Chinese state-owned news agency Xinhua on Sept. 8 condemned what it said were false accusations against the Chinese government by "international forces" attempting to freeze it out of reconstruction efforts in Libya. Xinhua's statement comes after the Chinese Foreign Ministry on Sept. 6 confirmed a Globe and Mail report released the previous day claiming that envoys of former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi had traveled to Beijing in July to meet with representatives from Chinese state-controlled weapons manufacturing companies (though it said the talks did not result in any deals or deliveries and said that the envoys had arranged to meet with the arms makers without permission from Beijing). It also comes after recent statements by Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, interim chairman of Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC), accusing China of obstructing the release of some of Libya's frozen assets. This has exacerbated the distrust between Beijing and the NTC, borne out of the latter's suspicion that China favored the Gadhafi regime during the war. The roots of this lie in Beijing's stated, longstanding policy of noninterference in other countries' internal affairs: China abstained from voting in March on the U.N. Security Council resolution to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, later publicly condemning the Western military intervention, and it remains the only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council not to recognize the NTC. Beijing's interests in Libya are relatively small; its relations with the former regime of Gadhafi were never close, and it owns no producing Libyan oil fields. However, it receives 3.5 percent of its total crude imports from Libya, and it has invested an estimated $20 billion in the country, mostly through state-owned enterprises. China is looking to improve relations with the NTC, both to see a return on those investments and to use its wealth to carve out a place in cash-poor post-Gadhafi Libya. However, several NTC officials have warned that the council may freeze out countries that did not support the rebellion. The fact that several elements within the NTC are displaying hostility to China and the other countries that did not fully support the rebels during the war suggests the NTC's willingness to use this perceived non-support in any future deals, meaning China's goals in Libya may not be easily achievable. It also reflects Beijing's uneasiness with its noninterference policy, especially in light of the rapidly changing situations in Libya and the Arab world.

China's Noninterference Policy

Noninterference has been a key part of China's foreign policy doctrine since the country's founding. Ostensibly based on respect for sovereignty, it calls for "peaceful resolution" in almost all cases and objects to outside intervention — particularly Western military actions. The Chinese government hoped the policy would reduce international pressure on the country, allowing it to focus on domestic growth. Moreover, it hoped to distinguish itself from other powers, particularly the United States, creating greater diplomatic maneuvering space — especially with non-Western countries. This is not to say that China stayed neutral in conflicts over the years, as evidenced by Beijing's support of dictatorships and non-Western-affiliated countries. However, the Libya situation has demonstrated a gradual shift in China's diplomatic policy. As Gadhafi's regime began to falter and the country descended into civil war, Beijing began making contact with both sides of the conflict. In May, it sent 50 million yuan ($7.6 million) in aid and supplies to the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, and in June, the Gadhafi government's then-foreign minister, Abdelati al-Obeidi, met with his Chinese counterpart in Beijing. This visit was followed by a similar visit from NTC representative Mahmoud Jibril later in the month, along with statements from the Foreign Ministry describing the opposition as "an important political power in Libya."

China's Evolving Interests

However, with China's rapid economic growth and soaring energy demand, China's interests are swiftly expanding around the world, which means securing energy and political interests in a given country is no longer as easy as it once was. Adding to this is Beijing's encouragement of state-owned or private companies to expand into overseas markets. Combined with a growing list of international players with similar interests, this means that Chinese involvement in conflicts such as the one in Libya require more flexible diplomatic efforts and more financial involvement, not to mention the risk of failure. In this context, the noninterference policy that originally aimed to reduce China's global involvement and responsibility has translated into a reactive foreign policy that has negatively affected China's ability to pursue its interests. Moreover, calls from the outside world for China to assume more responsibility and be proactive on the international stage have also been intense. Beijing's approach to the Southern Sudanese secession process has demonstrated its gradual adjustment of its noninterference stance. China owns about 40 percent of the oil rights in Sudan and South Sudan and accounts for about 60 percent of their oil exports. Beijing has long maintained relations with Khartoum, to the resentment of the south, which holds most of Sudan's oil reserves. The country's split has forced China to consider how to keep relations with both sides while preventing the entrance of Western countries that could undermine its interests. In fact, beginning in 2005, China established contact with South Sudan with a series of high-level visits while simultaneously becoming actively involved diplomatically between Juba and Khartoum, providing financial assistance to both sides and engaging in extensive infrastructure projects in an attempt to improve relations. Unlike Sudan, the rapidly unfolding situation in Libya has proved that China's noninterference policy can also be risky for Beijing's interests. As consequences from the Arab Spring continue to unfold, similar dilemmas could appear in other Middle Eastern and North African countries, where China has more investments and greater energy dependence — mostly in politically unstable countries. As China grows in international influence and demand for a greater global responsibility rises, it will continue to weigh the risks of a more proactive foreign policy with those of noninterference.