Egypt and Iran's geopolitical interests have been incompatible for most of the last five decades. Long before Sunni versus Shiite rhetoric accounted for the divergence, the two states' secular regimes competed for influence in the Persian Gulf's littoral states and on the Arabian Peninsula. Iran saw this area as falling within its traditional sphere of influence and viewed Egyptian involvement there with hostility. Iran especially objected to Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1962 deployment of thousands of troops to support republican rebels in southern Yemen. Nasser's anti-Western position and his relationship with the Soviets also conflicted with the Shah's close alliance with the United States.
Nasser's death in 1970 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 shifted the countries' geopolitics. The changes, however, only added to the discord between Iran and Egypt. The new Islamist republic founded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini opposed new Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Cairo meanwhile offered sanctuary to the exiled Shah, who lived there until his death. Egypt later backed Iraq during Baghdad's bloody eight-year war with Iran.
After Arab Uprisings, An Opening for Iran
Iran's reach within Sunni Arab-controlled countries is in general limited by ethno-sectarian and historical differences. Iran had an ally in Hamas, but Tehran's influence with the Palestinian Islamist group has declined since Hamas split with the regime in Damascus after the Arab unrest. Some Arab opposition groups also distanced themselves from Iran because the upheavals across the Middle East created new opportunities for them.
The Arab uprisings, however, created a distinct opportunity in Egypt. The change of leadership in Cairo and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood mean that Egypt might be open to changes in its foreign policy as well. This could provide an opening for Tehran, since the Muslim Brotherhood will have a different political agenda and different political constraints than the former regime. This is more of a long-term possibility, however, since Egypt's military council will continue to control foreign policy for now.
Iran has moved quickly to take advantage of the opportunity. For example, only weeks after Mubarak's removal from the presidency, Tehran asked for and received permission from Cairo to move two warships through the Suez Canal. Since then, various senior Iranian officials have engaged in outreach to Egypt. These efforts have involved prominent Egyptians including the leader of the country's highest institute for religious learning, Al-Azhar, and the newly elected president. Ahmadinejad first invited Morsi in early July to attend the Non-Aligned Movement summit. His aide's visit is a follow-up to that invitation.
Iran has two main motives for so publicly pursuing renewed ties with Egypt. First, it views the so-called Arab Spring as a historic opportunity to improve relations with one of the Arab world's largest and most important states. Iran had long sought a way to re-establish ties with Egypt, but Mubarak's government always rebuffed its overtures. Second, it sees better ties with Egypt as a way to counter opposition from Arab countries closer to its borders, namely, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council states.
Gulf State Fears
The recent Iranian initiatives have raised concerns in Riyadh and across the Gulf states, which remain deeply fearful of Muslim Brotherhood influence in the Arabian Peninsula.
Apprehensions are growing in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and other Gulf Cooperation Council capitals that the Muslim Brotherhood's rise in Egypt will trigger a regional rise of Muslim Brotherhood-type Islamist groups. They fear that the Muslim Brotherhood's prestige and influence and its ties with opposition groups in the Gulf states will result in challenges to the Gulf regimes' Islamic credentials and legitimacy. The Muslim Brotherhood's version of Islamism also stands in stark contrast to the Wahhabi strain of Islam dominant in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.
Recently, the United Arab Emirates has had strong public disagreements with Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian religious scholar living in Qatar. Al-Qaradawi is a strong proponent of the Muslim Brotherhood and one of the most influential Sunni theologians and jurists in the Islamic world. The United Arab Emirates also reportedly has expelled or refused to renew the visas of expatriates with suspected ties to the Islamist movement. Meanwhile, Kuwait's Muslim Brotherhood, known locally as Hadas, has steadily gained seats in parliament in recent years. It has aligned with other Islamist groupings opposed to the government. In nearby Jordan, the Islamic Action Front, a political arm of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, has boycotted polls for years and has formed an alliance with other opposition groups to force the government to revise recently drafted electoral laws.
Iran is playing on these fears while seeking opportunities to counter the Gulf Cooperation Council's sway in the region. To do so, Iran wants to form relationships with other Arab states outside its traditional ally, Syria, which is embroiled in conflict. Along with Iran's invitation to Egypt, Ahmadinejad has dispatched envoys to Algeria, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates with invitations for the August summit. He has also extended an invitation to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who will visit Iran for the first time. The Non-Aligned Movement summit provides an excellent opportunity to demonstrate that Iran is not isolated and is in fact building bridges to other Middle Eastern states. Notably, Iran is not expected to invite Saudi Arabia.
Egypt's Balancing Act
In a bid to reassure Riyadh and other Gulf Cooperation Council states regarding Egypt's intentions, Morsi reiterated Egypt's support for Gulf Cooperation Council security — in an interview with the Saudi newspaper Okaz — just prior to his visit to Saudi Arabia last week. Morsi also chose Saudi Arabia as the destination for his first official visit. This may have mollified Riyadh.
Cairo, with its new Islamist president, Morsi, will continue to balance any opening with Iran against the need to maintain a working relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Egypt is in no rush to normalize ties with Iran, but it does not want to completely reject the opportunity. A gradual opening of ties with Iran would give cash-strapped Egypt leverage in its relationship with the wealthy Gulf Cooperation Council states while allowing Cairo to maintain the appearance of being a regional power.
Though Egypt will remain focused internally for the short term, Cairo will nonetheless use Iran's overtures to demonstrate its regional importance. Egypt traditionally claimed the mantle of leader of the Arab world. But it has lost influence over the last few decades to its much richer and now more influential rival, Saudi Arabia. No other Arab or Middle Eastern state at the moment can compete with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council states when it comes to liquidity. This has placed Egypt — which desperately needs infusions of cash to help its economy recover in the aftermath of the last year's turmoil — in a position of needing to court the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Counterbalancing Saudi Arabia's overwhelming influence would be a key benefit of normalizing ties with Iran. Egypt might also regain some of its influence should Saudi Arabia fall victim to the same kind of unrest that hit Egypt in 2011. (While this remains unlikely at present, the prospect still worries Riyadh, which will remain especially wary of Muslim Brotherhood influence in the Arabian Peninsula.)
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council will watch closely to see how the opening of ties between Iran and Egypt plays out. The question remains how far Egypt will go in balancing its Persian Gulf neighbors against each other. Cairo could agree not to expand relations with Iran in exchange for more budgetary support from Saudi Arabia, for example. Morsi's choice of whether to attend the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran, after he paid tribute to Saudi Arabia, will be significant. If several other high-profile Arab leaders attend, Egypt will have a stronger rationale for going.
Cairo has some domestic concerns over Shiite influence in Egypt and over recent allegations of Iranian spying — concerns that Morsi would need to address before opening up to Iran. Even so, Cairo can and likely will incrementally expand economic and trade links — albeit in areas not affected by sanctions — and will slowly strengthen diplomatic ties with Iran.
