The Associated Press reported on Tuesday that differences have surfaced between the U.S. and the Iraqi governments on how to deal with radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr. While Shiite-dominated Baghdad had assumed a far tougher attitude toward al-Sadr — wanting to eliminate him as a political force altogether — Washington is seeking to accommodate al-Sadr in the political process. Meanwhile, as the Americans and the Iraqis try to figure out what to do with al-Sadr, the Iranians have their own set of problems with his movement. Iran enjoys a significant amount of influence over al-Sadr, giving the country the ability to rein him in, especially on several recent occasions. But the relationship between Iran and the maverick cleric-to-be is both complex and problematic. While the Iranians are providing al-Sadr with the opportunity to establish his clerical credentials by allowing him to pursue his studies in their seminary city of Qom, they also have used punitive tools to keep him in line. One tool includes a homicide case filed in an Iranian court against al-Sadr by the family of Ayatollah Abdul-Majid al-Khoei, an assassinated Iraqi Shiite cleric, according to an April 10 report in the U.K.-based Saudi news Web site Elaph. Al-Khoei was gunned down by unidentified assailants in An Najaf in April 2003 when he returned from exile in London following the toppling of the Baathist regime. The homicide victim was the son of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Abul-Qassim al-Khoei, an internationally renowned Iraqi Shiite cleric and the mentor of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Initially, the cleric's family filed a case with Iraqi authorities blaming al-Sadr along with 27 others for the killing. Although a judge issued an arrest warrant for al-Sadr, it was never executed. Overall, U.S. and Iraqi authorities did not pursue the matter. They decided to back off, given the power of his Mehdi Army militia and Iraq's unstable political situation. Frustrated with the situation, al-Khoei's family decided to take the matter to the Iranians. The case was brought to the attention of a special court established by the Islamic Republic founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini that is designed to prosecute clerics who violate the law. It seems the case has stalled there. Although it has not been pursued, it also has not been dismissed. Given certain jurisdictional issues, the Iranians cannot technically prosecute al-Sadr since he is neither an Iranian national nor a cleric. Furthermore, al-Khoei's family members are ideological rivals of the Iranians. In fact, Tehran views them as U.S. lackeys and has reveled in seeing them suffer setbacks. However, the lingering case still provides the Iranians with a handy method of keeping al-Sadr in check and managing his ability to upset their plans for Iraq. There are limits to the Iranians' power to intimidate al-Sadr, given his large following among the Iraqi Shia. Iranians have no interest in jeopardizing the relationships they have spent the last five years cultivating with the al-Sadrites. But that does not diminish the strong opposition many Iranians feel toward al-Sadr. Tehran has long viewed al-Sadr as a political wild card who can never be completely tamed. Recently, his willfulness was demonstrated in a March 29 interview with Al Jazeera in which he recalled a meeting with Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. "I told him that we share the same ideology, but that politically and militarily, I would not be an extension of Iran, and that there were negative things that Iran was doing in Iraq," al-Sadr reportedly said in the interview. "I mentioned to him a few things that Iran needs to rectify with regard to Iraq. Iran committed mistakes that it should not have made." Whether al-Sadr actually said this to Khamenei matters little, but the claims — made on an international television station — have still caused a significant stir within Iran. In fact, many senior Iranian officials have publicly criticized al-Sadr. Those critics include Tehran Mayor Mohammed Baqer Ghalibaf, who is seen as the main challenger to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in next year's presidential election. Another powerful critic includes Mohsen Rezai, secretary of the Expediency Council and the former head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This situation is being watched closely by Saudi Arabia, which is eager to counter an emerging Iran by exploiting intra-Shia rifts. This position could explain why news of the impending court case was reported by a Saudi media group while it has received little publicity elsewhere. The Saudis realize that problems between Iran and Iraqi Shia hamper Iran's ability to threaten their national security. Therein lies al-Sadr's ability to serve as a potential arrestor to Iranian ambitions in Iraq and the region. The Saudis are not the only ones happy to see the wrangling between al-Sadr and Iran. The United States, engaged in multiple complex dealings with Iraqi factions to block Iran's path toward regional dominance, also would like to see as many obstacles in Iran's path as possible. While it continues to create a bulwark among Iraq’s Sunnis, Washington can certainly benefit from a Shiite thorn in Iran's side, and recent comments from top U.S. officials have almost rallied behind al-Sadr. In fact, last week al-Sadr was described as "a significant political figure," by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who added that the United States wants the Shiite leader to work within the political process. Additionally Gen. David Petraeus, top U.S. commander in Iraq, called the al-Sadrite movement a major force that should be accommodated to varying degrees. Politicking aside, it is unlikely that Washington can align with al-Sadr, given his radical Islamist ideology and anti-occupation nationalist stance. That doesn't mean that a mutual understanding couldn't develop. Whether that happens remains to be seen. However, what is clear is that al-Sadr is proving to be a problem for Iran and his influence could play a key role in preventing the Iranians from dominating Iraq in the long run.