From the middle of the 20th century, Greek politics have been controlled by only a few powerful families, specifically the Papandreous and the Karamanlis. Since the end of the country's military dictatorship in the 1970s, these families have kept their hold on power by creating Greece's two traditionally dominant parties: the center-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), founded by the Papandreous, and the center-right New Democracy (ND), founded by the Karamanlis.
Andreas Papandreou, son of former three-time Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou, formed PASOK in the early 1970s. Andreas served as prime minister twice in the 1980s and 1990s, and his son, George, held the premiership from 2009 until political turbulence led to his November 2011 resignation. The ND was founded in the early 1970s by Konstantinos Karamanlis, who had served as prime minister three times before founding the party and afterward served another term as prime minister and two terms as president. His nephew, Kostas, was prime minister for two consecutive terms from 2004 to 2009. Together, PASOK and ND have historically received more than 80 percent of votes in parliamentary elections; as a result, they have rarely needed to form coalition governments with smaller parties.
However, the economic, social and political crisis in Greece poses a serious threat to this political establishment, exemplified by recent polls that show PASOK around 18 percent and ND around 22 percent. Thus, for the first time in Greece's post-junta history, a group of small, anti-establishment parties could defy the traditional Greek leadership and customary privileges. As many as 10 parties could exceed the 3 percent of votes necessary to get into Parliament, including the far-right Golden Dawn party and the far-left Stalinist Communist Party and Coalition of the Radical Left, the latter two of which are vying for third place in the elections, riding popular support of their anti-austerity rhetoric. While these parties will not be strong enough to form a coalition on their own, they will be a disrupting force in the Greek Parliament.
The mainstream parties see the elections as a key battle for their traditional control of Greek politics. In an attempt to keep power, these parties have implemented a new electoral law for this election cycle that gives an additional 50 parliamentary seats to any party or coalition that secures at least 39 percent of the vote. However, given the low polling numbers of PASOK and ND, it still may not be enough to form a single-party government.
The most likely post-election scenario is a PASOK-ND alliance. If this alliance fails, the two parties may individually look to form a coalition government with one or more parties outside the traditional power system. The outcome of such an alliance would be a fragile government in constant risk of collapse.
No matter which of these scenarios is realized, the results will be similar: The new Greek government will be weak and fragile. Any coalition that reaches the government will be the result of uncomfortable political alliances and will face a hostile opposition.
In addition, the new government will have to deal both with Greek voters who are strongly against austerity measures implemented by previous administrations and with the fact that the EU bailouts, which the austerity measures made possible, are keeping the country afloat. Thus the new Greek government may attempt to soften its budgetary targets to appease its voters while implementing just enough economic reforms to appease the EU leadership. It likely will approve the recent fiscal compact treaty and announce some reforms, but in general terms, the push for austerity will be slowed down — especially when the economy is expected to contract by 5 percent in 2012.
Greece's traditionally powerful parties already are attempting to deal with this new political reality. During the campaign, ND leader Antonis Samaras, whose party supported the austerity measures that Greece undertook in return for its bailouts, pledged less taxation and more social spending and growth policies. However, no matter what form the new Greek government takes, it will be driven by the need to balance opposing pressure from voters and from Brussels.
