose significant challenges to national reconciliation. Moreover, the process could be complicated further by the growing political competition within the government — particularly from the military and the ethnic Bamar community, as the entire spectrum of the country's political forces are gearing up for a general election in 2015.
Ethnic insurgent groups' near-term objectives are greater regional autonomy in ethnic areas, equal resource sharing in economic development along the border and a shift away from the Bamar-centric defense system and toward a federal army integrating ethnic armed forces under a decentralized military structure in the ethnic regions. More ambitiously, the ethnic forces also renewed their demand that the country transform into a federalist system that recognizes the economic rights and political power of ethnic groups other than the Bamar.
To this end, ethnic groups are seeking to amend the current constitution, drafted by the military in 2008, which ethnic forces often blame for reinforcing the military's role in the political structure. The constitution mandates that all armed forces fall under the command of the central government's defense services. At the same time, ethnic groups are demanding more local power to nominate and appoint officials, gain exclusive legislative power for ethnic states and even to develop their own constitution within the framework of the Union Constitution of Myanmar.
Still, many of these demands seem antithetical to the government's decadeslong effort toward centralized state-building and beyond the capability of its nascent transition, at least in the eyes of the Bamar-centric political elites. There is the remaining concern that political autonomy and a decentralized command structure under a federalist institution could make it easier for ethnic forces to attempt to secede, thereby threatening the power of a Bamar-led regime and national integrity. This worry exists even though most ethnic groups have dropped their demands for independence. In a preliminary recommendation released Jan. 31, the Constitutional Review Joint Committee rejected an amendment to create a federal army in line with the ethnic groups' demands. However, failing to accommodate those demands risks undermining the national reconciliation process. Given the extreme sensitivity of these issues, Myanmar's political leaders must make a concerted effort to bridge the division with ethnic forces as it begins the constitutional amendment process while weighing the multiple security threats and challenges to its grip on power.
Meanwhile, the national election in 2015 is exposing the divergent interests of political players who are willing to use the national reconciliation and constitutional amendment processes as political capital. These players include the government led by Thein Sein, the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party controlled by parliamentary head Thura Shwe Mann, the military commanded by Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and the democratic opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi.
Each of these groups is maneuvering to win seats in the Bamar-dominated parliament. Serious disagreements have already surfaced among these political rivals regarding the cease-fire. As constitutional amendments begin redefining the state's power, including a controversial provision on the military's power and restrictions on Aung San Suu Kyi participating in the election, political competition is likely to intensify.
Most critically, any attempt to reach a cease-fire and amend the constitution would require the consent of the military. Notably, the military has made it clear that it will not tolerate any attempts to marginalize its role in the reform process. The military has also continued to harass and attack ethnic minority insurgents despite the civilian government's moves toward peace. This suggests that elements within the military command structure are adhering to the military's former role in the country — a force to deter ethnic separatism.
This could remind the post-transition government that its policy of accommodation toward ethnic minority groups could come at a risk to national security and the military's role. The military's absence in negotiations and recent statements from Min Aung Hlaing that his troops are "afraid of no one" have raised questions about enforcement of the cease-fire agreement once it is signed.
Myanmar's post-transition moves to strike peace deals with ethnic insurgents are tenuous and fraught with difficulties due to the nation's fractured geography, the internal military-civilian divide and the sheer diversity of ethnic interests. In this regard, despite high optimism, the military junta's failed attempts to strike lasting deals in the 1990s could repeat themselves even after new agreements are reached.
- Part 1: Myanmar Confronts its Geography
- Part 2: Myanmar's Quest for Unity Faces Challenges
- Part 3: Myanmar: Emerging with a Wary Eye
- Part 4: Myanmar Pushes for Control Over its Restive Border Regions
