A total of nine people, including the attackers, have died as a result of an April 5 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan. No Americans were killed, but according to the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, three of those killed were local security personnel protecting the consulate. Media reports indicate that only four militants died in the attacks, but STRATFOR sources familiar with the incident say six died; eight to 10 were involved altogether. It is unclear what happened to the other militants, but reports indicate that some could have escaped after the attack. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the approximately 20-minute attack, which used two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) that targeted the main vehicle checkpoint leading into the consular compound. It appears the attackers intended to breach the checkpoint with the first IED and drive the second device up to the front of the consulate before detonating it, presumably to breach the building's exterior and allow gunmen to enter. Allegedly, the purpose of the attack was to storm the consulate and take U.S. diplomats hostage in retaliation for U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle strikes against militant targets. This objective was not met. The first VBIED failed to breach the front vehicle entry, as did the second, although it did damage the perimeter walls and military barracks located along the edge of the compound. The main diplomatic building remained untouched. The low death toll likely can be attributed to the fact that only the last blast was able to penetrate the outer perimeter, and it occurred approximately 10 minutes after the attack began. Ten minutes is a long time to scramble security response teams and move employees to safety, and such a time lapse eliminates the element of surprise. In fact, the attack took so long to develop that local media were able to arrive on the scene and capture the second explosion on video. U.S. diplomatic missions are extremely hard targets, with multiple concentric rings of security. The U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, a city frequently targeted by the TTP, is no exception. Simply gaining access to the street on which the consulate is located requires passing through Pakistani military checkpoints. The main diplomatic compound is behind both a wall and a series of less-strategic buildings positioned in a way that would limit the damage inflicted upon the mission in attacks such as the one on April 5. The militants struck with a surprising amount of firepower. Two VBIEDs and — judging by how close the militants got to the consulate — eight to 10 well-armed, well-trained and disciplined operatives are a lot of resources for the TTP to devote to a single mission. The TTP currently is battling the Pakistani state as the military continues its operations targeting their strongholds in the northwest Pakistani tribal belt, so the group has been put on the defensive. Large-scale attacks against hardened targets have dropped drastically so far in 2010, compared to the near-weekly suicide attacks in late 2009 that targeted, for example, the Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) offices in Lahore and U.N. offices in Islamabad — in other words, cities located in Pakistan's core. Despite the complexity of the attack, the militants were unable to inflict much damage. By comparison, a lone suicide bomber — using far fewer resources — attacked a political gathering in Lower Dir district in the North-West Frontier Province a few hours before the attack on the consulate and killed 40. Neither the VBIED nor the attackers were able to break through the delta barriers protecting the entrance to the consulate. However, due to its size, the second VBIED did damage buildings inside the compound — a feat not achieved in a handful of other recent attacks against U.S. diplomatic missions in Sanaa, Yemen; Istanbul; and Karachi, Pakistan. The April 5 attack forced the consulate to temporarily relocate its staff members to the embassy in Islamabad — likely because the breaches in the perimeter wall rendered the compound in Peshawar insecure and because it is standard practice to move non-essential staff to a secure compound to let them recover from the shock of an attack. The TTP could see the attack as a success, then, since it forced the U.S. presence out of the city (at least temporarily) without causing massive casualties among the local population. If this is the beginning of a new TTP campaign, follow-up attacks likely could shift to softer targets such as the ISI, the police or the military — or very soft targets such as hotels, markets or transportation, all of which have been frequent targets in the past.