Negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan have largely been over oil, both in the demarcation of border points between the countries and in how to split the revenue from extracted crude. A proposed change to the CPA following South Sudan's independence was to move from even distribution of sold oil revenue to a per-barrel transit fee that would theoretically equitably reflect each side's respective assets. However, the amount of this fee is the subject of strong dispute; South Sudan is asking for $1 per barrel, which is in line with global market standards but excludes the north's role in refining and allowing port access, and Sudan is demanding $37 per barrel to compensate for lost oil revenue.
Negotiations deadlocked last November when Sudan began seizing South Sudanese oil at Port Sudan in lieu of unpaid transit fees. South Sudan reacted Jan. 22 by ordering a full shutdown of its oil production and disconnecting its oil fields from Sudanese export pipelines.
Tensions have been building since then, and armed clashes have broken out, with the SAF fighting against not only Juba-backed rebels (whom they have historically had problems in expelling from the north) but also with the SPLA. The latest fighting has occurred less than 30 kilometers (19 miles) from the border, near oil blocks operated by the Greater Nile Petroleum (3 and 7) and PetroDar (1, 2 and 4) oil consortium companies, which represent about 80 percent of the region's oil production. If Sudan were to fully capture and hold either set of blocks, or part of both, it could increase its physical control of regional oil production to 60 percent.
Sudan's Strategy and Constraints
To increase its negotiating position in CPA talks, Sudan must capture some arrangement of these oil fields by expelling rebels, holding the territory and, most critically, showing it can continue production and exports by protecting its pipeline infrastructure from pro-Juba rebels. The largest concentrations of these two oil consortiums' blocks are the key oil field chains Heglig and Palouge, which span the border.
Sudan's main positions from which to advance on these oil fields are its two military bases in South Kordofan state, Kadugli and Talodi. Officially, these bases hold a combined 40,000 troops, though Small Arms Survey and South Sudan claim these forces are closer to 50,000-70,000. Additionally, Sudan can draw on police forces from cities near conflict sites. The police only number a few hundred and have less training than the military, but they are better armed and trained than regional militias and can help the military with valuable logistics, such as control of road access.
These forces are superior in number to those aligned with South Sudan. The south's primary counter to Sudan's advance is an estimated 10,000-15,000 rebels led by the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), a combination of three rebel groups: the Darfur-based Justice and Equality Movement; former SPLA commanders still within Sudanese territory under the flag of SPLA-North; and two factions of the Sudanese Liberation Movement. The SPLA's official forward positions are in Malakal, Upper Nile state and Bentiu, Unity state, with an estimated 5,000 troops each.
The SPLA remains heavily dependent on southern-affiliated rebels, and Juba has made arming the SRF a priority. These forces are currently known to hold positions just north of Heglig, and an estimated 8,000 troops are near Lake Abyad/Jau. However, Khartoum has made efforts to constrain these rebels' supply lines by arming anti-southern militant groups in the region, resulting in an increasingly weakening resistance.
Foreign Actors
Third-party stakeholders in Sudanese oil — particularly China, which buys 65 percent of the countries' crude exports — have attempted to mediate the dispute with the goal of restoring production to pre-conflict levels. Sudan's seizure of oil fields in Upper Nile state in February is a case in point. After Sudan unilaterally seized these fields, PetroDar (a consortium that includes China's CNPC and Sinopec, Malaysia's Petronas and Kuwait's Al Kharafi) publicly recognized Sudan's control over assets and allowed it to resume oil production in two seized fields.
If Khartoum can replicate that model in the Heglig oil fields and present itself as the guarantor of oil flow, it could draw more foreign backers to its side. However, while it has been making gains and the South Sudanese resistance has been weakening, it is still currently unclear if Sudan will be able to do this, and these stakeholders have thus eschewed choosing a side. Nevertheless, each of these foreign players will be watching carefully to assess whether Sudan will be able to use its military advantage to effect political resolution and further their commercial interests.
