Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak called for a United Nations-sponsored international conference on terrorism Oct. 11 after a meeting with Italian President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi. Mubarak said the purposes of the conference would be to analyze the underlying causes of terrorism through an "integrated approach" involving the international community, and to aid the understanding of the distinction between "the efforts of people seeking their legitimate rights and attempts by a few deviant elements to impose their violent views on the world." In the meantime, both Egyptian and Israeli security and intelligence continue to investigate the four explosions which hit three separate tourist resorts in Sinai Peninsula, killing some 30 people and injuring more than 100. That this was the first such attack in Egypt after seven years of virtual silence from jihadists — and that three separate jihadist outfits claimed responsibility for it — suggests that this is the work of local/regional jihadist operators commissioned by al Qaeda but who might morph into al Qaeda's competitors. This factionalization of jihadism could lead to competition among various organizational structures over the common pool of human and material resources, not to mention their ideological and methodological differences. The Sinai bombings remain murky, especially in terms of who is behind them and how were they pulled off. The claims of responsibility only add to the mystery. Gama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Alamiyah (World Islamic Group) was the first one to claim responsibility within hours of the attack. This was followed by two other groups — Islamic Tawhid Brigades and Brigades of the Martyr Abdallah Azzam claiming — the attacks on the following day. The third group also claimed that it was part of al Qaeda. Essentially, we have two possibilities: Jamaat al-Tawhid and Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad), led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi may be behind the attack in Egypt, given the involvement of Jordanian Bedouin elements who have reportedly provided the material for the explosives; or al Qaeda itself sponsored the attack or commissioned it to local jihadist operators loosely affiliated to the jihadist network. The first scenario is the least likely. First, al-Zarqawi would have issued a statement claiming responsibility, as his organization has usually been quick to claim terrorist attacks in the past. Moreover, it is difficult for his group to be able to sustain operations in Iraq while staging attacks in the broader Middle East — especially in Egypt, which has traditionally been the home of many al Qaeda rank and file. Also, investigators reportedly think at least one female suicide bomber was involved in the bombings. Given al-Zarqawi's traditional Wahhabist thinking, it is unlikely that his group would employ women. So it seems there is an al Qaeda hand in the attacks. This does not mean that this operation was micromanaged by al Qaeda prime; it was likely pulled off by an al Qaeda-inspired or al Qaeda-sponsored cell. Most likely, when planning such an attack, al Qaeda dispatches a liaison to the area where the operation is intended. This individual — who has leadership skills, is ideologically well-versed, is aware of potential sources of funding and who is a veteran of training facilities and possesses technical and/or combat skills — then makes use of local people on the ground to stage an attack. The liaison for Egypt may have been transferred from another area and not necessarily from Pakistan, where the apex of al Qaeda leadership is believed to be hiding. This is, perhaps, the manner in which the jihadist network seeks to generate an image of the transnational proliferation of the jihadist movement. STRATFOR has argued that the objective behind all al Qaeda attacks is to effect the rising of the masses. Having failed at doing so, the emergence of mostly independent cells or small groups engaged in staging attacks in different countries can be an alternative to the original goal and a means of maintaining relevance. In essence, the attacks in Egypt follow the general pattern of al Qaeda's operations that have come to the surface since the destruction of the network's headquarters in Afghanistan. So, the question is whether this approach is sustainable for the premier jihadist movement. Can it face a serious competition from regional actors such as al-Zarqawi — who might be trying to position himself and his group as the new and real leaders of the jihadist cause — and/or can the commissioned local cells move on to assume a more independent stature? It is difficult to assess the sustainability, but al Qaeda's approach will have to do for now. Both Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have sufficient political and religious capital — they do not fear competition. Furthermore, they hold the key to connect the various nodes in the network, having directly or indirectly trained many of the jihadists out there. Also, from their point of view, as long as there is activity in multiple areas, they can maintain the image of a global movement. They do not have to be in charge, per se and they do not have to be in Iraq to be able to make it work for them. Reliance on local affiliates can, in the short-term, give the perception that the jihadist network is proliferating; however, over time, it has the potential to create problems for al Qaeda, making it more difficult to sustain itself and avoid competition.